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The Law and Political Economy of a Student
Debt Jubilee
LUKE HERRINE†
ABSTRACT
The notion of a student debt jubilee has begun its march from the
margin of policy debates to the center, yet scholarly debate on the
value of canceling student debt is negligible. This article attempts
to jump start such debate in part by presenting a novel policy
proposal for implementing a jubilee. In addition to reviewing the
history of student debt and the arguments for canceling much or all
of it, it presents a detailed legal argument that canceling public
student debt (which accounts for 95% of student debt outstanding)
could be undertaken by the Executive Branch without further
legislation. The Secretary of Education has already been given the
authority to “modify” and to “compromise, waive, or release” its
claims against students. There is a strong argument under current
case law that this authority is a grant of prosecutorial discretion,
which would be unreviewable by courts. Even if a court were to rule
otherwise, at least some cancellation plans would likely survive
“arbitrary and capricious” review. In any case, this litigation risk is
not a good enough reason for a President not to try to relieve the
burdens of student debt if Congress cannot agree on a bill that will
do so.
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INTRODUCTION
A student debt jubilee is an idea whose time is coming.
Only a few years ago, talk about canceling student debt was
confined to the radical fringes. Today there are two
competing bills that would cancel different amounts of
student debt bouncing around the Senate, both introduced
by prominent progressive politicians during their runs for
President. Things are moving so fast that between the time
this Article was accepted for publication and was actually
published, its proposal to cancel student debt via Executive
Action was adopted by one of these candidates as part of her
platform. The rapidly unfolding COVID-19 crisis seems only
to have accelerated the mainstreaming of the idea. Even
centrist Democrats are now getting behind the idea of
canceling $10,000 of student debt as part of a relief package.
The non-Progressive presumptive Democratic nominee has
committed to at least some student debt cancellation.1
Meanwhile, scholarly work on student debt cancellation
remains thin to nonexistent. This Article begins to fill the
gap. It discusses why such a jubilee would be desirable and
how it might be implemented. After reviewing the history of
student debt and the arguments for cancellation, the last
section of the Article presents the possibility that a
substantial amount of public student debt cancellation could
be undertaken without further legislation. The Secretary of
Education has already been given the authority to “modify”
or “compromise, waive, or release” its claims against
students. Under current law, at least some uses of these
authorities would be treated as an exercise of “prosecutorial
discretion,” which are unreviewable by courts (apart from
Constitutional challenges). Although a court might be
inclined to narrow the authority, current law provides ample

1. Joe Biden, Joe Biden Outlines New Steps to Ease Economic Burden on
Working People, MEDIUM (Apr. 9, 2020), https://medium.com/@JoeBiden/joebiden-outlines-new-steps-to-ease-economic-burden-on-working-people-e3e12103
7322.
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room for maneuver and, in any case, the risk of having debt
cancellation reversed by an increasingly unpopular judiciary
is worth taking.
Part of the reason that student debt cancellation has
long been excluded from mainstream policy debates, is that
the common wisdom is that student debt is mostly harmless.
The logic goes that higher education is a high-yield
investment in individual productivity and wage-earning
potential, so high-yield that the cost of borrowing to fund this
investment is well worth it. Part I of this Article traces how
this way of thinking about student debt came to be. Student
debt was originally a compromise device to fill in small gaps
in public subsidy while avoiding charged political debates. At
the beginning of the postwar period, using federal spending
to universalize public higher education was not far from
enactment. Southern segregationist concerns about federal
usurpation of state power, Catholic concerns about
undermining parochial education, and a widespread
assumption that one could work one’s way through college
without much of a problem (and that doing so was virtuous)
presented the main obstacles. Having the federal
government subsidize students rather than institutions
avoided some of these obstacles, and having it do so through
lending rather than grants avoided others. Encouraging
banks to lend by guaranteeing their return used an
accounting trick to avoid concerns about an expanding
federal budget in the guns-and-butter 1960s.
For the first decade after the Higher Education Act first
created a permanent student loan program, federal grants
for low-income students managed to hold back the growth of
the industry, reserving it primarily as a supplement for
middle class students. But college costs continued to rise and
political support for public subsidy waned. Student loans
were always there as a compromise to fill in the gap.
Meanwhile, the student loan industry came into its own as a
lobbying force, and the idea of “democratizing credit” took on
its own momentum. Student debt truly began to grow in the
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1990s. It was then that for-profit colleges consolidated into
big businesses designed to suck in as much federal student
aid as possible, that Sallie Mae went private and began to
develop innovative techniques for expanding student
lending, and that state governments began cutting higher
education budgets in earnest. Students, colleges, and
policymakers all began to view higher education primarily as
an investment in future employability, as “human capital.”
Student debt came to seem a natural part of the lifecourse.
Unique among varieties of household debt, the growth of
student debt continued unabated through the 2008 crisis. It
has continued its growth since. Yet the financial crisis also
began to undermine the legitimacy of student debt and to
loosen the grip of the student debt industry on politicians.
Although some economists continue to insist that there is no
student debt crisis, the rapidly growing default rate, the
overwhelming evidence of systematic fraud at many forprofit colleges, the increasing evidence of student debt’s role
in deepening the racial wealth gap, and the undermining of
the “skills gap” theory of growing income inequality, among
other things, have made that an increasingly untenable
position. Organizing by student debtors themselves
combined with a dawning realization among politicians that
the misery caused by student debt could be harnessed for
political gain has pushed the possibility of canceling student
debt and restructuring the higher education system so it no
longer generates more of it into the mainstream.
Part II describes the burdens that student debt creates.
As debt is negative wealth, those who have it are necessarily
that much less wealthy. This wealth gap is felt most strongly
by those who already have little wealth to begin with (of
course, those with a good deal of wealth are unlikely to take
out debt). Student debt deepens the racial wealth gap as well
as the class divide. Student debt has also been shown to
increase anxiety and even to worsen health outcomes, while
preventing people from making major investments such as
buying a house or a car, or getting married or having kids.
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These effects channel through families and communities,
further deepening race and class divides. Even for the
relatively well off, taking on debt pushes people into more
lucrative but less socially valuable and less individually
rewarding work, furthering the ongoing “Meritocracy Trap”
by which the highly educated work themselves ragged as
facilitators of extraction.2 As well, the aggregate effect of
reduced ability to spend on anything but paying down debt
presses down demand. In our demand-driven economy, that
has the knock-on effect of lowering productivity and
employment—again, deepening class and racial divides.
Student debt also has knock-on social and political
effects. It changes the way individuals, institutions, and
policymakers think about the role of higher education in
society—making it appear to all as fundamentally an
investment in worker productivity, with a cost to be borne
primarily by individuals. The idea of education as a collective
good gets erased. And as more and more institutions—from
servicers to for-profit colleges to public universities—come to
be dependent on the student debt system, student debt
creates its own political inertia.
With these burdens in mind, Part III explores some
arguments for canceling student debt. The main argument is
that student debt creates unjustifiable burdens on
individuals while distorting our political and higher
education systems in unacceptable ways. There is no reason
to force individuals to take out debt to finance their own
educations that is not a better reason to make higher
education free for all while implementing a progressive
income (and wealth) tax. Canceling student debt would
remove this unjustified burden. It would also end the
pernicious influence that student debt has had on the
institutional structure of and public consciousness about
higher education. If done in combination with a program to
render public higher education free to all who want to access
2. DANIEL MARKOVITS, THE MERITOCRACY TRAP (2020).
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it, it would contribute to the reconstruction of higher
education in a formation more fitting for a democratic
society. Canceling student debt would also have major
positive effects on many peoples’ lives, including those whose
debts would be relieved, along with the debts of their friends,
family, and communities. That relief would have a
macroeconomic effect that would increase employment as
well as opening up fiscal space for more productive
investment.
After a brief review of current legislative proposals to
cancel student debt (sure to become rapidly out of date), Part
IV lays out the argument for a jubilee without further
Congressional action. The core argument is that the
Secretary
of
Education
has
absolute—that
is,
unreviewable—discretion to determine when not to enforce a
claim over which it has jurisdiction. In the leading case of
Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court declared that an
agency’s non-enforcement decision could only be reviewed if
a statute created “law to apply” of sufficient specificity to be
a “meaningful standard against which to judge [an] agency’s
exercise of discretion.”3 And the Higher Education Act
contains no such standard. Though recent case law has
complicated the Chaney test somewhat, the law as it stands
now is still solidly on the side of judicial deference.
The Department of Education’s prosecutorial discretion
only applies to loans over which it has a claim, so only public
loans (which now account for 95% of those outstanding) and
only those already in the books would qualify for such relief.
For Direct Loans, which account for approximately 80% of
public student loans, this is not a problem. For the FFELP
and Perkins Loans that remain outstanding, on the other
hand, the Department would have to use its powers
creatively to obtain possession. As well, the Department
would have to consult with the Department of Justice to
comply with its own regulations, the Office of Management
3. 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
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and Budget to dodge or eliminate the requirements of socalled “Administrative PAYGO,” and the Treasury to ensure
that the canceled debt is not taxed as income. Clearly, then,
the White House would have to initiate and guide the debt
cancellation program for it to be carried out effectively.
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I. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STUDENT DEBT
A. Federal Higher Education Policy Before the Higher
Education Act
Student loans have come to seem a natural part of the
U.S. higher education system, a right of passage for all but
the luckiest people who attend college. Until very recently,
all the debates about student loans among national
policymakers and the academics they listen to revolved
around how to make loans work more effectively as an
investment instrument. The idea that funding higher
education through student debt might be fundamentally
misguided—even inhumane—was hardly considered. There
is a deep irony here. None of the people who originally
designed the student debt system thought that student debt
should be a right of passage. Few of them even thought about
higher education as primarily an individual investment.
Rather, student debt was a compromise between competing
visions, most potently between those who sought to expand
higher education to all and those who wanted to limit access
to a privileged few. To fully see the problems with student
debt, it will be fruitful to explore how we got to the present
from these origins.
We must remember that before the National Defense
Education Act of 1958, student loans were almost unheard
of. At that time—and for many years after—banks were
reluctant to offer unsecuritized loans to pay for an education.
Indeed, in an era where commercial banks were highly
decentralized, when credit scores did not yet exist, let alone
follow everyone everywhere, and where there was plenty of
money to be made lending to businesses, banks were
reluctant to offer any unsecuritized loans for any nonbusiness expense.4 It was thought to be too risky (the debtor
4. See LOUIS HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA IN RED INK
69–88 (2011); Luke Herrine, Credit Reporting’s Vicious Cycles, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 305, 310–14 (2016) (on the history of credit reporting); Martha
Poon, Scorecards as Devices for Consumer Credit: The Case of Fair, Isaac &
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could just skip town!). When they were offered at all, student
loans were offered only at prohibitively high interest rates
after extensive background checks or as a loss-leading perk
for wealthy customers.5
When Congress created the market for student loans, it
was as a grudging compromise. Nobody was particularly
thrilled with the arrangement (aside, perhaps, from the
neoclassical labor economists excitedly developing the
concept of “human capital” and attempting to inject it into
policy discussions),6 nor did anybody have any notion that it
would take on the size and importance it has. Loans were the
way that those who supported expanding higher education
through federal subsidy could get enough votes from those
who were skeptical of the project.
Legislative discussion of federal higher education policy
began after the GI Bill had opened the possibility of using
federal fiscal power to expand access to higher education
beyond the elite.7 Previously, the federal government had
mostly left it to the states to finance and regulate every level
of the educational system.8 (The Land Grant Acts of 1862 and
Company Incorporated, 55 SOC. REV. 284, 288 (2007).
5. See Elizabeth Popp Berman & Abby Stivers, Student Loans as a Pressure
on Higher Education, in THE UNIVERSITY UNDER PRESSURE 129, 134–35
(Elizabeth Popp Berman & Catherine Paradeise eds., 2016); SUZANNE METTLER,
DEGREES OF INEQUALITY: HOW THE POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION SABOTAGED
THE AMERICAN DREAM 61 (2014).
6. See Laura Holden & Jeff Biddle, The Introduction of Human Capital
Theory into Education Policy in the United States, 49 HIST. OF POL. ECON. 537,
537–38 (2017).
7. See METTLER, supra note 5, at 56–59.
8. See METTLER, supra note 5, at 115–16. Christopher Loss has shown that
the project of expanding higher education began in the aftermath of World War
I, but only really took form after the G.I. Bill. See CHRISTOPHER LOSS, BETWEEN
CITIZENS AND THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE
20TH CENTURY 19–93 (2011). We might also note that history might have gone
otherwise. Lawrence Gladieux and Thomas Wolanin pointed out that “[a]t the
Constitutional Convention of 1787, several proposals were advanced to give the
federal government authority to establish institutions of higher education,” but
they all failed. LAWRENCE E. GLADIEUX & THOMAS R. WOLANIN, CONGRESS AND THE
COLLEGES 3 (1976).
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1890 are the notable exceptions).9 But the Servicemen’s
Readjustment Act of 1944—the GI Bill—guaranteed a free
college or trade school education to returning (and qualified)
World War II veterans, and a quarter of all veterans, 2.6
million men, took advantage of the opportunity.10
Men’s college graduation rates had tripled by 1950.11
Expanding higher education was widely seen as a success, by
policymakers, by the ex-soldier beneficiaries, and by much of
the population more broadly.12 The notion that people from
working class backgrounds could not cut it in college had
become difficult to defend.13 Indeed, as universal high school
education had only recently become a national reality, the
quelling of similar doubts about the ability of poor and
working class students to make it past eighth grade was a
living memory.14 The bounds of the possible seemed worth
prodding. Many intellectuals and politicians began to
imagine the possibility of expanding universal—though still
racially segregated—education beyond the twelfth grade.
In 1946, two years after the GI Bill became law,
President Truman convened “outstanding civic and
educational leaders” to “reexamine our system of higher
education in terms of its objectives, methods, and facilities;
and in the light of the social role it has to play” as part of a
Commission on Higher Education.15 The Commission issued
a six-volume report. It recommended:
9. METTLER, supra note 5, at 41.
10. Id. at 6; see also Loss, supra note 8, at 124.
11. METTLER, supra note 5, at 6.
12. Loss, supra note 8, at 95.
13. See generally CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN
EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY 247–84 (2008).
14. Id. at 158–62, 195–99.
15. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, HIGHER EDUCATION FOR
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, VOLUME I: ESTABLISHING THE GOALS v (1947) [hereinafter
TRUMAN COMMISSION RPT.: VOL. I]. For background on the Commission, especially
with respect to the changing attitudes about the role of higher education in the
immediate postwar/early Cold War period, see Loss, supra note 8, at 133–39.
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American people should set as their ultimate goal an educational
system in which at no level—high school, college, graduate school,
or professional school—will a qualified individual in any part of the
country encounter an insuperable economic barrier to the
attainment of the kind of education suited to his aptitudes and
interests.16

Although it acknowledged that “equal educational
opportunity [could not] be attained immediately,” it
envisioned that the “phenomenal increases in productivity
per worker” that were already underway promised to
generate enough social surplus to “be able to support
education at all levels far more adequately in the future than
we could in the past,” so long as political and social
institutions prioritized doing so.17
Accordingly, the Commission recommended immediately
allocating the funds necessary to make thirteenth and
fourteenth grade totally tuition and fee free at public
universities for all who qualified, to reduce tuition and fees
to nominal amounts for fifteenth and sixteenth grades, and
to increase the availability of adult education.18 These funds
would come both in the form of subsidies to states to increase
their support for public universities and as a combination of
scholarships and fellowships to fill in the gap for underresourced students. The Commission also recommended a
program of federal grants to cover costs of living for underresourced students starting in tenth grade.19 All of this

16. TRUMAN COMMISSION RPT.: VOL. I., supra note 15, at 36.
17. Id. at 37.
18. See id. at 37–38; PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, HIGHER
EDUCATION FOR AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, VOLUME V: FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION
3–4 (1947) [hereinafter TRUMAN COMMISSION RPT.: VOL. V]. After examining the
finances and expected enrollment numbers in detail, the Commission concluded
that “[t]he wide variation in the ability of the various States to support higher
education makes a program of equalization imperative if a defensible minimum
program of higher education is to be provided on a Nation-wide [sic] basis.”
TRUMAN COMMISSION RPT.: VOL. V, supra note 18, at 38.
19. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, HIGHER EDUCATION FOR
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, VOLUME II: EQUALIZING AND EXPANDING INDIVIDUAL
OPPORTUNITY 38 (1947) [hereinafter TRUMAN COMMISSION RPT.: VOL. II].
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would be provided on a non-discriminatory basis: indeed (a
decade before Brown, and half a decade before Sweatt)20 the
Commission also included extensive recommendations on
desegregation, on ending religious quotas, on increasing
women’s enrollment (ending “antifeminism,” as the
Commission put it), and on creating more flexible admission
standards to account for ability rather than access to
resources.21
In sum, the so-called “Truman Commission”
recommended striving for universality in higher education
primarily through expanding public schools, with the federal
government playing a large and growing role in financing.
However, “advocates of broader federal support for higher
education unrelated to military service faced an uphill
struggle. In fact, aid-to-education proposals of all kinds
repeatedly ran aground in Congress, blocked by civil rights
and church-state controversies and fear of federal control of
education.”22 In a familiar pattern, white supremacists only
wanted federal funds if conditions of funding did not
threaten segregation, and antiracists wanted to undermine
segregation or at least avoid having the federal government
support it. “Battle lines were also drawn between northern
Catholic Democrats, who insisted on the inclusion of
religious colleges, and others who viewed such an approach
as a violation of the separation of church and state.”23
Moreover, “[m]any members of Congress at that time had
worked their way through college” and found the notion of
non-veterans getting a “free ride” distasteful.24

20. Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629 (1950).
21. See TRUMAN COMMISSION RPT.: VOL. II, supra note 19, at 25, 39.
22. Lawrence E. Gladieux, Federal Student Aid Policy: A History and
Assessment, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Oct. 1995), https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OPE/PPI/
FinPostSecEd/gladieux.html [hereinafter Gladieux, Federal Student Aid]; see
also METTLER, supra note 5, at 59–60.
23. METTLER, supra note 5, at 59.
24. Gladieux, Federal Student Aid, supra note 22.
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Sputnik launched a panic that jogged the loggerheads
open, but only enough for student loans to slip through.25
Desperate not to fall behind the USSR’s military technology
or international prestige, politicians sought to expand
investment in the sort of research and education that could
lead to innovations in mass destruction or advantages in
espionage.26 Yet “suspicion of giving students a ‘free ride’”
remained powerful enough to cool the Cold War fervor.27 The
Eisenhower Administration’s and the Democratic Party’s
bills would have created federal scholarships for
undergraduates, but the program was “deleted on the House
floor and cut back in the Senate, then abandoned entirely in
the House-Senate conference.”28 A student-lending program
made it through. After all, debt brings the moral individual
responsibility along with it.29 The resulting National Defense
Education Act of 1958 (NDEA) thus simultaneously created
the federal government’s first direct aid to non-veteran
college students and the first student loan program.
But the suspicion of free riding and usurping states’
rights ran deep.30 The National Defense Education Loans
(NDEL) program was temporary and highly conditional. The
loans were made available only to students who
demonstrated financial need and potential in science, math,

25. See Loss, supra note 8, at 156 (“Proposals for increased federal funding
for the nation’s education system had been circulating around the Capitol for
nearly two decades, but it took the Sputnik crisis to secure the political support
needed to move the legislation through Congress. The handful of liberals who
inhabited the ‘small world of education politics,’ as one leading historian on the
topic has described it, seized their opportunity to increase federal support for
elementary, secondary, and higher education.”).
26. See GLADIEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 8, at 8–9; METTLER, supra note 5, at
58.
27. GLADIEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 8, at 9.
28. Id.
29. On the “political lightness” of federally financed debt programs as
compared with direct federal subsidy, see SARAH QUINN, AMERICAN BONDS: HOW
CREDIT MARKETS SHAPED A NATION (2019).
30. See Loss, supra note 8, at 157–58.
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engineering, or foreign languages—that is, only those
students whose educations could serve the interests of
staffing the growing Cold War military and espionage
apparatus.31 They “reached only about 25,000 students.”32
And rather than having the federal government directly lend
to students, Congress set up a system whereby each state
had access to a pool of federal money to allocate among
colleges. The colleges then issued the loans subject to terms
dictated by Congress and the regulations of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare (from which the
Department of Education eventually split off).33 NDEL
eventually became part of the Federal Perkins Loan
Program, which was more generally focused on providing
low-interest loans to students that demonstrated financial
need.34 Although NDELs were phased out in 1972, Perkins
Loans inherited NDEL’s basic structure and maintained it
until the Perkins Loan program was terminated in 2015.35
The details of this structure will become important later.
B. The Higher Education Act Lays the Foundation for the
Modern Regime
If it took the Cold War to bring student loans into

31. National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, § 204(4)(B),
72 Stat. 1580, 1584. On the role of Cold War thinking in designing higher
education funding, see Loss, supra note 8, at 121–60.
32. Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 134. This was not seen as a small
number at the time and, indeed, created the foundation for more federal
involvement in higher education funding. See Loss, supra note 8, at 159.
33. Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 134; Loss, supra note 8, at 158
(discussing the growth of the Commissioner’s office as a result of the NDEA). On
the transfer of the Commissioner’s responsibilities to the Secretary, see
Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 668
(1979).
34. See Volume 6—The Campus-Based Programs, FED. STUDENT AID
HANDBOOK 6–3 (Oct. 5, 2015), https://ifap.ed.gov/fsahandbook/attachments/
1516FSAHbkVol6Master.pdf.
35. See Kelly Field, Perkins Loan Program, a Federal Stalwart Since 1958,
Meets its Demise, CHRONICLE HIGHER ED. (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.chronicle
.com/article/Perkins-Loan-Program-a/233527.
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existence, it took the War on Poverty to make them an
indefinite fixture of federal higher education policy.
President Johnson attributed his own rise from poverty to
power to the access to education he received. So he saw
federal funds for primary, secondary, and postsecondary
education as crucial for equalizing empowerment.36
Meanwhile, the mobilizations of the black freedom struggle,
the campus free speech movement, and other progressive
groups and the overwhelming Democratic victory in 1964
created momentum for a wave of social democratic
legislation.37 Yet the familiar segregationist and parochial
countercurrents against democratizing higher education
remained. And grants without conditions, especially for
middle-class students, were still met with suspicion from the
members of the elite preoccupied with the ideology of
bootstraps.38 As well, the sense that tradeoffs and
prioritization were necessary was acute even among
progressive voices. The Beltway was abuzz with concerns
about the size of the federal government’s balance sheet
while domestic spending expanded alongside investment in
foreign regime change in the increasingly hot Cold War.39
As in 1958, student loans were hit on as a way to get

36. See Loss, supra note 8, at 168–71; GLADIEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 8, at
17; METTLER, supra note 5, at 51.
37. See Loss, supra note 8, at 169–75.
38. See GLADIEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 8, at 20; Loss, supra note 8, at 175
(“Democratic leaders . . . agreed to a Guaranteed Student Loan Program for the
middle-class—guaranteed because the federal government insured the loans on
behalf of the private banks and lending agencies that financed them—in order to
garner Republican support for federal aid to students with ‘exceptional financial
need.’ Democrats considered the guaranteed loan provision a small price to pay
for the achievement of federal grants for needy students.”).
39. On the parallel role that this environment played on federal mortgage
policy and the creation of the financial technique of securitization, see Neil
Fligstein & Adam Goldstein, A Long Strange Trip: The State and Mortgage
Securitization, 1968-2010, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF
FINANCE 339, 345–46 (Karin Knorr Cetina & Alex Preda, eds., 2012); Sarah
Quinn, “The Miracles of Bookkeeping”: How Budget Politics Link Fiscal Policies
and Financial Markets, 123 AM. J. SOC. 48 (2017).
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doubters on board (which is not to say that student loans
were the only, or even the most important, program created
by the HEA!). And, though creating a direct lending program
surely would have had lower administrative and agency
costs, the concerns about the size of the government’s
balance sheet turned the Johnson Administration away from
that path. The accounting rules in effect at the time placed
direct loans on the liability side of the government’s balance
sheet (as an up-front cost paid down over time), making their
immediate cost similar to a grant, though reduced once
repayment began.40 However, these same rules treated loan
guarantees as creating no up-front cost: they would only
show up as liabilities if and when the guarantee had to be
paid out.41 The Higher Education Act of 1965 took advantage
of this accounting trick to create a program that insured
private agencies’ guarantees on student loans issued by
approved financial institutions, calling it the Federal Family
Education Loan Program (FFELP).42 The idea was to make
lending to students as low risk as possible to encourage
banks to lend in exchange for doing so on governmentdictated terms.
As with the NDEA, the politicians responsible for the
original HEA understood student loans as gap-fillers. They
assumed that most of the cost of higher education would be
borne by states, endowments, and parental wealth.43 This
was, after all, the era that political scientist Suzanne Mettler
refers to as “the zenith of mass public higher education.”44
Most students without substantial family wealth could cover
the cost of tuition, fees, supplies, room, and board by working
a summer job.45

40. See Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 135.
41. Id.
42. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-329, § 431, 79 Stat. 1219, 1245.
43. See GLADIEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 8, at 17–20.
44. See METTLER, supra note 5, at 118–23.
45. Id.
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The post-GI Bill expansion of higher education had
begun to increase its relative cost, putting the possibility of
full affordability just out of reach for many middle class
families. Policymakers understood student loans as a way to
cover that difference without fully committing to making
higher education universal—a compromise position
acceptable to those who did not believe in universalism. In
the few years surrounding the HEA, student loans accounted
for only five percent of federal aid to higher education
students.46 Moreover, since wages had consistently gone up
for two decades and upward mobility over the life course
seemed almost inevitable, especially for college graduates, it
did not seem to be that much to ask of students pay back the
little bit of money they would have to borrow to supplement
for their summer wages. Nobody conceived that loans would
become central to higher education finance.
Those familiar with the state of higher education debate
will recognize that this is precisely the inverse of the nowstandard human capital story in which individuals are
primarily responsible for financing their own education and,
because those with educations earn much more over the long
term than they cost in the short term, it makes sense to
borrow money to do so.47 From the perspective of human
capital theory, the government’s main task is to encourage
that socially beneficial investment. It can do so by facilitating
lending as much as possible and directly subsidizing only as
necessary to supplement for the poorest borrowers.48
Midcentury politicians, on the other hand, operated within a
46. Gladieux, Federal Student Aid, supra note 22.
47. See Investing in Higher Education: Benefits, Challenges, and the State of
Student Debt, EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT U.S. 10 (July 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160718_ce
a_student_debt.pdf [hereinafter Investing in Higher Educ.]; see also Sherwin
Rosen, Human Capital, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (2d ed.,
Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume, eds., 2008). But see Blair Fix, The
Trouble with Human Capital Theory, REAL-WORLD ECON. REV., Dec. 10, 2018, at
15.
48. See Investing in Higher Ed., supra note 47, at 13.
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reality in which financing education was primarily a
collective responsibility except perhaps for the very wealthy.
Loans were introduced to supplement for those who slipped
through the cracks when consensus could not be reached on
the value of universal higher education. And loans were
understood to exist in a broader education policy apparatus
focused on shaping not just workers, but citizens.
C. Entrenchment and Metastasis
In another strange inversion from today’s bonanza, the
initial problem with FFELP was that not enough banks were
willing to issue loans. Indeed, the banking lobby initially
opposed FFELP, because they did not want the government
dictating the terms of their loans, even if the government was
taking all the risk.49 Apparently, creating a primary market
was not enough to sweeten the pot. So, in the 1972
reauthorization of the HEA, Congress created Sallie Mae—
i.e. the Student Loan Marketing Association—to get a
secondary market in government-guaranteed student loans
going. Subsequent reforms over the years made student
loans more and more liquid and the deepening of the markets
for collateralized debt increased supply of loans.50
The 1972 reauthorization proved fateful for two other
reasons. First, it also expanded federal grant funding for lowincome students, which eventually became the Pell Grant
program. This was a crucial step for moving the federal role
in making higher education affordable beyond subsidizing
lending. Yet it was also a crucial step away from the idea that
affordability in higher education should be achieved through
subsidy to public schools. “During the debate leading up to
this legislation, the higher education community urged
Congress to enact formula-based, enrollment-driven federal
aid to institutions. But legislators decided that funding aid
to students was the more efficient and effective way to
49. See Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 135; METTLER, supra note 5, at 61.
50. See Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 135–36.
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remove financial barriers for needy students.”51
In a pattern of thinking that would become increasingly
common, “Congress also viewed student aid as a way to
harness market forces for enhancing the quality of higher
education. Students, voting with their feet, would take their
federal aid to institutions that met their needs; less
satisfactory institutions would wither.”52 Here is when the
notion of higher education as fundamentally a marketplace
begins to take hold. Here is where it becomes increasingly
mainstream to think of the federal government’s role as
subsidizing the consumer-investors of that marketplace
instead of “picking favorites” among “sellers” of education
(i.e. colleges).53
Second, the 1972 reauthorization opened up federal aid
to so-called “proprietary institutions of higher education,”
that is, for-profit colleges.54 Though the GI Bill had provided
funding to trade and vocational schools, some of which were
for-profit, the fly-by-night frauds that had ensued had
discouraged policymakers from repeating the experiment.55
Reincorporating for-profits into federal higher education
policy was part of an effort to emphasize “postsecondary

51. Gladieux, Federal Student Aid, supra note 22; see also GLADIEUX &
WOLANIN, supra note 8, at 44–49.
52. Gladieux, Federal Student Aid, supra note 22.
53. This shift had a number of causes. It was partially in response to efforts
on behalf of economists to frame things in this way, most influentially through
the “Rivlin Report” of 1969 and through Milton Friedman’s more radical
popularizations. See GLADIEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 8, at 25–27 (on Friedman’s
role), 52–53 (on the Rivlin Report). It was also partly a result of the emerging
backlash against student radicalism and the connected backlash against taxes
and partly a result of structural changes that had made higher education into a
“buyer’s market.” Id. at 23–25, 28–29. These shifts must be understood in light
of broader shifts towards offloading distributional conflict onto “the market.” See
GRETA KRIPPNER, CAPITALIZING ON CRISIS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE RISE OF
FINANCE 58–85 (2012).
54. See A.J. ANGULO, DIPLOMA MILLS: HOW FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES STIFFED
STUDENTS, TAXPAYERS, AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 85–91 (2016); METTLER, supra
note 5, at 92–93; Gladieux, Federal Student Aid, supra note 22.
55. See ANGULO, DIPLOMA MILLS, supra note 54, at 85–91.
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education” rather than “higher education” in order to destigmatize educational programs beyond the traditional fouryear degree. As such, for-profits were swept in alongside
increased funding to community colleges, part-time
students, and non-profit vocational programs.56
From another angle, the inclusion of for-profits and the
more general move from “higher education” to
“postsecondary” education was part of the emerging
understanding of the higher education field as a market.
More “sellers” of education—or, rather, easier entry into the
market that the government was in the process of creating—
meant more competition as well as more variety. Both
competition and variety ensure greater choice, with means
higher consumer welfare/surplus.
Unbeknownst to legislators, they had prepared the body
politic for a metastasis of student debt. By 1973, student
loans already accounted for over 20% of aid to higher
education students, four times the share from a decade
before.57 That number grew to 40% by 1983 and to 60% by
1993.58 Over that same twenty years, federal grants followed
the inverse pattern: going from almost half of aid to students
to around 20%.59 Indeed, in 1986 the Reagan Administration
nearly torpedoed all federal student aid to college students,
along with the very existence of the Department of
Education.60 Meanwhile tuition’s creep picked up the pace.
In a time of unprecedented inflation, the price of college rose
much faster than inflation. Increased enrollments put
pressure on existing facilities. Increased productive

56. Gladieux, Federal Student Aid, supra note 22.
57. See id.
58. See id. This growth was not uniform, as Berman & Stivers point out “the
rapid expansion of federal grant aid in the 1970s limited demand for loans[, but]
[t]his changed after 1978, when Congress removed the income cap from the GSL
program.” Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 135 (emphasis added).
59. See Gladieux, Federal Student Aid, supra note 22.
60. See id.
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efficiency in sectors other than higher education also made
the relative cost of higher education increase (since
education has not become more “efficient”), a process known
as “Baumol’s Cost Disease.”61 This put increasing pressure
on states’ budgets, and state governments began to waver in
their commitment to making public colleges and universities
free or affordable for all.62 Hesitation to fund public goods
adequately was in part due to a growing crisis of legitimacy
connected to stagflation and in part due to the growing
conservative campaign against “campus radicals” (initially
led by Reagan himself in his California gubernatorial
campaigns) and the “taxpayer revolt” against spending on
public goods, especially those that had begun to benefit black
and brown people who had previously been excluded.63
Student loans maintained their role as gap fillers as the
gap they had to fill stretched wider. Political deadlock on
whether to expand or to contract federal aid for higher
education could always be resolved by the compromise option
of making student loans easier to access. And as student
lending became big business, it grew a big-business-sized
lobbying arm. Student debt was no longer just a pressure
valve to avoid resolving debates about the role of public
higher education in a pluralistic democratic society. It now

61. See GLADIEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 8, at 21–23 (on rising costs);
METTLER, supra note 5, at 67–68 (same). See generally ROBERT B. ARCHIBALD &
DAVID H. FELDMAN, WHY DOES COLLEGE COST SO MUCH? (2011) (making the cost
disease argument for higher education); WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE COST DISEASE:
WHY COMPUTERS GET CHEAPER AND HEALTH CARE DOESN’T (2012) (elaborating on
the theory of a “cost disease”).
62. See Gladieux, Federal Student Aid, supra note 22. See generally David A.
Tandberg, Politics, Interest Groups and State Funding of Public Higher
Education, 51 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 416 (2010).
63. See GLADIEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 8, at 23–25 (on the role of campus
radicalism). See generally Aaron Bady & Mike Konczal, From Master Plan to No
Plan: The Slow Death of Public Higher Education, 59 DISSENT 10 (Fall 2012) (on
Reagan’s role and its larger significance to California’s public higher education
system in particular); CAMILLE WALSH, RACIAL TAXATION: SCHOOLS, SEGREGATION,
AND TAXPAYER CITIZENSHIP, 1869–1973 (2018) (on the role of tax politics and
taxpayer identity in the reinforcement of segregation and racial hierarchy).
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created its own political pressure.64
D. Student Debt Becomes Natural
By the 1990s, the student loan market, and higher
education more generally, had already become something
entirely different from that envisioned by the drafters of the
HEA, let alone the NDEA. Yet, in retrospect, it was not until
that point that student debt really began to take off.
Sociologists Beth Popp Berman and Abby Stivers argue
that three legal changes account for this turning point. First,
Congress changed the federal accounting rules both to reduce
the cost of direct loans based on expected repayment amount,
and to require counting loan guarantees as a liability from
the date of the guarantee based on their expected payout.
This change made it such that federal accounts would reflect
the cost savings that would result by cutting out the forprofit middlemen, which almost immediately led to calls for
replacing the convoluted FFELP program with a direct
lending program.65 Direct Loans were first created as a pilot
in 1992.66 Private lenders, having switched from reluctant to
enthusiastic, lobbied heavily against direct lending, while
simultaneously ramping up lending in an attempt to crowd
out the government.67 At least some members of Congress
welcomed this competition as a way to test out the Direct
Loan program against the “market” alternative.
Second, faced with this possibility of extinction, Sallie
Mae lobbied successfully to “go private,” i.e. to no longer be
subject to even the minimal rules that came with being a
government-sponsored entity.68 It then began to issue both
64. On this dynamic, see Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 137–41 and
METTLER, supra note 5, at 67–82.
65. See Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 138.
66. Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat.
448, 569 (1992).
67. Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 138–39.
68. See id. at 139–40.
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federally guaranteed and non-guaranteed “private” student
loans. The first company to do business solely in student
loans contributed greatly to their accelerating growth.
Third, the competition that came with the creation of
Direct Loans generated lobbying momentum for the
development of so-called “unsubsidized” loans. Unlike the
“subsidized” loans previously offered to undergraduates, the
federal government did not pay the interest on these loans
while borrowers were enrolled. Unsubsidized loans were not
means tested, so they enabled higher-income students to
enter the market.69
These higher income students, and indeed every other
student, were increasingly interested in loans because the
price of college continued to rise. Even adjusting for inflation,
the sticker price for a college degree increased by 120%
between 1987 and 2010.70 After netting out institutional aid,
the increase is still 92% over and above general inflation.71
Economists Grey Gordon and Aaron Hedlund helpfully point
out that this inflation greatly exceeds that of “much
maligned healthcare costs”: had the average price of college
risen at the rate of the average price of healthcare, it would
have only grown by 32%.72 Added on top of the increase in
costs from the 1970s and 80s, and higher education has risen
five times faster than inflation.73 As only the wealthiest
families in a world of mostly stagnant incomes can afford to
pay these prices out of pocket, student debt has gushed

69. See id. at 139.
70. See Grey Gordon & Aaron Hedlund, Accounting for the Rise in College
Tuition, in EDUCATION, SKILLS, AND TECHNICAL CHANGE: IMPLICATIONS FOR
FUTURE U.S. GDP GROWTH 357, 357 (Charles R. Hulten & Valerie A. Ramey eds.,
2019).
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. Tyler Kingkade, Pell Grants Cover Smallest Portion of College Costs in
History as GOP Calls for Cuts, HUFFPOST (Aug. 29, 2012, 8:56 AM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/pell-grants-college-costs_n_1835081.
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accordingly.74
The 1990s also saw the transformation of for-profit
colleges from small vocational schools occasionally plagued
by scandal to increasingly consolidated corporate behemoths
that oriented their business strategy around maximizing
access to student loans and, to a lesser degree, other forms of
federal higher education aid.75 For most of these schools,
students were merely the conduit for federal aid, and
“education” was the thing to pretend to do in order to gain
access to that aid. They spent big on marketing and lobbying
while reducing the cost of all other expenditures through
returns to scale and a new focus on “efficiency.”76 Using
legally questionable practices to convince students to convert
their eligibility for federal student loans into shareholder
profits in exchange for increasingly questionable
“educations,” for-profit colleges brought new, “nontraditional,” lower-income, borrowers into the market and
made sure they borrowed as much as possible.77 When the
74. Also worthy of mention is the fact that the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”) made private student loans
ineligible for bankruptcy protection, which seems to have increased loan volume
while making holding debt more burdensome. See generally Alexei Alexandrov &
Dalié Jiménez, Lessons From Bankruptcy Reform in the Private Student Loan
Market, 11 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 175 (2017).
75. See Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 140–41; METTLER, supra note 5, at
92–110; Charlie Eaton et al., The Financialization of U.S. Higher Education, 14
SOCIO-ECON. REV. 507, 525–27 (2016) [hereinafter Eaton et al., Financialization];
Charlie Eaton, Agile Predators: Shareholder Value and the Transformation of
U.S. For-Profit Colleges SOCIO-ECON. REV. (forthcoming) (draft on file with
author) [hereinafter Eaton, Agile Predators]. See generally TRESSIE MCMILLAN
COTTOM, LOWER ED: THE TROUBLING RISE OF FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES IN THE NEW
ECONOMY (2017).
76. See generally Eaton et al., Financialization, supra note 75. Some of these
enormous FPCUs are publicly traded and some are owned private equity
companies and investment banks. Many go back and forth between these two
ownership structures. Eaton, Agile Predators, supra note 75.
77. See Gregory D. Katz, For-Profit Colleges: Undercover Testing Finds
Colleges Encouraged Fraud and Engaged in Deceptive and Questionable
Marketing Practices, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (Aug. 4, 2010, 10:00 AM),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10948t.pdf; S. COMM. ON HEALTH EDUC., LABOR,
AND PENSIONS, FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE
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financial crisis crashed the job market, for-profits had
developed finely-oiled machines to profit off of the
desperation.
In 2010, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, Congress
finally eliminated FFELP. One reason for the shift, cited by
Berman and Stivers, was that policymakers saw private
lending dry up and realized that making students dependent
on financial institutions to fund college put those students at
the mercy of financial cycles even if interest rates were
regulated.78 Surely at least as important was the fact that
finance was weakened and delegitimized, leaving it unable
to exert the same sway over Congress it had during
neoliberal boom times. The Obama Administration, wanting
to do something in higher education, saw an opportunity and
took it. In stark contrast from 1965, finance lobbyists fought
tooth and nail to be able to continue lending (and to avoid
regulations). They kept the private student loan market, but
that has become increasingly irrelevant. Today 95% of
outstanding student loans are public.79
FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS, S. PRT. NO. 112-37 (2012),
https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/for_profit_report/Contents.pdf
[hereinafter HELP Report]; David Halperin, Law Enforcement Investigations and
Actions Regarding For-Profit Colleges, REPUBLIC REPORT (Apr. 9, 2014),
https://www.republicreport.org/2014/law-enforcement-for-profit-colleges/
(last
updated Jan. 9, 2020); Adversary Complaint, Villalba v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc.,
No. 16-0727 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. filed Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.legal
servicescenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1-Adversary-Complaint.pdf;
Molly Hensley-Clancy, Lower Education: How a Disgraced College Chain
Trapped its Students in Poverty, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 13, 2014),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/mollyhensleyclancy/lower-education?utm_term=.lmQ
DqN8DY#.hsQRJepR4; Annie Waldman, Who’s Regulating For-Profit Schools?
Execs from For-Profit Colleges, PRO PUBLICA (Feb. 26, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/whos-regulating-for-profit-schools-execs-from
-for-profit-colleges.
78. See Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 141–42.
79. Author’s calculation based on data from Federal Student Loan Portfolio,
FEDERAL STUDENT AID (last visited Feb. 17, 2020), https://studentaid.ed.gov/
sa/about/data-center/student/portfolio and Zack Friedman, Student Loan Debt
Statistics In 2018: A $1.5 Trillion Crisis, FORBES (June 13, 2018, 8:32 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2018/06/13/student-loan-debtstatistics-2018/#5221dccc7310.
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Although the financial crisis did occasion the elimination
of FFELP—and eventually of Perkins, too80—it did not stop
the growth of student debt. Student debt, indeed, was the
only type of household debt that was completely unaffected
by the collapse in credit markets and its reverberations onto
the balance sheets of businesses and households.81 Just
between 2003 and 2017, the total level of student debt
outstanding grew by a factor of seven, from around $200
billion to around $1.4 trillion. And the growth accelerates: as
of 2018, outstanding student debt was around $1.52
trillion.82 In 1993, this number was still countable in
millions.83

80. See Kelly Field, Perkins Loan Program, a Federal Stalwart Since 1958,
Meets its Demise, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 1, 2015),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Perkins-Loan-Program-a/233527.
81. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., HOUSEHOLD DEBT & CREDIT REPORT (Q3
2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/microeconomics/hhdc.html.
82. Friedman, supra note 79.
83. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, STUDENT LOANS (Q3 2019),
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FGCCSAQ027S.

2020]

STUDENT DEBT JUBILEE

307

II. THE PROBLEMS WITH STUDENT DEBT
A. Direct and Indirect Burdens on Debtors, Communities,
and Society
Taking on enormous amounts of debt to pay for higher
education has become so routine and widespread that it has
transformed our higher education system, the political
system that structures it, and much of our society more
generally. By one measure, as of 2017, approximately 45% of
white households headed by people between 25 and 40 years
old and about 50% of black households headed by people
between 25 and 40 years old had student debt.84 Those
numbers in 1990 were 10% of white households and 25% of
black households.85 In that same time period the median
debt burden doubled, from $10,000 to $20,000 (the average
among indebted students is now around $27,000).86 And
these are certainly undercounts, since young people
burdened by student debt are increasingly forced to live with
parents or relatives, unable to form the “independent
households” that the dataset (the Survey of Consumer
Finances) counts.87 According to Department of Education
data, 69% of all students graduating with a bachelor’s degree
had student debt in 2016, in an average amount of nearly
$30,000.88 Those numbers in 1996 were 58% and $13,000.89

84. JULIE MARGETTA MORGAN & MARSHALL STEINBAUM, THE STUDENT DEBT
CRISIS, LABOR MARKET CREDENTIALIZATION, AND RACIAL INEQUALITY: HOW THE
CURRENT STUDENT DEBT DEBATE GETS THE ECONOMICS WRONG (2018).
85. Id.
86. See id. at 10.
87. Id. at 14; Mike Konczal, The Devastating, Lifelong Consequences of
Student Debt, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 24, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/
article/118354/brookings-study-student-debt-misses-lifelong-consequences.
88. Quick Facts about Student Debt, THE INSTITUTE FOR COLLEGE ACCESS AND
SUCCESS (Apr. 2019), https://ticas.org/files/pub_files/qf_about_student_debt.pdf.
89. Id.
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1. Burdens on Individuals and Communities
The most immediate impact of student debt is on debtors
and their loved ones. Inability to form an “independent
household” is not only or primarily a problem for
demographers studying debtors, after all. This so-called
“failure to launch” can be attributed to the fact that student
debt burdens have risen most precipitously during a time
when incomes for all but the wealthiest have plateaued or
plunged.90 While those with college educations make
significantly more on average than those without, all but the
elite do worse than their counterparts from a generation ago.
As Julie Morgan and Marshall Steinbaum have pointed
out, this dynamic indicates that the “college premium” is not
so much a measure of college graduates being rewarded for
their superior skills (their “human capital”) as it is an
indication of the increasing power of the capitalist and
managerial class to suppress wages for workers across the
board while demanding more education credentials from the
workers they recruit.91 As a result, in the U.S. we now have,
to borrow independent researcher Matt Bruenig’s phrase,
“the most educated poor in history.”92
This “credentialization” dynamic increases the burden of
holding the same amount of student debt, because the same
amount of education is rewarded less. A growing burden for
the same amount of debt multiplied by the ballooning
amount of debt has come to mean that student debt is a
constraint of individual freedom throughout the life course
and a growing collective weight on families and communities.
Needless to say, this is quite the opposite of what the drafters
of the HEA had in mind.
Default rates are up, as are uses of income-based
90. See MORGAN & STEINBAUM, supra note 84, at 21.
91. Id. at 26–27.
92. Matt Bruenig, Why Education Does Not Fix Poverty, DEMOS (Dec. 2, 2015),
https://web.archive.org/web/20160529205902/http://www.demos.org/blog/12/2/15
/why-education-does-not-fix-poverty.
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repayment plans that draw out repayment over a longer
period of time.93 In addition to the aforementioned fact that
increased student debt burdens leads people to delay
marriage and other varieties of family or household
formation, it reduces wealth both in the short and long
terms,94 decreases entrepreneurship and business
formation,95 and forces many to put off major purchases and
investments like houses and cars.96 And all of this is during
“normal” times—during a massive economic crisis of the sort
that has now occurred twice in the span of less than 20 years,
debts become even more crippling burdens.
Unsurprisingly to any student of stratification, some
individuals, families, and communities feel these burdens
disproportionately. A growing literature indicates that lowincome households and Black and Latino households have
more burdensome debts, leading to higher delinquency rates
and higher concentrations of the other ills that come along

93. See Casualties of College Debt: What Data Show and What Experts Say
about Who Defaults and Why, INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS (June 2019),
https://ticas.org/wp-content/uploads/legacy-files/pub_files/casualties_of_college_
debt_.pdf; MORGAN & STEINBAUM, supra note 84, at 25.
94. Robert Hiltonsmith, At What Cost? How Student Debt Reduces Lifetime
Wealth,
DEMOS
(Aug.
2013),
https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/
publications/AtWhatCost.pdf; Richard Fry, Young Adults, Student Debt, and
Economic Well-Being, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 14, 2014), http://www.pewsocial
trends.org/2014/05/14/young-adults-student-debt-and-economic-well-being/;
William Elliott & IlSung Nam, Is Student Debt Jeopardizing the Short-Term
Financial Health of U.S. Households?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV.
(Sep./Oct. 2013), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/13/09/Elliott
.pdf.
95. Konczal, supra note 87.
96. Meta Brown & Sydnee Caldwell, Young Student Loan Borrowers Retreat
from Housing and Auto Markets, LIBERTY ST. ECON. (Apr. 17, 2013),
http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2013/04/young-student-loanborrowers-retreat-from-housing-and-auto-markets.html#.U6mTeJSwIvI; Meta
Brown, Sydnee Caldwell, & Sarah Sutherland, Just Released: Young Student
Loan Borrowers Remain on the Sidelines of the Housing Market in 2013, LIBERTY
ST. ECON., http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2014/05/just-releasedyoung-student-loan-borrowers-remained-on-the-sidelines-of-the-housing-market
-in-2013.html#.U3KfrOZdXoU.
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with relatively heavy debt loads.97 This is in part due to the
fact that for-profit colleges, which produce unusually high
amounts of indebtedness for unusually low benefits, target
“non-traditional students.” It is also in part because students
from disadvantaged backgrounds face more challenges—
financial and otherwise—even when they attend public and
non-profit colleges.98 Recent work indicates that
indebtedness among Black households has increased at
higher rates than among White or Hispanic households (to
use the crude categories of the census).99 Morgan and
Steinbaum estimate that 70 percent of Black student debtors
who left school in 2004 will default.100
These findings jibe with the long line of research showing
that families that are struggling economically and who have
been subject to systematic racialized dispossession have
experienced the burdens of any type of indebtedness
disproportionately. They can also be contextualized by
findings that racial wealth disparities make it such that
“black families whose members study and work hard are still
hindered in their efforts to generate the resources necessary
for their own security and to ensure the well-being of their
children.”101

97. See MORGAN & STEINBAUM, supra note 84; Kavya Vaghul & Marshall
Steinbaum, How the Student Debt Crisis Affects African Americans and Latinos,
WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Feb. 17, 2016), http://equitablegrowth.org/
research-analysis/how-the-student-debt-crisis-affects-african-americans-andlatinos/; Mark Huelsman, The Debt Divide: The Racial and Class Bias Behind the
“New Normal” of Student Borrowing, DEMOS (May 19, 2015),
http://www.demos.org/publication/debt-divide-racial-and-class-bias-behind-newnormal-student-borrowing; Ending the Debt-For-Diploma System, DEMOS (Aug.
2013), http://www.demos.org/publication/ending-debt-diploma-system.
98. See generally COTTOM, supra note 75; SARA GOLDRICK-RAB, PAYING THE
PRICE: COLLEGE COSTS, FINANCIAL AID, AND THE BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN
DREAM (2016).
99. See Monnica Chan et al., Indebtedness Over Time: Racial Differences in
Student Borrowing, 20 EDU. RESEARCHER 558, 558 (2019).
100. MORGAN & STEINBAUM, supra note 84, at 30.
101. Darrick Hamilton et al., Umbrellas Don’t Make It Rain: Why Studying and
Working Hard Isn’t Enough for Black Americans, INSIGHT CTR. FOR CMTY. ECON.
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2. Macroeconomic Effects
The burdens of student debt inevitably resonate from
individual debtors to families and communities. When
parents are co-signers, of course, their children’s debts are a
burden, but even without such formal co-obligation, every
individual depends on the support of family, friends, coworkers, and others when they face hardship. People with
less individual wealth to draw upon are especially likely to
depend on community for financial difficulties.
Beyond these social network effects, a society that places
massive debts on a growing amount of its population at the
beginning of adulthood creates a massive demandsuppression program that suppresses employment,
especially among the most vulnerable.102 Debts force
individuals to divert income from spending on goods and
services to paying down bills. The increased employment in
the loan servicing and debt collection industries are not
enough to fill in for the decreased demand, which thus
depresses investment, which reduces job creation and wage
increases, which holds back aggregate demand further,
which reduces investment further, etc.
As will be discussed in more detail below, student debt’s
effects on demand are enough to reduce production and
employment by non-trivial amounts.103 As well, those
burdened with student debt are more likely to take highpaying jobs that they do not like rather than relatively lowerpaying jobs that involve giving back to their communities.104
DEV. (Apr. 2015), http://www.insightcced.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/
Umbrellas_Dont_Make_It_Rain_Final.pdf.
102. See Neil Irwin, How Student Debt May Be Stunting the Economy, N.Y.
TIMES (May 14, 2014), http://eee.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/upshot/the-role-ofstudent-debt-in-stunting-the-recovery.html.
103. SCOTT FULLWILER ET AL., LEVY ECON. INST., THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS
STUDENT DEBT CANCELLATION (Feb. 2018), http://www.levyinstitute.org/
pubs/rpr_2_6.pdf [hereinafter “MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS”].
OF

104. See Jesse Rothstein & Cecilia Elena Rouse, Constrained After College:
Student Loans and Early Career Occupational Choices, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 149
(2011); Konczal, supra note 87.
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And “[t]hese directly measurable effects of student debt
cancellation would be complemented by unmeasured social
benefits like greater social mobility and quality of life.”105 An
initial study confirms intuition and anecdotal evidence that
student loans take a toll on mental health, which can filter
through to physical health as well (and this does not take
into account the fact that student debt might make paying
for healthcare more difficult).106
3. But What About the Benefits of Student Debt?
All of this only presents one side of the ledger. Student
loans are not just impositions of burdens, after all. They are
used to pay for educations. It is a perfectly plausible reading
of the history of higher education policy to say that millions
and millions of people would not have obtained educations
without student debt to help them.
It is such an appreciation for the increased access that
student debt has enabled that has prevented student debt
cancellation from being taken seriously for so long. It is not
hard to find economic policy writing explaining how people
with college educations tend to be better off than those
without, due to the aforementioned “college premium.” The
increased earnings that come with a college education are
much greater, on average, than the (financial) cost of student
debt over the course of a lifetime. For many, perhaps most,
households, paying student debt is more an inconvenience
than a burden—like paying the gas bill. Moreover, an
educated population tends to produce more “value”—output
measured in money—for every hour of labor, which (at least
in theory) increases the “social surplus” that all can share (at
least in theory). Put them together, and you have the

105. MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS, supra note 103, at 13.
106. See Katrina Walsemann, Gilbert C. Gee & Danielle Gentile, Sick of Our
Loans: Student Borrowing and the Mental Health of Young Adults in the United
States, 124 SOC. SCI. & MED. 85, 92 (2015); Elizabeth Sweet et al., The High Price
of Debt: Household Finance and its Impact on Mental and Physical Health, 91
SOC. SCI. & MED. 94 (2013).
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standard “human capital” argument, where a college
education is understood as an investment in an individual’s
capacity to produce “value,” which makes that individual
more valuable to capitalists oriented towards earning profits
by maximizing value, thus allowing an individual to earn
more money on the labor market.
But one need not restrict one’s account of the value of
higher education to wages and productivity to appreciate the
fact that a student debtor uses their loan to buy something
of value. Indeed, one can reject the story of the “college
premium” (for reasons discussed below) and still believe that
the benefits to both individuals and to society of subsidizing
higher education well outweigh the costs of doing so through
loans.
While there is no doubt that one cannot account for the
burdens of student debt without accounting for the benefits,
there are several reasons to doubt that this is the right way
to think about the balancing.
First, for many people it is not even clear that they are
made better off by exposure to the combination of a college
education plus student debt. For-profit colleges have played
an especially pernicious role in this regard. As mentioned,
these institutions focus on attracting “non-traditional”
college students, i.e. those who are already worse off
economically than other college students. They encourage
these students to take on as much debt as they can, either
obscuring the amount of debt or assuring them that it will be
easily paid off (why else would everybody else be doing it and
the government approving of it?). Thus, for-profit college
students take on the most debt relative to income, and they
have the least likelihood of paying it off.107 Given their
backgrounds (the racial discrimination many of them face,
107. See Robert Howarth & Robert Lang, Debt and Disillusionment: Stories of
Former For-Profit College Students as Shared in Florida Focus Groups, CTR. FOR
RESPONSIBILITY LENDING (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.responsiblelending.org/
sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/crl-florida-debt-disillusionmen
t-l-aug2018.pdf.
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the lack of social capital, the lack of family income support,
etc.), these debtors are already likely to do less well in the
labor market.108 And credentials from for-profit colleges
generally do not improve their lot much, if at all. A 2012
study found that for-profit students did worse than
comparable students who went to community colleges, while
a 2016 study found that, on average, students who attended
for-profits actually made less money than before they
enrolled—i.e. that their college premiums were negative.109
Indeed, some former students have reported that the forprofit college they attended served as an anti-credential:
something that they leave off their resume if they want to
increase
their
chances
of
employment.
With
disproportionately high debts and disproportionately low
wealth and income, it should be no surprise that default
rates on student loans among for-profit students are so high
that they have pushed up the average default rate of the
entire federal student loan portfolio.110 The burden of
student debt compounded on top of other forms of financial
precariousness has caused anxiety, depression, and even
suicide.111
Similar considerations apply to students who attended
college at non-profit or public schools, but who failed to
complete their studies. These students, often with relatively
108. See COTTOM, supra note 75, at 157–77.
109. See David J. Deming, Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The For-Profit
Postsecondary School Sector: Nimble Critters or Agile Predators?, 26 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 139 (2012); Stephanie Riegg Cellini & Nicholas Turner, Gainfully
Employed? Assessing the Employment and Earnings of For-Profit College
Students Using Administrative Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 22287, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22287?utm_campaign=
ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw.
110. See Deming, Goldin & Katz, supra note 109; Adam Looney & Constantine
Yannelis, A Crisis in Student Loans? How Changes in the Characteristics of
Borrowers and in the Institutions They Attended Contributed to Rising Loan
Defaults (Brookings Institute, Working Paper, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ConferenceDraft_LooneyYannelis_StudentLoanDef
aults.pdf.
111. Adversary Complaint, supra note 77.
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low student debt amounts, do less well financially and
default disproportionately. And many others face negative
college premiums.
Even for people for whom post-college incomes justify the
amount of debt taken on in terms of lifetime balance sheets
(that is, the lifetime amount of debt payments is less than
the lifetime amount of the college premium), the cost may not
be worth it. That is both because people experience their
balance sheets moment by moment rather than over the
course of a lifetime—making the cost of debt relative to
income at any given time more relevant for which
opportunities are available and for resilience in the face of
exogenous shocks—and because the other costs of debt
should be accounted for. Those with substantial debts that
are nevertheless well below their lifetime income may be
worse off on net due to high stress levels, physical health
deterioration, “failure to launch,” and other non-financial
costs.112
Second, even were the advantages of a college education
to clearly outweigh the burden of debts for all who took on
student debt, that fact in itself does not make financing
higher education through individual indebtedness good
policy. There is still the question of the relevant baseline to
judge reality from. Suppose that we assume, along with the
prevailing human capital framework, that college graduates
are paid for their marginal productivity, which increases
because of skills gained at college. Even if that were so, one
could just as well finance human capital development by
making public higher education free or creating a voucher
program or some other alternative to individual
indebtedness. Human capital development plus debt, and no
human capital development at all do not exhaust the possible
arrangements. One would need an account of why student
debt is the superior form of higher education finance given
other possible alternatives, not just why it is better than
112. See generally GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 98.
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fewer people going to college.
Responding to this challenge, some have argued that
student debt makes sense at least for those who earn high
incomes and/or who come from families with high wealth
(thus, “income-based repayment” makes sense), since these
individuals who have benefited the most from education “pay
it forward” to those who might benefit.113 One obvious
problem with this response is that the current distribution of
the debt burden does not come close to representing a world
in which those who benefit most from education (on the
human capital framework—i.e. those who earn most after
college).114 But suppose one could correct for that. A deeper
challenge is that the wealthiest (and luckiest—including
recipients of financial aid, both “merit” and means based)
beneficiaries of college do not take on debt, and never will.
So they will not “pay it forward” under this logic. They might
“pay it forward” via taxation,115 but then that raises a further
point. It is not clear why one’s goal should be to have those
who could not afford college without some sort of financial
aid and then make a lot of money after college be the most on
the hook for the cost of education. If the goal is to develop a
scheme in which the payors are those who are the most able
113. See, e.g., Monica Potts, Paying it Forward on Student Debt, AM. PROSPECT
(Aug. 13, 2013), https://prospect.org/article/paying-it-forward-student-debt; see
Susan Dynarski, An Economist’s Perspective on Student Loans in the United
States (Economic Studies at Brookings, Working Paper, 2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/economist_perspective_
student_loans_dynarski.pdf.
114. This is taking the human capital theory for granted and ignoring the fact
that people’s incomes after college might reflect social capital, cultural capital,
and the like. Even if one were to correct for that fact, it is not clear why, unless
one is fully committed to the investment market metaphor, one would want those
who experience the greatest difference between what they would have earned
without a college degree and what they would have earned with it to pay the most
for education.
115. This is speaking loosely, setting aside the question of whether taxes “pay
for” spending. For currency issuers like the federal government, they do not; see
Stephanie Bell, Do Taxes and Bonds Finance Government Spending?, 34 J. ECON.
ISSUES 603 (2000). For currency users like state governments, they (plus bonds)
do.
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to pay (which would include those who benefit most from
higher education, even if they did not themselves get one,
since they receive the benefits of engineers, poets, etc.), then
progressive taxation based on wealth and/or income is much
superior.
In any case, there is also strong reason to doubt that
human capital theory, and the “skills gap” explanation it
provides for income differences, accounts for what is going on
with the college premium. As noted above, recent research
has demonstrated that the college premium is largely
explicable in terms of credentialization rather than skill
differences.116 And many authors have pointed out that
subsidizing education does not reduce inequality on its own.
So emphasizing its role in equalizing income or wealth has
the pernicious effect of drawing resources away from more
effective programs for doing so, while also providing a way to
blame the relatively worse off for their socio-economic
standing. (Which is not to gainsay the value of higher
education, only to question whether its value is properly
comprehended as a replacement for industrial policy, labor
regulation, redistribution of wealth, etc.).117
What is more, a focus on the benefits of student debt to
individuals and even to productivity fails to account for the
reverberating burdens beyond individuals to families and
communities. It fails to account for the collective loss—the
reduction in goods and services, the increase in
116. See, e.g., Morgan & Steinbaum, supra note 84; David Card & John E.
DiNardo, Skill-Biased Technological Change and Rising Wage Inequality: Some
Problems and Puzzles, 20 J. LABOR ECON. 733 (2002); David Autor, How Long Has
This Been Going On? A Discussion of “Recent Flattening in the Higher Education
Wage Premium: Polarization, Skill Downgrading, or Both?” by Robert G. Valletta
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Response Paper, 2017); Labor Market
Monopsony: Trends, Consequences, and Policy Responses, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC
ADVISERS (Oct. 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
page/files/20161025_monopsony_labor_mrkt_cea.pdf; Marshall Steinbaum, How
Widespread is Labor Monopsony? Some New Results Suggest It’s Pervasive,
ROOSEVELT INST. BLOG (Dec. 17, 2017), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/howwidespread-labor-monopsony-some-new-results-suggest-its-pervasive/.
117. See, e.g., Hamilton et al., supra note 101.

318

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

unemployment—that results from the dampening of
aggregate demand. It fails to account for the diversion of
people from socially valuable but low-paying work (teaching,
social work, artmaking) into extractive but high-paying work
(flash trading, private equity firm-flipping, engineering
fracking equipment). A full accounting of the costs and
benefits of student debt cannot be reduced to comparison of
the aggregate of individual’s loan payments over a lifetime
compared with the aggregate of their incomes above what
they might have expected to earn without a college degree.
And the accounting would have to specify the alternatives
against which the costs and benefits are to be compared:
student debt looks different when compared to restricting
higher education to the elites than it does when compared to
providing universal public higher education.
More on such accounting will come out below, and no
single article can cover its full scope. For now, it is enough to
point out that the nature of the accounting is not a mere
measuring of lifetime earnings versus debt burdens. It is not
a matter of whether student debt is bearable or not. The
question of what counts as an unjustified burden requires
drawing moral baselines. It requires reasoning about the
value of education to a good society and how the burden of
payment ought to be divided in such a society. One cannot
undertake a full accounting without something to say about
when, if ever, charging individuals for the cost of education
is justified and when such charges ought to force individuals
to take on debt.
B. Distortions of Higher Education
Student debt has also contributed to the restructuring of
higher education. The more higher education is funded by
debt, the more transactional the relationship between
students and college becomes. The fact that students will be
on the hook for tens of thousands of dollars of tuition makes
them more likely to ask whether they’re getting their
“money’s worth” and, specifically, to think of that value in
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terms of how much it increases their ability to earn money in
the future. Students come to view themselves as customers
relative to institutions of higher education, and as investors
(in “human capital”) relative to the education itself. Colleges
that depend increasingly on tuition—mostly funded through
debt—come to view students as present and potentially
future income streams, and education as a service that is
being sold to these customers.118 Policymakers, who started
out thinking of higher education as primarily a public charge
with debt filling the gaps, have come to understand higher
education in the same terms—as investment in human
capital.
Although modern (i.e. neoclassical) human capital
theory was originally developed in the late 1950s, it only
really began to influence discussions of higher education
outside of economics departments when student debt became
a mass phenomenon.119 The felt reality of higher education
as leveraged investment made the financial metaphor less
abstract, more plausible. Thus, the most influential policy
voices for the past twenty years or so have understood the
role of policy as that of facilitating profitable investments
through access to credit (with some subsidy for lower-income
students and some credit insurance via income-based
repayment) and consumer protection regulation that forces
students and colleges to “internalize” the cost of their
actions.120
118. See Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 145–51; WENDY BROWN, UNDOING
STEALTH REVOLUTION 175–200 (2015).

THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S

119. See Elizabeth Popp Berman, How College Became an Investment in
Human Capital (unpublished draft chapter, on file with author).
120. See, e.g., CEA Report; Dynarski, supra note 113; Beth Akers & Matthew
M. Chingos, Is a Student Loan Crisis on the Horizon?, BROOKINGS (June 24, 2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/is-a-student-loan-crisis-on-the-horizon/;
Nicole Allan & Derek Thompson, The Myth of the Student-Loan Crisis, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/03/
myth-student-loan-crisis/309231/; Diane Harris, The Truth About Student Debt:
7 Facts No One is Talking About, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 8, 2019, 12:44 PM),
https://www.newsweek.com/2019/08/23/student-debt-loans-truth-facts-coverstory-1453057.html. See generally GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (1993).
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The notion that education might have value to individual
or society beyond increasing an individual’s ability to
compete on an increasingly monopsonistic job market (or,
according to human capital theory, through increased worker
“productivity”) fades into the background. Why would we
care whether our fellow Americans have knowledge of, say,
the basics of climate science or the history of racialized
domination in the United States if this knowledge does not
produce returns on the labor market? Why would we care if
colleges decide who to hire and fire based on desire to meet
job-focused student demand and to adjunctify the college
workforce, undermining investment in research and
academic freedom?
Indeed, focusing on a return on investment at the retail
level obscures the social value of investing in the sorts of
skills that are useful for doing particular types of labor.
Individual students will make “investment” decisions based
on the current state of the labor market, with perhaps some
information about what the near future will look like. But
the labor market can be subject to rapid changes, and society
can suddenly need particular types of skills that were not
well remunerated previously. The COVID-19 crisis has made
abundantly clear how suddenly skills such as knowledge of
infectious disease, ability to produce medical devices, ability
to design a fiscal and monetary response to a sudden collapse
in supply and demand, and the like become highly valuable
while others suddenly collapse in market value. As with
other areas of investment, it makes sense to have the state
fund long-term investments in knowledge and skills that
may not produce immediate returns or even be of obvious use
in the short term to ensure that such investments are made
rather than leaving it to profit-maximizing individuals to
invest in the skills most likely to produce returns over their
lifetime based on present information.121

121. See generally MARIANNA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE:
DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS (2013).
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The focus on short-term employability has been most
explicit in the for-profit sector, where the colleges explicitly
sell themselves in terms of return on investment and charge
as much as possible to maximize revenue from students.122
Students, meanwhile, understand education almost entirely
in terms of how it will increase their job prospects (and then,
only in relatively low-wage job markets). Policymakers
understand their role as ensuring for-profits actually
produce the return on investment that they advertise,
whether through disclosure regulation, consumer fraud
enforcement, or more “intrusive” ways of forcing for-profits
to internalize bad job market outcomes.123
Much as the suffering of for-profit college students
provides an extreme example of the negative impacts that
student debt can have on people’s lives, the success of forprofit colleges provides an extreme example of the negative
structural dynamics engendered by funding education
through student debt. Although generally less explicitly
transactional, many more “traditional” colleges have begun
to sell themselves in terms of return on investment as
students increasingly view themselves as consumers of
educational (investment) services.124 Manifestations of this
tendency include adding more specialized terminal masters
degree programs that charge high tuition and advertise
professionalization of one type or another (often without the
promised return on investment), changing undergraduate
curricular offerings to tilt away from purportedly “useless”
low-demand disciplines like history, philosophy, and art, and
122. See ANGULO, supra note 54, at 114–46 (2016); COTTOM, supra note 75, at
113–56; HELP Report, supra note 77; ITT Educ. Svcs. Inc., Annual Report (Form
10-K) 3 (Feb. 23, 2007) (describing the business model as “to increase student
enrollment without incurring a proportionate increase in fixed costs.”).
123. See ANGULO, supra note 54, at 114–32; Rebecca Schulman, “This is Your
Money”: Why For-Profit Colleges are the Real Welfare Queens, SLATE (June 4,
2015, 5:14 PM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2015/06/for-profit-colleges-andfederal-aid-they-get-more-than-90-percent-of-their-funding-from-the-governmen
t.html.
124. See Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 145–51.
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towards more “useful” high-demand disciplines like exercise
science and business management.125
C. A Self-Reproducing Political Economy
Funding through student debt also creates a political
dynamic in which more and more entities depend on how the
government manages its student debt programs, and on how
they can attract investment from non-governmental actors.
In the process of what sociologist Charlie Eaton and his coauthors have called “the financialization of higher
education,” running a college becomes more and more like
running a business.126 Administrators have to spend more
time with budgets, donors, investors, and lobbyists than with
curricula, professors, and students. Mutual dependence on
student debt among colleges, financial companies, servicers,
guaranty agencies, etc. creates a powerful lobby for the
expansion of debt with as little accountability as possible (or,
when accountability is non-negotiable, it should be measured
in terms of return on investment so that colleges can take
credit for the college premium that results from wage
repression and everybody that makes money from student
debt can stay in business). We have seen that non-profit and
public colleges had initially opposed funding through debt—
favoring funding directly to them instead, but, as they have
become more dependent on debt and the possibility for
anything else has faded into the background, their lobbying
arms have mostly come around as advocates for more
loans.127 In the face of policy disagreement and
immobilization among students and faculty, concentrated

125. See Yoni Appelbaum, Why America’s Business Majors Are in Desperate
Need of a Liberal-Arts Education, THE ATLANTIC (June 28, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/why-americas-businessmajors-are-in-desperate-need-of-a-liberal-arts-education/489209/. See generally
Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 WASH. &. LEE L. REV. 527 (2013)
(justifying this outcome in human capital terms).
126. Eaton et al., Financialization, supra note 75.
127. Supra [discussion of the 1972 amendments].
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interests, the existence or profitability of which depend on
colleges remaining unaffordable and debt remaining
plentiful, kept the gravy train rolling.128 Berman and Stivers
refer to this effect as the creation of a “policy field” in student
debt, which caused student debt to become “a pressure on
higher education.”129
Again, for-profits provide an extreme illustration of the
general dynamic. Higher education expert Bob Shireman has
identified a cyclical politics of for-profit colleges, which he
refers to as “scandal, regulate, forget, repeat.”130 This cycle
goes all the way back to the GI Bill, when for-profit
vocational schools first received access to federal aid, but it
took on a more regular rhythm after the 1972 amendments
to the HEA first granted for-profit colleges access to student
loans and other Title IV aid. Every half decade or so since
then, amongst a steady trickle of lawsuits, out comes an
excoriating report from one or another branch of the federal
government or from enterprising investigative journalists
about widespread fraud in the for-profit sector. These reports
lead for calls for accountability, which are fought tooth and
nail by for-profits until they result in some more-or-less tepid
regulatory action. Some of these regulations have limited the
outright fraud and stemmed the tide of odious debt, but only
somewhat and only until a new deluge wipes them away.
Once the fury dies down and the news cycle rolls elsewhere,
for-profits’ lobbyists continue their usual business of
neutralizing or eliminating unfavorable regulations and,
when enough Republicans are in Congress, gaining new
regulatory favors.131

128. See METTLER, supra note 5, at 51–60.
129. Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 137. The concept of “field” Berman and
Stivers employ comes from NEIL FLIGSTEIN & DOUG MCADAM, A THEORY OF FIELDS
(2015).
130. Robert Shireman, The For-Profit College Story: Scandal, Regulate, Forget,
Repeat, CENTURY FOUND. (Jan. 24, 2017), https://tcf.org/content/report/profitcollege-story-scandal-regulate-forget-repeat/.
131. See id.; METTLER, supra note 5; ANGULO, supra note 54 at 58–84 (on the
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Not infrequently, for-profit lobbyists work alongside the
lobbyists for more “traditional” colleges. And, of course,
Sallie Mae and others that profit most directly from student
loans have fought for their own regulatory favors with a
similar ability to win when the light does not shine too
brightly on them. As discussed above, even common sense
policy like cutting out the middlemen in student lending took
nearly thirty years of fighting once the first pilot program
was created, and then the victory only came because of a
world-historical financial crisis.132
Most perniciously, the Department of Education (DOE)
itself, the federal administrative agency responsible for
regulating higher education, has come to think like a student
debt profiteer. This is both because it is one—that is, it is
directly responsible for the issuance and collection of nearly
all student debt and subject to multiple incentives to
maintain its budget in the black—and because many of its
appointed staff come through the revolving door from these
concentrated interests who profit from student debt.133 So
early scandals); Id. at 85–132 (on subsequent scandals). Earlier parts of Angulo’s
book discusses the development of for-profit colleges and other vocational schools
before the GI Bill, but in this earlier era federal funds were not at issue and so
the scandal process was not quite the same. For a recent example of the lengths
to which for-profits will go to stop regulations, see Eric Lichtblau, With Lobbying
Blitz, For-Profit Colleges Diluted New Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/us/politics/for-profit-college-rules-scaledback-after-lobbying.html. For the current state of affairs, with the Secretary of
Education totally in the bag for for-profit colleges, see David Dayen, Betsy DeVos
Quietly Making it Easier for Dying For-Profit Schools to Rip Off a Few More
Students on the Way Out, THE INTERCEPT (Apr. 12, 2019, 9:55 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2019/04/12/betsy-devos-for-profit-colleges/; Erica L.
Green & Stacy Cowley, Emails Show DeVos Aides Pulled Strings for Failing ForProfit Colleges, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/23/
us/politics/dream-center.html.
132. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., David Halperin, Another For-Profit College Lobbyist to Join
DeVos Education Department, REPUBLIC REPORT (Mar. 6, 2018, 11:33 AM),
https://www.republicreport.org/2018/another-profit-college-lobbyist-join-devoseducation-department/; Scott Jaschik, Breaking: Apollo Sold to Investors with
Obama Ties, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/
quicktakes/2016/02/08/breaking-apollo-sold-investors-obama-ties.
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each time DOE considers what to do about abuses among forprofit colleges, student loan servicers, accreditors, or some
other branch of the student loan complex, it is subject both
to external and internal lobbying to keep the gravy train
rolling.
Student debt, in other words, creates the conditions for
its own perpetuation, transforming the higher education
system and many other aspects of our society along with it.
For many years, the only opponents of increased student
debt with any voice in Washington were non-profit advocacy
groups without mobilized bases, and thus without much
political capital to throw around. In addition to the general
difficulty of mobilizing a mass group of people without a
common identity, many student debtors have internalized
the morality of individual responsibility that comes with the
legal obligation to repay and had been preoccupied with
taking the sorts of risks—political or otherwise—that might
put them out of a job and behind on their payments. Some
observers have posited that the increase in student debt
contributed to the de-mobilization of college students, both
by preoccupying students with worries about bills (forcing
them to get jobs when they might have spent that time
organizing, adding mental stress and thus reducing the
capacity to take creative and risky political action) and by
socializing students into the consumerist role discussed
above.134 On this theory, student debt functioned as a form
of social control, whether intentionally or not.
In recent years, there have been some signs that more
and more student debtors have begun to understand their
plight not as an individual responsibility but as a collective
failure.135 As these debtors have started to mobilize,
134. Cf. Interview by Edward Radzivilovskiy with Noam Chomsky, (Feb. 27,
2013), https://chomsky.info/20130227/; Chris Maisano, The Soul of Student Debt,
JACOBIN (Dec. 27, 2012), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2012/12/the-soul-ofstudent-debt/.
135. See, e.g., James Ceronsky, Five Ways Student Debt Resistance is Taking
Off, TRUTHOUT (Oct. 28, 2013), https://truthout.org/articles/five-ways-student-
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politicians have begun to take notice. For the first time since
student debt first became part of federal higher education
policy, members of Congress and plausible candidates for
President have proposed bills containing structural reform of
federal higher education policy that includes cancellation of
student debt and policies that would prevent further
accumulation by making college broadly affordable. The
COVID-19 crisis has only heightened the contradictions and
made calls for debt cancellation louder.
The sorts of policies that Truman’s Commission on
Higher Education concluded were necessary more than
seventy years ago may finally be on the horizon. There is a
certain irony here: the introduction of student debt pulled
federal higher education policy away from the Truman
Commission’s vision, but the misery that debt brought into
being may have contributed to the mobilization that would
bring federal higher education policy back in line with it.

debt-resistance-is-taking-off/; Astra Taylor, A Strike Against Student Debt, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/28/opinion/a-strikeagainst-student-debt.html. I should mention that I was involved in organizing
the debt strike mentioned in this article. See also DEBT COLLECTIVE,
https://debtcollective.org (last visited Mar. 20, 2020) (I was formerly legal director
of this organization); STUDENT DEBT CRISIS, https://studentdebtcrisis.org/ (last
visited Mar. 20, 2020).

2020]

STUDENT DEBT JUBILEE

327

III. REASONS TO CANCEL STUDENT DEBT
Canceling student debt would make individual debtors
wealthier and end ongoing extractive or coercive
relationships between debtors and their creditors, servicers,
or collectors. Both the wealth transfer and the elimination of
indebtedness (the same thing in accounting terms, but not in
every way) would make debtors’ lives—and the lives of the
families, friends, and communities on which debtors
depend—easier. Since student debts’ burdens are skewed
along race and class lines, these impacts would
disproportionately benefit relatively disadvantaged people—
though not the most disadvantaged (on average, those who
have not attended college are worse off). Eliminating trillions
of dollars of liabilities would increase aggregate demand,
stimulating investment and employment and redirecting
both towards more socially beneficial forms of work. These
knock-on macroeconomic effects would also make many
peoples’ lives better (and likely a much smaller number of
other peoples’ lives worse) in not entirely predictable ways.
But blanket student debt cancellation is a sideways—or,
at best, partial—approach to the problems of wealth
inequality and of demand/investment shortfalls. Regarding
the former, many student debtors are relatively quite well
off, and for the student debtors who are struggling the most
it is not always clear that student debt cancellation is the
most effective way to make their lives better (or, at the least,
student debt cancellation would have to be part of a broader
relief package). Regarding the latter, student debt
cancellation does not provide the biggest stimulus effect.
What student debt cancellation is not a sideways
approach to, though, is removing a burden on individuals
and society that has no good justification. Student debt
cancellation makes the most sense as a form of restitution
and revitalization. It is best situated in a program that wipes
our collective hands clean of a way of financing higher
education that places the primary burden on individuals,
with racist, anti-egalitarian, and anti-democratic effects.
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Canceling student debt repudiates the legitimacy of this
allocation of burdens. When paired with a plan to
de-commodify and democratize higher education, and
especially when paired with a series of reforms of the way we
organize wealth distribution, labor, and investment, it
contributes to rebuilding a higher education system on the
principle of collective responsibility for investing in skills,
forms of knowledge, and ways of knowing that benefit all of
us. It would be part of building a system more along the lines
envisioned by the Truman Commission, before student debt
was invented.
That doing so would also make millions of peoples’ lives
better both directly and indirectly cannot be counted against
it. That its distributional consequences would be ambiguous
in the short term provides reason to pair it with other
reforms to make our society more equal, not a reason not to
undertake an otherwise worthy plan.
A. Student Debt as Illegitimate
The most fundamental argument for canceling student
debt begins from the proposition that student debt burdens
individuals and distorts higher education and political
systems in ways that are unjustified. Put differently: there
is no good reason to force people to take out debt to get an
education or to keep people in debt because they got an
education. When there is no good reason to keep people in
debt, there is a good reason to cancel their debt.
The simplest form of this argument is the most extreme:
student debt is fundamentally misguided and should not
exist at all. This is the view for those who believe education
of all levels is a collective responsibility—whether
understood as a public good, a right, or in some other terms—
and to make individuals pay for their own educations is to
fail to meet that responsibility. It is to treat education as a
privilege. Rather, we should all chip in, whether according to
our ability to do so, according to the degree to which we have
been benefited by a society with these educational
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institutions, or according to some other principle of shared
burden. The notion of collective responsibility for education
can be supported instrumentally (we all benefit from living
among highly educated people in a way that cannot be
measured at retail), deontologically (each of us has a right to
a certain amount of education), social-contractually
(reasonable people would agree to providing a certain
amount of education), or in some combination. It could be
grounded in a political theory of a free and democratic
society, in which education plays the role of socializing
people for self-governance, providing skills the value of
which can be collectively determined, and facilitating the
sort of critical thinking that enables collective freedom to be
exercised. Fleshing out the details of these views and how
they might line up to different sorts of financing structures
is beyond the scope of this Article. But it is worth noting that
this general way of thinking is familiar for K-12 education in
the United States. Even primary and secondary education
are not actually funded in accordance with a belief in
collective responsibility (i.e. they are highly unequally
funded, with advantages going to the already wealthy, and
especially to white families), the discussion usually begins
from the premise of collective responsibility rather than
individual investment.
The simple anti-debt view can also be grounded in a more
pragmatic, and potentially complementary, set of reasons.
The basic way of thinking here would be that creating a
market for individual indebtedness to finance education
might have been a justifiable compromise to expand access
to higher education during a time when higher education
was still seen by many as a privilege and as primarily a
responsibility of the several states and when there was no
reason to believe student debt would be anything but a minor
burden on a few people. But we live in a time when higher
education has become increasingly necessary, when the
higher education system would collapse without continued
federal government support, and when student debt has
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come to transform our whole way of viewing higher
education. Canceling student debt would eliminate the
political coalition that continues to privatize and financialize
higher education, causing worse consequences for those who
have already been failed by our educational system and are
duped by for-profit colleges. For that matter, it would
eliminate the scam industry built on pretending to help
people make student debt payments easier—because there
would be no such payments to help people make. A whole
slew of grifters would be out of business. A full repudiation
of student debt would reorient the way people think about
the role of higher education. It would give students more
autonomy in determining what to study and what sort of
work to do. (This autonomy would be more, not maximal: the
job market’s pressures would still loom large absent other
reforms.) It would create less pressure on institutions to
teach narrowly “practical” classes, to produce a “return on
investment,” and/or to satisfy financiers and donors, opening
up space for more academic freedom.
Less full-throated versions of these ways of thinking
could provide reasons for a middle ground view in support of
some but not all debt cancellation. How far the anti-debt
argument goes depends on the circumstances in which one
thinks it is justifiable to have individuals who cannot afford
the upfront cost be financially responsible for their own
educations. At the level of principle, one might think that, for
instance, we collectively owe it to each other and to ourselves
as a society to make education, and more specifically higher
education, easily accessible, but not necessarily free or even
debt-free. Perhaps so long as most of the cost of education is
collectively borne, then affordability is enough. Affordability
does not inherently exclude the need to take on debt to pay—
suppose the debt is easily paid off as soon as a student
receives her first year’s worth of post-college paychecks, for
instance—and so forcing people to take on student debt does
not inherently violate this type of right to education. One
might pair this view with at least a partial endorsement of
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the importance of price signaling—i.e. of internalization of
cost—such that an individual should bear more of the cost of
her education when she learns something that produces less
social benefit. Or perhaps when she goes to school without
actually learning anything—using up social resources on
education without actually being educated—or when she
reaches some pre-determined limit of schooling (as a way of
rationing social resources).
At a pragmatic level, one might take the view that lower
amounts of student debt (both in the aggregate and
individually relative to income/wealth) do not produce the
sorts of burdens on individuals or the political system that
higher amounts do. So full cancellation would not be
necessary to achieve the goals of cancellation. On this view,
the original view for student debt as a gap-filler made sense
and should be preserved, but this time with a policy
apparatus more focused on keeping it in check. The benefit
of hindsight would become a form of foresight.
One can calibrate up or down, and a full discussion goes
well beyond our purposes here. The basic principle to get
across is that there is a link between one’s view about the
wisdom of individual responsibility for higher education at a
political, moral, and practical level and one’s view about
whether current student debt burdens are justifiable. The
less justifiable current burdens are, the better the reason for
canceling student debt.
This way of justifying a student debt jubilee treats it as
a way to right a (social and individual) wrong. It is morally
justified
for
that
reason,
independently
of
welfare/distributional effects of cancellation, just as
providing a remedy for an intentional tort or a violation of
property rights is justified (to the extent it is!) regardless of
the relative resources of the plaintiff and the defendant. This
is not to say that the distributional effects of student debt
may not provide part of the reason to think that student debt
is (or is not) a wrong that merits a remedy, just as a tort or
property rule might be justified in part on net distributional
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terms. But finding student debt unjustified—and the
cancellation of it justified—in part because of the
distributional implications of funding higher education
through individual indebtedness is not the same thing as
finding the cancellation of student debt justified only insofar
as it is a means to increase the material wellbeing—as a
transfer of wealth—of those who are currently worst off.
B. Eliminating the Burdens of Student Debt
Whatever the reason for canceling student debt, doing so
would remove student debtors’ need to set aside a certain
portion of their income to pay off their debts, thereby freeing
up income streams for other uses. This increase in
purchasing power can be thought of as equivalent to a cash
transfer. Increased purchasing power benefits former
student debtors and their intimates by giving these
beneficiaries access to more goods and services, by increasing
their willingness to make big purchases like houses and cars,
by making it more financially sensible to start a family, by
increasing emotional and physical well-being, and in any
number of other ways that having more money is beneficial
in a society where money increases access to nearly
anything. It would, in other words, make less likely at least
some of the negative life outcomes associated with student
debt discussed above. Recent research suggests that these
benefits would contribute to narrowing the Black-White
wealth gap, because Black households tend to hold relatively
more student debt for a given level of income or wealth than
do white households.136 There is some debate, however, over

136. See generally Marshall Steinbaum, Student Debt and Racial Wealth
Inequality (Aug. 7, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Jain Family
Inst.); Louise Seamster, How Should We Measure the Racial Wealth Gap?
Relative vs. Absolute Gaps in the Student Debt Forgiveness Debate, SCATTERPLOT
(July 27, 2019), https://scatter.wordpress.com/2019/07/27/how-should-wemeasure-the-racial-wealth-gap-relative-vs-absolute-gaps-in-the-student-debtforgiveness-debate/. But see Adam Looney, How Progressive is Senator Warren’s
Loan Forgiveness Proposal?, BROOKINGS (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.brookings
.edu/blog/up-front-/2019/04/24/how-progressive-is-senator-elizabeth-warrens-
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the optimal design of a debt cancellation policy if one’s goal
is narrowing this gap.137
Increasing the purchasing power of many people at once
also has knock-on macroeconomic effects when the people
with increased purchasing power use that to buy goods and
services, stimulating business investment, increasing
employment, etc. in the familiar Keynesian virtuous cycle. A
study published by the Levy Institute of Economics at Bard
University found that “the positive feedback effects of [full]
student debt cancellation could add on average between $86
billion and $108 billion per year to the economy,” which
would “create 50 percent to 70 percent as many jobs in its
peak year as the current economic expansion creates in an
average year, and could continue to sustain about one-third
of the job creation seen in the cancellation’s peak years
throughout the duration of the cancellation.”138 At least
given the state of the macroeconomy in 2017, this expansion
would have negligible inflationary effects.139
The main source of objection raised by that way of
thinking is that a transfer payment just to student debtors—
and a transfer payment that takes the form of debt
cancellation rather than cash transfers—is not the best way
to target such payments.140 If one’s goal is macroeconomic
loan-forgiveness-proposal/.
137. See Seamster, supra note 136; Steinbaum, supra note 136; Naomi Zewde
& Darrick Hamilton, Cancel All the Student Debt: It’s About Economic and Racial
Justice, Rewire News (Oct. 14, 2019); Mark Huelsman, Only One Candidate’s
Student Debt Plan Narrows the Black-White Wealth Gap, Rewire News (June 8,
2019).
138. FULLWILER ET AL., supra note 103, at 8, 41.
139. Id. at 45.
140. See, e.g., Looney, supra note 136; Matt Bruenig, The Student Debt
Forgiveness Muddle Continues, PEOPLE’S POLICY PROJECT (June 24, 2019),
https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/2019/06/24/the-student-debt-forgivenessmuddle-continues/; David Leonhardt, Eliminating All Student Debt Isn’t
Progressive, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/18/
opinion/student-debt-forgiveness-college-democrats.html; Eric Levitz, Critics of a
Student Debt Jubilee Are Right (and Wrong), INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 20, 2018),
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/11/eliminate-all-student-debt-leonhardt-
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stimulus, one could generate a greater multiplier effect by
targeting spending differently: to infrastructure, to the
poorest, etc. If one wants to target macroeconomic stimulus
according to some sort of industrial policy—i.e. to develop
certain areas of investment, skills development, and
innovation, rather than letting financiers decide where to
spend the money based on profitability projections—then one
should direct spending towards the area in which one wants
to create the investment. Thus, investment in green tech, in
high-speed trains, in public housing, in reparations for
slavery and native genocide, and the like would be a better
macroeconomic program than canceling student debt.
From a distributional angle, there is reason to doubt that
student debtors should get a benefit that people who have
had to reduce their consumption to pay off their student debt
should not.141 Or, rather, if one’s sole goal is to increase
purchasing power for those where that increase would do the
most good, one should simply pay cash to people in the most
need of it: i.e. those with the least income and/or wealth.142
Student debtors tend to be relatively well off, since a majority
of the population does not go to college at all, gaining not
even the college premium that student debtors benefit from.
And a substantial fraction of student debtors are quite well
off: highly paid doctors, lawyers, financiers, and the like have
large debts if they recently graduated. Paying cash rather
than canceling debt would have the added advantage that it
would not mandate how recipients of the transfer payment
must spend it: they could direct income streams according to
their own priorities.
None of these arguments address the sorts of reasons for
new-york-times-ocasio-cortez.html.
141. See Lukas Mikelionis, Warren’s Massive $640 Billion Student Loan
Cancellation Questioned Over Fairness to Students Who Paid Off Their Debts,
FOX NEWS (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/warrens-massive640-billion-student-loan-cancellation-questioned-over-fairness-to-students-whopaid-off-their-debts.
142. See Bruenig, supra note 140; Levitz, supra note 140.
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canceling student debt discussed above. Assuming that one
does not find these arguments convincing—that one thinks
that student debt does not distort higher education, because,
say, one thinks that student debt is fundamental for
producing productive workers according to whatever the
market demands—each of these arguments has some merit.
But, even on that assumption, they all implicitly assume that
there is a trade-off between student debt cancellation and
other transfers from the government. Without such a tradeoff, they are not arguments against the value of increasing
the purchasing power of the population of people who happen
to have student debt (by canceling their debts), but rather
arguments that other ways of increasing purchasing power
would be even better. Put differently: why not (assuming one
shares these priorities) enact student debt cancellation in
addition to antipoverty programs, a Green New Deal,
reparations, etc.?
Here’s one potential reason: there is only so much fiscal
space in which the government can operate, whether due to
a concern about raising taxes, about inflation, about “the
national debt,” or some combination. But it is doubtful that
student debt cancellation would have much impact on the
fiscal space in which the federal government can operate.
The national debt is not something to worry about in the
abstract, and the national deficit is to be celebrated,
especially during recessionary periods—especially during
the current crisis. There is little reason to be concerned about
inflation in the contemporary environment (this was so even
before the COVID-19 crisis). But even if there were a need to
create fiscal space for other priorities, there are plenty of
ways to do so: plenty of places in the budget could do with
trimming (most notably the military budget could be cut by
hundreds of billions of dollars while harming only defense
contractors and arms dealers and by tens of trillions of
dollars with enormous benefits for humanity), and there is
plenty of room to raise taxes both to stave off inflation and to
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remove power from the rich.143
Another potential worry is that there is a limited supply
of “political capital” for progressive priorities, and policies
like universal healthcare, expanding public housing,
strengthening unions, restructuring the criminal legal
system, or even equalizing resources for K–12 education
should be in line before student debt cancellation (perhaps
even if it’s understood as part of a program of
de-commodification). But even accepting that student debt
cancellation should not be a high priority in terms of its
relative contribution to social justice and even accepting that
limits on political capital make setting priorities necessary,
there is a problem with treating political capital as only
usable for (as it were) consumption goods. Less cryptically:
some expenditures of political capital are investments. They
create or strengthen or grow a political base, or make a titfor-tat exchange easier, or put political opponents on the
back foot, or otherwise make enacting other priorities easier
in the future.
It seems at least plausible that canceling student debt
would function in this way. Student debt cancellation would
benefit tens of millions of people in a direct and tangible way,
and more indirectly. It would both disproportionately benefit
young people, perhaps encouraging them to vote and even
motivating them to engage more deeply with progressive
politics, and benefit highly educated people, who are more
likely to vote. Combined with a package of other policies, it
could contribute to building a broad political coalition, rather
than shrinking the pie. Perhaps it would go otherwise,
perhaps student debtors would pull up the ladder. But that
is not obvious in the abstract: whether that would be so
would surely depend on the details of the policy and the
circumstances of its enactment.
The most elemental potential trade-off derives from the
fact that enacting policies takes time. One cannot do
143. See Levitz, supra note 140.
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everything at once, and the further in the future one plans to
do something the more certain it is. So one must set priorities
for what should be done first. It cannot be denied, of course,
that some things have to be done before others. Time
marches ever onward. And so we come to the root of these
worries about badly targeted benefits: the worry that student
debtors just are not that deserving relative to others.
Certainly it is true that, if one’s priority is to determine
who most deserves an increase in purchasing power and how
that increase would most stimulate the macroeconomy, other
distributional considerations are more important. And it is
also true that, even if one’s priority is relieving the burdens
of student debt (or, more narrowly, relieving the burdens of
those who were made worse off by taking on student debt,
even accounting for the benefits of some college education), a
means-tested intervention that also includes payments to
some people who have paid off their debts but are worse off
because they had to divert resources to do so would be better
targeted. But even if those things are true, they do not
undermine the point that canceling student debt would have
beneficial effects, which, even purely understood in terms of
purchasing power, are reason to give it some priority. And
there are other reasons in its favor, some of which have just
been reviewed. Distributive implications could be accounted
for in the details of the design of the plan.
There remains the question of what to do for people who
already paid off their student debt or what to do about the
fact that canceling student debt would not prevent future
people from taking it on. The latter question would be
directly addressed if student debt cancellation were paired
with a plan to make higher education free/affordable, as it
should be and (as we will discuss) as the leading plans do.144
The former I will not address at any length: any removal of

144. There are some complications here: nobody is proposing to make all higher
education free, so graduate level education and private higher education would
still generate debt.
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an injustice always fails to benefit those who have already
experienced the injustice. In any case, canceling student debt
does not in itself preclude paying those who paid theirs off
early or who scrimped and saved to avoid taking it on.
Finally, concerns about the distributional implications of
debt cancellation do not in themselves provide a reason not
to cancel any student debt. They provide a reason to apply
some sort of limitation on a jubilee, likely via some sort of
means test. Doing so might be a good idea, but it would have
to be weighed against the difficulty of coming up with the
right way of targeting relief and the administrative burden
that such means testing inevitably creates, which often
creates conditions that prevent the most vulnerable from
accessing relief. Others have begun to hash out these details.
C. Debt Cancellation as Jubilee
A jubilee is not exactly the same thing as a transfer of
cash or benefits in kind. It is a different way of increasing
wealth. It ends a particular type of obligation, a claim on a
flow of income over time. Doing so has effects that are not
entirely reducible to increasing purchasing power. It ends
the need to come up with liquidity (i.e. cash) to pay off a debt,
which makes the pressure to find employment less intense
and increases one’s ability to pay other bills. This is
especially important in when, say, incomes suddenly freeze
up. Canceling debt also reduces a household’s leverage and
eliminates creditors’ power over their debtors. Reducing
leverage makes households less vulnerable to business cycle
downturns (or full-blown economic crises) and makes it less
risky to do things that might result in losses of income or
increases in costs. It is also likely to improve credit scores (on
average), which increases opportunities to take on other debt
on better terms, to get approved for an apartment, to get a
lower rate on insurance, and even to get a job. Reducing
aggregate leverage enables more productive borrowing
and/or decreases the potential for debt deflationary effects in
a downturn.
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Eliminating the relationship between debtor and
creditor makes it such that a debtor does not have to worry
about the debt or anything associated with it anymore:
staying on top of payments, signing up for the right
repayment plan, dealing with errors or predatory practices
from servicers and collectors, avoiding scams, etc. It makes
one freer to make choices without having to think about how
they will impact one’s ability to pay a debt: to take time off
from work, to do less lucrative work (or more lucrative work
without being worried about falling into the cracks of
repayment plans), to go back to school, etc. It also prevents
the creditor from setting conditions on what a debtor can do.
In the case of public student debt, that means, for instance,
being able to do work that does not qualify for the public
service loan forgiveness plan or to take a year off from doing
that type of work without facing a huge penalty. Jubilees
have been traditionally undertaken for both of these reasons.
In sum, they create a clean slate, a form of rough justice that
allows debtors to move on with their lives and reduces total
leverage.
A recent study has demonstrated how canceling student
debt can have knock-on deleveraging effects.145 Researchers
examined what happened to individuals who suddenly found
their private student debts canceled because a collector could
not establish chain of title.146 These borrowers were already
in default—so they were already not paying on these debts,
so none of the effects had to do with increased cash flow.147
Yet they reduced their total indebtedness by an average of
$4,000 beyond the amount of student loan cancellation they
received.148 They did both by borrowing less on existing
accounts (i.e. they had less need to take on a credit card
145. Marco Di Maggio, Ankit Kalda, & Vincent Yao, The Effects of Debt Relief
on the Student Loan Market, VOX CEPR POLICY PORTAL (Sept. 7, 2019),
https://voxeu.org/article/effects-debt-relief-student-loan-market.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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balance for routine purchases) and by taking out fewer
debts.149 Less debt meant they were significantly less likely
to go into delinquency or default on their other debts.150 Some
of the results may be attributable to the fact that these
borrowers increased their income on average, apparently
because they were able to find better jobs.151
D. Conclusion
In sum, there are multiple overlapping reasons to cancel
student debt. How these reasons fit together will depend on
one’s view about the role of higher education in society and
about the virtues of means-testing programs, among other
things. Different combinations of the above considerations
will lead to support for debt jubilees with different scopes.
And the onset of a world historical economic crisis that
suddenly makes paying student debt impossible for many
may well make much of the foregoing obsolete. This Article
takes no position on the optimal design for a debt jubilee, but
the foregoing should provide enough reasons in favor of some
sort of jubilee that it will make sense to explore how one
might be implemented.

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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IV. CANCELING STUDENT DEBT WITHOUT CONGRESS
Two competing bills for a student debt jubilee, both
promoted by Democratic Party leaders who were candidates
for that party’s Presidential nomination, have been drafted
and lay waiting for the right political moment.152 Although
they vary in their scope and in some details, both would run
debt cancellation through the Department of Education—
instructing it to take possession of outstanding FFELP and
Perkins Loans, to purchase outstanding private student
loans, and to cancel them alongside outstanding Direct
Loans.153 Both would make debt cancellation tax-free and
both are paired with bills that would make at least public
undergraduate education free for all.154
For the first time since the federal government created
student debt, it is well within the realm of possibility that
the next President would be ready to sign a student debt
jubilee into law. And more and more members of Congress
seem likely to vote in favor of sending such a bill to the
President’s desk. Indeed, it is not out of the question that at
least some student debt cancellation could come out of the
current crisis, with Democratic leaders discussing a write-

152. See Student Debt Cancellation Act of 2019, H.R. 3448, 116th Cong. (2019),
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr3448/BILLS-116hr3448ih.pdf (“Omar
Bill”); Student Loan Debt Relief Act of 2019, H.R. ___, 116th Cong. (2019)
(“Cornyn Bill”), https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Student%20Loan
%20Debt%20Relief%20Act%20(Legislative%20Text).pdf; Bernie Sanders, This is
How We Will Cancel All Student Debt, MEDIUM (June 24, 2019),
https://medium.com/@SenSanders/this-is-why-we-should-cancel-all-student-debt
-6ea987d02ce2; College for All and Cancel All Student Debt, BERNIE,
https://berniesanders.com/issues/college-for-all/; Team Warren, I’m Calling for
Something Truly Transformational: Universal Free Public College and
Cancellation of Student Debt, MEDIUM (Apr. 22, 2019), https://medium.com/
@teamwarren/im-calling-for-something-truly-transformational-universal-freepublic-college-and-cancellation-of-a246cd0f910f.
153. Clyburn Bill §§ 101(c), (e), (g); Omar Bill §§ 2(c), 3.
154. Omar Bill §§ 2(e), 3(e); Clyburn Bill § 101(d); College for All Act of 2017,
https://www.sanders.senate.gov/download/college-for-all-act?inline=file;
Summary of Sen. Sanders’ College for All Act, https://www.sanders.senate.gov/
download/collegeforallsummary/?inline=file.
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down of $10,000 or more as part of ongoing relief efforts.155
Still, another possibility is worth considering: one that
avoids a notoriously deadlock-prone Congress. This section
will argue that the Executive Branch already has the power
to cancel student debt. The Higher Education Act (HEA)
gives the Secretary of Education a broad discretionary
authority to “modify” or “compromise, waive, or release”
DOE’s claims against student debtors.156 This settlement
authority has only ever been used in a narrow set of
circumstances, consistent with DOE’s longstanding practice
of treating student debtors primarily as revenue streams.
But nothing in the statute requires DOE to continue to use
these powers narrowly. A Secretary committed to student
debt cancellation, working in an administration with the
same commitment, could cancel some or all public student
debt, which, recall, is 95% of outstanding student debt.
Doing so would involve using an authority in an
unprecedented way. And the broader the cancellation, the
more in tension it would be with the continued existence of
student debt collection under the HEA. So a court given a
chance to review an Executive jubilee undertaken via an
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, especially a court with
the sort of anti-novelty, anti-administrative-state, and antiprogressive tendencies as those that increasingly dominate
the federal judiciary, would likely have some serious doubts.
The Supreme Court been fairly explicit that Congress does
not “hide elephants in mouseholes,”157 and that courts and
agencies should exercise “common sense as to the manner in

155. Michael Stratford, Student Loans Emerge as Sticking Point in Stimulus
Debate, POLITICO (Mar. 23, 2020).
156. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1082(a)(4), (6) (2018).
157. This phrase comes from Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531
U.S. 457, 468 (2001), and has taken on the status of ritual incantation since. See,
e.g., Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1071 (2018); Epic
Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1626–27 (2018); Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal.
Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1947 (2016); EPA v. EME Homer City Generation,
L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 528 (2014); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006).
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which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such
economic and political magnitude to an administrative
agency.”158 And the Debt Collection Improvement Act does
require all agencies to “try to collect” debts to the federal
government as they become due, which must be read in light
of an HEA that provides quite detailed instructions for how
the Department of Education is to collect on student debt.159
There are responses to each of these doubts, and they
will be discussed in turn. The following will argue that
governing law provides strong support for the proposition
that DOE has absolute discretion to determine when to stop
collections, when to collect less than the full amount, and
when to release claims debtors’ in toto. And, aside from the
law (and assuming any potential challenger would have
standing), there is some reason to doubt whether a federal
court, especially in a moment of plummeting legitimacy,
would be inclined to take a controversial legal position to
reverse what is sure to be wildly popular massive economic
relief for tens of millions of people.
Predicting outcomes is impossible. What follows is an
argument in favor of the Secretary of Education’s broad
discretion to cancel student debt paired with a discussion of
the legal and operational obstacles to be overcome.
A. The Law of Prosecutorial Discretion at Administrative
Agencies
1. Prosecutorial Discretion, Generally
It is a longstanding principle of Anglo-American law
158. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000); see
also id. at 132 (“[A] reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a
particular statutory provision in isolation. The meaning—or ambiguity—of
certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.”).
159. 31 U.S.C. § 3711(a)(1) (2018) (“The head of an executive . . . agency—(1)
shall try to collect a claim of the United States Government for money or property
arising out of the activities of, or referred to, the agency.”); see also Salazar v.
King, 822 F.3d 61, 83 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating in dictum that § 3711(a)(1) gives
DOE “the non-discretionary mandate to collect on federal student loans”).
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that, as stated in Marbury v. Madison, “[w]here the head of
a department acts in a case, in which executive discretion is
to be exercised; in which he is the mere organ of executive
will . . . any application to a court to control, in any respect,
his conduct, would be rejected without hesitation.”160
Executive discretion takes multiple forms. One of them—the
one at issue here—is prosecutorial discretion (sometimes
also referred to “enforcement discretion”). An agency (acting
via its officer) exercises such discretion when it determines
whether or not to enforce a right it has (or may have) against
a private party. This type of decision is not reserved for
agents of the state. The common law barred courts from
reviewing any litigant’s decisions about whether, when, and
how to bring or dismiss a case, whether civil or criminal.161
A right to bring a case is not an obligation to do so. This rule
has applied time out of mind to private litigants and public
officials alike.
With respect to public officials in particular, court
deference derives in part from this principle common to all
potential litigants and in part out of respect for the
constitutional separation of powers. To the extent discretion
is part of what it means to execute the laws, for the Judiciary
to second guess such discretion would be for it to “invade a
special province of the Executive.”162 Since prosecutorial
discretion is at least to some degree inherent in the execution
of a law, when the Constitution vests “[t]he executive Power”
in the office of the President and commands her to “take Care
that the [l]aws be faithfully executed,” it vests the President
160. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170–71 (1803).
161. See The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 454, 457–59 (1868); see also
Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v.
Salinas, 693 F.2d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 782 (3d
Cir. 2000). Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now requires
leave of court to dismiss a criminal case, though generally a prosecutor’s
“discretion . . . should not be . . . disturbed unless clearly contrary to manifest
public interest” or in bad faith. United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
162. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999).
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and her officers with the discretion to determine how to go
about executing the law.163 When Congress makes a law
enforceable by an instrumentality of the executive, it does so
against this constitutional background, implicitly delegating
discretion in enforcement.
The common law baseline is absolute discretion, but,
because Congress creates the laws that the Executive Branch
is charged with enforcing, Congress can alter the common
law baseline by creating standards for an officer’s
discretion.164 At least as a default, prosecutorial discretion
is commonly referred to as absolute and can only be
challenged with “clear evidence” that an official has engaged
in selective prosecution that violates one or more individual’s
constitutional rights.165 In practice, this has meant that, at
least with respect to criminal prosecutors, courts will never
interfere with a non-enforcement decision (as long as
constitutional rights are not violated). As the Supreme Court
put it in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, “so long as the prosecutor
has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an
offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand
jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”166
163. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (Vesting Clause), art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (Take Care
Clause); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (“The
Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer the laws enacted
by Congress.”); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (discussing the role
of the Take Care Clause in vesting prosecutorial discretion); Kate Andrias, The
President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1046–47 (2013)
(discussing the constitutional basis for the President’s enforcement power).
164. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. Pro. § 48(a).
165. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463–65 (1996); Reno, 525 U.S.
at 488–91; see also Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
166. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). Theoretically,
exceptions exist for cases in which a prosecutor’s discretion infringes on another
Constitutional right, but these rarely make an impact in practice. See Armstrong,
517 U.S. at 464–65; Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456; Bolling, 347 U.S. at 497. For recent
discussion on the problems with the discretionary power this creates, see EMILY
BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN PROSECUTION
AND END MASS INCARCERATION (2018); Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial
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Prosecutors have used this discretion as a form of de
facto lawmaking, for both good and ill. In the latter category,
prosecutors have developed “pre-trial diversion” programs
without any statutory authorization and, in recent years,
have openly refused to prosecute certain victimless crimes,
the enforcement of which has contributed mightily to racial
injustice.167 In the former, the Department of Justice
categorized some financial firms as “too big to prosecute” in
the wake of the financial crisis. Where these decisions have
been challenged, they have been resoundingly upheld.168
Even where courts of first instance have the explicit
responsibility to review consent judgments, they have been
rebuked by appellate courts when they came close to
usurping an agency’s judgment as to whether, and how far,
to pursue a case.169
The name should not be misleading: prosecutorial
discretion does not apply only to criminal prosecutions, or
only to cases (criminal or civil) brought by the DOJ or statelevel office that employs “prosecutors.” The foundational
cases on prosecutorial discretion focus on the power of the
Attorney General and other Department of Justice (DOJ)
officials.170 These cases have sometimes been said to
establish that the Attorney General has an “inherent
authority” to exercise prosecutorial discretion,171 but they
Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611 (2014); William J. Stuntz,
Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2548 (2004); Steven J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J.
1979 (1992).
167. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 197 (5th Cir. 2015) (King, J.,
dissenting) (discussing pre-trial diversion programs), https://www.motherjones
.com/crime-justice/2018/03/philadelphias-new-da-found-an-innovative-way-tolegalize-pot-and-other-cities-should-pay-attention/.
168. For many years, prosecutors in states controlled by white supremacists
declined to prosecute murders, assaults, and other acts of brutality if committed
against Black people.
169. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2014).
170. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 331–32 (1928); The
Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 454, 454 (1868).
171. E.g., U.S. Att’y’s Manual 4-3.100 (1994) (“The Attorney General has the
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actually relied on the logic just articulated. Congress granted
the Attorney General broad enforcement authority with the
Judiciary Act, which, read against the common law baseline
of absolute prosecutorial discretion for both private and
public litigants, should be understood as a grant of broad
prosecutorial discretion.172 In other words, these cases
provide no reason to treat the Attorney General’s (or the
DOJ’s, or any prosecutor’s) prosecutorial discretion as
unique, aside from the fact that the grant of discretion
extends to a particularly broad variety of cases. Moreover,
nothing in these decisions restricted prosecutorial discretion
to the DOJ’s criminal functions: the foundational
Confiscation Cases explicitly treated civil and criminal
litigation as on a par.173
inherent authority to dismiss any affirmative action and to abandon the defense
of any action insofar as it involves the United States of America, or any of its
agencies, or any of its agents who are parties in their official capacities.”).
172. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464–65 (US Attorneys have broad “latitude
because they are designated by the statute as the President’s delegates to help
him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.’”) (emphasis added); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. at 456–59.
See generally Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal
Law: Origins and Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 9–11 (2012)
(discussing circuit court cases).
173. See Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. at 457–59. This includes “[p]ower to
release or otherwise dispose of the rights and property of the United States,” even
though that power is “lodged in the Congress by [Article IV of] the Constitution.”
Royal Indemnity Co. v. U.S., 313 U.S. 289, 294 (1941) (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 3, cl. 2). That is because Congress can confer that power to an official in the
executive branch (and confer the power to delegate it), including by giving an
official the power to dispose of federal property, to enter into contracts, to settle
claims, and the like. See id.; Alcoa, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 698 F.3d
774, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2012). Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether Royal
Indemnity applies to cabinet-level officials, since it only concluded that
“[s]ubordinate officers of the United States are without [the power to dispose of
the rights and property of the United States], save only as it has been conferred
upon them by Act of Congress or is to be implied from other powers so granted.”
Royal Indemnity Co., 313 U.S. at 294 (emphasis added); but see Warren v. United
States, 234 F.3d 1331, 1337–38 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Royal Indemnity for the
proposition that “the Government cannot abandon property without
congressional authorization” and applying that proposition to the Coast Guard);
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow (Hybognathus amarus) v. Bureau of Reclamation,
599 F.3d 1165, 1185 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Warren and applying it to the Bureau
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Early focus on the DOJ seems to be merely an artifact of
the Judiciary Act’s vesting primary enforcement power in
that office and the ability of the DOJ to handle nearly all
cases on behalf of the federal government. As the
administrative state grew, so did the number of offices in the
Executive Branch with enforcement powers. For some years,
there was uncertainty about the authority of these officials
to exercise discretion to settle even the most trivial of cases,
and common practice was to refer every potential
non-enforcement or compromise determination to the DOJ
for approval unless the agency had an explicit grant of
settlement authority.174
As will be discussed further below, the resulting burden
on the DOJ eventually led it to encourage Congress to pass
the Federal Claims Collection Act (FCCA), which granted a
default settlement authority to all administrative
agencies.175 But subsequent case law has made clear that the
FCCA was unnecessary to create such authority, and the
uncertainty that preceded it was unfounded.
As with the Judiciary Act, the Administrative Procedure
Act enacted the common law presumption that an official
charged with the enforcement of a particular set of claims
has absolute discretion to determine whether and how to do
so.176 Prosecutorial discretion is implicit in the power to
enforce a law, whether that power is vested in an employee
of Reclamation); U.S. General Accountability Office, Principles of Federal
Appropriations Law (3d ed. 2008): The Government’s Duty and Authority to
Collect Debts Owed to it, 2008 WL 6969346, at *1 (“It follows [from Royal
Indemnity] that, without a clear statutory basis, an agency has no authority to
forgive indebtedness or to waive recovery.”).
174. See Improvement of Procedures in Claims Settlement and Government
Litigation, 89th Cong. 23 (1966); Sidney B. Jacoby, The 89th Congress and
Government Litigation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1223–24 (1967); see generally
H.R. REP. NO. 89-533 (1965) (discussing this practice).
175. Federal Claims Collections Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-508, 80 Stat. 308
(1966).
176. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831–32 (citing 5 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 28:6
(1984)); see Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 607–10 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(discussing the common law baseline in more detail).
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of the DOJ or another administrative agency. Their
prosecutorial discretion is of the same nature and subject to
the same principles of (non-)review.177
2. Prosecutorial Discretion of Administrative Agencies:
The Heckler Framework
The leading case on administrative agencies’
prosecutorial discretion is Heckler v. Chaney. In that case,
death row inmates had petitioned the FDA to take
enforcement action against companies that were producing
and selling the drugs used for lethal injections. Although
these drugs had all been approved as “safe and effective” for
some uses, they had not been tested or approved for use in
executions.178 The Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA)
prohibited (and continues to prohibit) unapproved uses, and
mandates that those who violate this prohibition be
punished by fine or imprisonment.179 The FDA’s own
published rules carried out this mandate by requiring the
agency to “investigate . . . thoroughly and to take whatever
action is warranted to protect the public” from unapproved
uses.180 The FDCA contained (and still contains) a grant of
permission to exercise discretion to refrain from initiating
proceedings, but only in the case of “minor violations.”181 The
inmates argued that the FDA was thus required to at least
temporarily ban the use of these drugs while an investigation
into their safety and effectiveness for use in executions was
undertaken. The FDA claimed it had “inherent discretion” to
determine whether such enforcement action was warranted
177. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (citing Heckler in determining not to
review a criminal prosecutor’s discretion, thus implicitly treating them as on a
par); Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831 (drawing explicitly on the case law regarding the
DOJ’s prosecutorial discretion to declare the FDA’s discretion absolute).
178. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 823–24.
179. See Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1186 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(discussing the mandatory nature of the FDCA’s prohibitions).
180. Id. at 1186 (quoting Legal Status for Uses Unapproved by the Food and
Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16503, 16504 (Aug. 15, 1972)).
181. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 837.
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or not, especially given the question of whether it had the
authority to regulate the use of such uses.
A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit (with then-Judge
Scalia dissenting) found that the language and the structure
of the FDCA mandated investigation of unauthorized uses
and prosecution of any violations.182 By that point, it had
become well established that there was a strong presumption
in favor of reviewability of administrative agencies’
actions.183 After all, the APA “waives the federal
government’s sovereign immunity in actions brought under
the general federal question jurisdictional statute.”184
However, following the common law of judicial review of
agency action, the APA reinstates immunity via § 701(a)(2)
when “agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law.”185 At the time, the only Supreme Court case to have
interpreted § 701(a)(2) was Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe. Volpe had called the exception it creates
“very narrow,” only applicable when there is “no law to
apply” for the agency or the reviewing court.186
In applying this rule, the D.C. Circuit found that the
FDCA, combined with the FDA’s guidance for implementing
it, made some enforcement action against unauthorized uses
of drugs mandatory. Writing for the court, Judge SkellyWright reasoned that, even though it is difficult to review
exercises of discretion, a court must be “responsible for

182. Chaney, 718 F.2d at 1176.
183. See Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984); Dunlop v.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140
(1967) (“[O]ur cases [have established] that judicial review of a final agency
action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason
to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.”); see also Mach Mining, LLC
v. E.E.O.C., 575 U.S. 480, 486 (2015).
184. Lunney v. United States, 319 F.3d 550, 558 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Califano
v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977)).
185. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2018).
186. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting
S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945)).
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ensuring that government officials do not negate or frustrate
congressional
enactments
through
bureaucratic
187
arbitrariness.”
Treating prosecutorial discretion as
unreviewable rather than deserving of “a great degree of
deference” would be to abdicate judicial responsibility,
especially when there was ample “law to apply.”188 In this
decision, the D.C. Circuit was building on a series of cases
that had begun to chip away at absolute deference for
prosecutorial discretion.189
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.190 Rather
than ask whether the statute granted discretion, the Court,
in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, accepted
the FDA’s argument that an agency has inherent discretion
to refuse to take enforcement action. It reasoned that, unless
Congress creates explicit rules for how to determine whether
to enforce a given type of claim, there is “no meaningful
standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise” of its
enforcement power.191 In addition, it disagreed with the D.C.
Circuit that the FDCA created such a standard or that the
FDA’s guidance was binding.

187. Chaney, 718 F.2d at 1191.
188. Id.
189. See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Wong
Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 718–19 (2d Cir.
1966); Heckler, 470 U.S. at 841–49 (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing some of
these cases and arguing that they should have applied).
190. The decision to reverse was unanimous, but there were three opinions in
the case. Justice Brennan concurred in the decision and wrote separately to
clarify that he read the majority opinion narrowly to leave open room for
clarification of its scope. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 838–39. Justice Marshall concurred
in judgment. Id. at 840. He would have found that prosecutorial discretion is not
absolute, but, so long as not clearly prohibited by statute, reviewable for abuse.
Id. at 840–41.
191. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830. For subsequent development of the “no
meaningful standard” interpretation of § 701(a)(2), see Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 370 (2018); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182,
191 (1993); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 816–18 (1992); Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599–600 (1988); ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
482 U.S. 270, 282, (1987).
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Even though the FDCA says quite clearly that violators
“shall be imprisoned . . . or fined,” the Court held that further
“case law or legislative history” would have to be adduced to
indicate that this language, however mandatory it seemed,
actually mandated prosecution of every violator.192 It found
that the prohibition of unapproved uses could not serve as
“law to apply” because it was “simply irrelevant to the
agency’s discretion to refuse” to enforce that clear
prohibition.193 It was not even impressed by the argument
that Congress’s explicit grant of permission to exercise
discretion in the case of “minor violations” should lead to the
negative inference that Congress did not grant such
permission in cases of major violations.194
But the Court did not just overrule the D.C. Circuit’s
application of Overton Park. It went on to clarify that courts
should be significantly more deferential toward exercises of
agency discretion than Overton Park itself may have implied.
The “common law of judicial review of agency action”195 has
required not just “a great degree of deference,” as the D.C.
Circuit found, but, rather, that “an agency’s decision not to
prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal
process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s
absolute discretion.”196 In other words, the APA’s
presumption of reviewability should be flipped: “an agency’s
decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed
immune from review under § 702(a)(2)” absent a clear
statutory indication otherwise.197

192. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 835.
193. Id. at 836.
194. Id. at 837.
195. Id. at 832.
196. Id. at 831 (emphasis added).
197. Id. at 832 (emphasis added); see also id. at 831 (referring to the flipping
of the presumption); Salazar, 822 F.3d at 75 (stating that because of Heckler, “the
opposite presumption [to the strong presumption of reviewability] applies when
a plaintiff seeks to require that an agency take an enforcement action”); Montana
Air Chapter No. 29, Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Inc. v. Fed. Labor Relations
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The Court justified this presumption in terms of “the
general unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions
to refuse enforcement.”198 It pointed out that decisions
regarding whether to enforce involve “a complicated
balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within
[an agency’s] expertise,” and that the question of expertise
has long provided justification to defer to agency action.199 It
also noted that decisions not to enforce do not “infringe upon
areas that courts often are called upon to protect” because it
involves decisions not to exercise the “coercive power over an
individual’s liberty or property rights.”200 Finally, it
connected administrative agencies’ prosecutorial discretion
to that of, well, prosecutors, reasoning that “an agency’s
refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the
characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the
Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long
been regarded as the special province of the Executive
Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by
the Constitution to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.’”201
The presumption of unreviewability can be rebutted if
Congress has “provided guidelines for exercise of [an
agency’s] enforcement power . . . either by setting
substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing the
agency’s power to discriminate among the issues or cases it
will pursue.”202 In such a situation, Congress should be taken

Auth., 898 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Heckler for the proposition that
“[a]n agency’s decision not to take enforcement action generally . . . is presumed
to be immune from judicial review”); Robbins v. Reagan, 780 F.2d 37, 44 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (referring to the “shift in the presumption” of reviewability that
Heckler created).
198. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831.
199. Id. at 831–32.
200. Id. at 832.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 833.
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to have “withdr[awn] discretion from the agency.”203 This is
how the Heckler court explained its previous decision in
Dunlop v. Bachowski, which summarily affirmed the Third
Circuit’s determination that when a statute “provides that
after investigating a complaint, [an agency official] must
determine whether there is probable cause to believe that
violations” have occurred and to prosecute them if no
settlement can be reached, a court can review a decision not
to prosecute an alleged violation for arbitrariness.204
Rebutting the presumption through explicit statutory
language is also how the Court explained the D.C. Circuit’s
earlier finding in Adams v. Richardson that HEW
“consciously and expressly adopted a general policy which is
in effect an abdication of its statutory duty” when it
repeatedly refused to enforce mandatory school integration
orders.205 Although the Supreme Court “express[ed] no
opinion” on the Adams decision or the general principle that
repeated refusal to enforce a statutory scheme could rebut
the presumption of unreviewability, it did “note [in a
footnote] that in those situations the statute conferring
authority on the agency might indicate that such decisions
were not committed to agency discretion.”206 In other words,
if an agency’s discretionary decision to adopt a pattern of
non-enforcement is to be reviewable, it is only insofar as that
decision undermines the statute’s allocation of discretionary
authority. With respect to the Adams case in particular, it is
helpful to note that the relevant statute set forth specific
procedures for enforcement, including specific situations in

203. Id. at 834.
204. See id. at 833–34. The quote is from the Third Circuit’s decision.
Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 88 (3d Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court
reviewed this decision at length—reversing in part and affirming in part—but it
treated this particular aspect of the decision summarily in a footnote. See Dunlop
v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 n.7 (1975).
205. Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (1973). The discussion in
Heckler is at 470 U.S. at 833 n.4.
206. 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (internal quotations omitted).

2020]

STUDENT DEBT JUBILEE

355

which the alternative of “voluntary compliance” could be
used.207 It also involved more than a case of nonenforcement, since HEW was “actively supplying segregated
institutions with federal funds, contrary to the expressed
purposes of Congress.”208
In the same footnote, the Supreme Court also held out
the possibility that “a refusal by the agency to institute
proceedings based solely on the belief that it lacks
jurisdiction” might not count as an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.209
3. Prosecutorial Discretion of Administrative Agencies
after Heckler
Heckler continues to provide the guiding framework for
determining when a federal agency’s decision is too
discretionary to be justiciable. Several aspects of the
framework have been elaborated in subsequent cases,
although the case law is not entirely consistent.
Unsurprisingly, given the number of administrative law
cases it hears, the D.C. Circuit has developed the most well
paved trail of analysis. “To determine whether a matter has
been committed to agency discretion,” it first “consider[s]
both the nature of the administrative action at issue and the
language and structure of the statute that supplies the
applicable legal standards for reviewing that action.”210
Although it is not always straightforward to separate out
analysis of the nature of the action from the way the
statutory scheme treats the type of action at issue, analysis
is to begin with the former. As relevant here, “decisions not
207. 480 F.2d at 1163.
208. Id. at 1162.
209. 470 U.S. at 833 n.4.
210. Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d 848, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Assoc. of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d
1027, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Sec. of Labor v. Twentymile Coal Co., 456 F.3d 151,
156 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Drake
v. FAA., 291 F.3d 59, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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to take enforcement action,” which includes settlements, are
presumed unreviewable.211 Non-enforcement decisions are to
be distinguished from “routine dispute that federal courts
regularly review,” as when a private party objects to an
agency’s determination about that party’s rights212 or when
an agency determines whether exhaustion requirements
have been met in an appeal of its decision.213 The
presumption of non-justiciability may be rebutted if a review
of the statute reveals “meaningful standards to cabin the
agency’s otherwise plenary discretion.”214 “On the other
hand, if the statute in question does not give any indication
that violators must be pursued in every case, or that one
particular enforcement strategy must be chosen over another
and if it provides no meaningful guidelines defining the
limits of the agency’s discretion, then enforcement is
committed to the agency’s discretion.”215
The Supreme Court has clarified that, in addition to
“express language” in a statute, the “structure of the
statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and
the nature of the administrative action involved” can also be
considered to determine whether there is “law to apply” in
211. Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d at 856; Irritated Residents, 494 F.3d at
1031 (involving settlement agreements); Schering, 779 F.2d at 687 (also involving
settlement agreement); see also Block v. SEC, 50 F.3d 1078, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Other types of judgments have also been found presumptively non-reviewable.
See, e.g., Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. at 282; Webster, 486 U.S. at 601; Lincoln
v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993); Lunney v. United States, 319 F.3d 550 (2d Cir.
2003).
212. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S.Ct. 361,
370 (2018).
213. Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1765, 1777 (2019); see also Salazar, 822 F.3d
at 75 (“The presumption against judicial review of decisions not to take
enforcement action protects agency discretion in allocating its resources to choose
their enforcement targets. See id. Unlike the plaintiffs in Chaney, who asked the
court to compel the FDA to take enforcement measures against third parties
within the agency’s sphere of regulation, the plaintiffs here ask the court to
review whether the DOE acted arbitrarily and capriciously in taking enforcement
actions against plaintiffs.”).
214. Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d at 856 (quoting Drake, 291 F.3d at 70).
215. Id.; see also Irritated Residents, 494 F.3d at 1033.
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reviewing an apparently discretionary act.216 Again, the
nature of the action and the meaning of the statutory scheme
are intertwined. Justice Scalia has provided some guidance
to sorting them out in an influential dissent in Webster v.
Doe.217 There, he argued that courts should look “to such
factors as whether the decision involves ‘a sensitive and
inherently discretionary judgment call,’ whether it is the sort
of decision that has traditionally been nonreviewable, and
whether review would have ‘disruptive practical
consequences.’”218 The idea is that whether an action is
“committed to agency discretion by law,” as § 701(a)(2) puts
it, depends not just on what the statute itself says, but in
addition on the “common law of judicial review of agency
action” and executive action more broadly, incorporating
traditional and contemporary judgments about the wisdom
of judicial interference with executive discretion in different
circumstances. Whatever a statute says, review is less wise
in, say, matters regarding national security than in matters
regarding the design of the census.219 Deferring to how to
216. Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984). Block was
interpreting § 701(a)(1), but it has been applied in subsequent cases inquiring
into the applicability of § 701(a)(2). See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish
& Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 370 (2018); Mach Mining, 575 U.S. at 490;
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 (1988); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125, (2000) (“Regardless of how serious the problem
an administrative agency seeks to address, however, it may not exercise its
authority in a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that
Congress enacted into law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
217. This part of the dissent was not disputed by the majority and was
subsequently cited by the unanimous opinion in Vigil, 508 U.S. at 191.
218. Webster, 486 U.S. at 609 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citing Department of Navy
v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988); ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270,
282 (1987); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821; Southern R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied
Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 457 (1979)).
219. Justice Stevens has expressed a similar sentiment regarding the wisdom
of understanding a statutory grant of discretion against a background
understanding of the wisdom of judicial interference in the area at issue. See
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 817–18 (1992) (Stevens, J. concurring)
(“While the operations of a secret intelligence agency may provide an exception
to the norm of reviewability, the taking of the census does not.”). This concurrence
was also cited approvingly in Vigil, 508 U.S. at 191–92.
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prioritize resources is wiser than deferring to how to balance
competing interests. To give full meaning to § 701(a)(2), and
to differentiate from § 701(a)(1)’s limitation to statutes that
“preclude judicial review,” requires locating a statutory
scheme within a broader jurisprudential analysis and
exercise of good sense.
Yet the inquiry should not be entirely freewheeling. In
the recent case of Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court
found that when a grant of discretion is clear from the text
of the statute, no further inquiry into structure or purpose is
required.220 This decision sits somewhat in tension with
some recent Supreme Court cases that have emphasized that
the presumption of non-reviewability is to be “quite
narrowly” drawn, limited to “those rare circumstances where
the relevant statute [provides] no meaningful standard
against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”221
However, these cases can be distinguished both on the
grounds that they involved statutes that did not clearly leave
a decision to agency discretion and that they involved actions
that were not of the sort to which courts generally differ.222
They can best be read as warnings not to extend the
presumption of non-reviewability too far beyond situations
in which there is truly no law to apply.
Courts are more likely to find that a statute creates law
to apply to review a discretionary determination if a statute

220. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2410 (2018); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508
U.S. 182, 194 (1993) (noting the fact that Congress approved of a particular
program funded with lump sum appropriations does not “translate through the
medium of legislative history into legally binding obligations” to earmark funds
for that program absent express statutory language).
221. Weyerhaeuser, 139 S.Ct. at 370 (quoting Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191
(1993)); see also Mach Mining, 575 U.S. at 486 (“the agency bears a heavy burden
in attempting to show that Congress prohibited all judicial review of the agency’s
compliance with a legislative mandate.”) (internal punctuation omitted).
222. For instance, Mach Mining involved a statutory mandate that the EEOC
engage in a conciliation process as a “reviewable prerequisite to bringing suit”
and Weyerhaeuser involved a mandatory procedure that the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife service had to go through in determining how much habitat to protect.
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creates procedural requirements and/or standards, however
bare bones. Regarding procedural requirements, in
Weyerhaeuser the Supreme Court found that a statute that
commanded “the Secretary [of the Interior] to consider the
economic and other impacts of” restricting development in a
given area to protect a particular species and created factors
“to guide the agency in the exercise of its discretion,” which
invited a court to review whether the Secretary had
“appropriately consider[ed] all of the relevant factors” in
making any such determination.223 In Mach Mining, the
Court found that a statute’s direction that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission “eliminate [the]
alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods
of conference, conciliation, and persuasion” created a
reviewable “duty to attempt conciliation of claims,” even if it
also gave the EEOC “abundant discretion . . . to decide the
kind and extent of discussions appropriate in a given
case.”224 Regarding substantive standards, in Sierra Club v.
Hodel, a divided panel of the Tenth Circuit found that it
could review a decision by the Bureau of Land Management
to decline to stop construction on a road that went through
federal lands, because the relevant statute provided a
“definite standard” for review by requiring the BLM to
manage the area in question “in a manner so as not to impair
the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness”
including taking “any action required to prevent unnecessary
or undue degradation” and by creating a “duty to define and
protect roadless areas of more than 5,000 acres having
wilderness characteristics.”225
223. 139 S.Ct. at 371.
224. 575 U.S. at 495.
225. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1073–75 (10th Cir. 1988) (internal
punctuation and citations omitted). These obligations were actually assigned to
the Department of the Interior, of which the BLM is a part. At least one crucial
issue in Hodel seemed to be that the exercise of discretion enabled private parties
to alter the status quo such that statutory provisions would no longer be
applicable to them. The statute at issue explicitly required the agency to at least
maintain the status quo, even if it did not require taking particular enforcement
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Courts are more likely to find a decision beyond the
bounds of review if the statute contains permissive rather
than mandatory language and/or if there are no discernible
procedural requirements or substantive standards to apply.
In Perales v. Casillas, the Fifth Circuit found that because
“[p]re-hearing voluntary departure and employment
authorization for the beneficiaries of approved visa petitions
are purely creatures of regulation, and nothing in the
Immigration and Nationality Act immunizes a deportable
alien from deportation when a visa petition filed on his behalf
is approved,” it had no law to apply to review any decision by
the Immigration and Nationality Service to deny such
authorizations.226 It quoted the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Achaeoso–Sanchez v. INS: “When there are no rules or
standards there is neither legal right nor legal wrong. There
may be moral or prudential claims, but such claims are the
province of other actors, be they administrators or
legislators.”227 In Sierra Club v. Jackson, the D.C. Circuit
found that “Congress’s mandate to the Administrator is that
she shall ‘take such measures, including issuance of an order,
or seeking injunctive relief, as necessary [to prevent the
construction or modification of a major emitting facility]’”
created no “guidance to the Administrator or to a reviewing
court as to what action is ‘necessary.’”228 In Drake v. FAA, it
found that “a provision that allows the Administrator to
[dismiss a complaint] when she ‘is of the opinion that the
complaint does not state facts that warrant an investigation,’
gives the FAA virtually unbridled discretion” to determine
when to dismiss a complaint, with or without a hearing.229
There is one more twist in the dance between the nature
action. See also Westchester, 778 F.3d at 420; Sluss v. United States Dep’t of
Justice, Int’l Prisoner Transfer Unit, 898 F.3d 1242, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2018);
Friends of Animals v. EPA, 383 F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1117–18 (D. Or. 2019).
226. 903 F.2d 1043, 1048 (5th Cir. 1990).
227. Id. at 1047 (quoting 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir.1985)).
228. 648 F.3d 848, 856 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
229. 291 F.3d 59, 70–71 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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of the action and the content of the statutory scheme. As the
D.C. Circuit, the Second Circuit, and the Seventh Circuit
have all recognized, even if an agency has discretionary
authority over an area, its decisions can be reviewed if it
cabins its own discretion.230 Regulations can cabin
discretion, of course, since agencies must comply with their
own regulations.231 But even guidance and statements can
do so, at least in the D.C. Circuit, so long as “the statements
create binding norms by imposing rights or obligations on the
respective parties.”232
Even when confronted with a non-enforcement decision
that is presumptively non-reviewable without any evidence
to rebut this presumption, “the D.C. Circuit has recognized
two exceptions to the general rule of unreviewability.”233
First, “agency nonenforcement decisions are reviewable
when they are based on a belief that the agency lacks
jurisdiction.”234
Second,
“an
agency’s
statutory
interpretations made in the course of nonenforcement
decisions are reviewable.”235 The latter is hardly an
exception, since courts can always review the statutory
interpretations of agencies. As for the former, it comes from
footnote four of Heckler itself. Although Heckler only left the

230. Cardoza v. CFTC, 768 F.2d 1542, 1550 (7th Cir. 1985); Steenholdt v. FAA,
314 F.3d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Salazar, 822 F.3d at 76–77.
231. Cardoza, 768 F.2d at 1550; see also Nat’l Fam. Plan. Reprod. Health Ass’n,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[A]n agency issuing a
legislative rule is itself bound by the rule until that rule is amended or revoked.”)
(citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695–96 (1974); United States. ex rel.
Bilokumsky v. Tod, 264 U.S. 149, 155 (1923)).
232. Steenholdt, 314 F.3d at 639; see also Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d at
846.
233. Montana Air Ch. 29, Assoc. of Civilian Technicians, Inc. v. FLRA, 898 F.2d
753, 756 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DHS, 908 F.3d
476, 495–97 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted 193 S.Ct. 2779 (2019).
234. Montana Air, 898 F.2d at 756 (citing International Longshoremen’s Ass’n
v. National Mediation Bd., 785 F.2d 1098, 1100 (D.C.Cir.1986)).
235. Id. (citing International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace &
Agricultural Implement Workers v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237, 245 (D.C.Cir.1986)).
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question open as to whether agency non-enforcement actions
based on a judgment of lack of jurisdiction would be an
exception to the general presumption of non-reviewability,
both the Ninth and D.C. Circuits have resolved the issue
definitively.
It is this exception to the presumption of nonreviewability that the Ninth Circuit applied in determining
that it could review the Trump Administration’s decision to
repeal the Obama Administration’s policy of Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”).236 In doing so, it merged
the two exceptions into one: “an agency’s nonenforcement
decision is outside the scope of the Chaney presumption—
and is therefore presumptively reviewable—if it is based
solely on a belief that the agency lacked the lawful authority
to do otherwise.”237 Applying this rule, that Court found that,
because the Trump Administration had repealed the DACA
because it thought that it was unlawful (and not just because
it wanted to as a matter of policy), a court could review that
decision. This decision is currently being reviewed by the
Supreme Court.
Ironically, the Fifth Circuit has also found that at least
some decisions about deferred action on removal are
reviewable, but it did so in striking down another Obama
Administration policy: Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans (“DAPA”).238 The reasoning in the decision is not
entirely clear, but it is worth examining because of its
potential relevance. “Deferred action” (originally called
“nonpriority”) is the name for the longstanding practice of
immigration enforcement authorities to decline to pursue
deportation against certain classes of legally deportable

236. Regents, 908 F.3d at 499.
237. Id. at 497; see also ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270,
283 (1987) (“[I]f the agency gives a ‘reviewable’ reason for otherwise unreviewable
action, the action becomes reviewable.”).
238. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 166 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by default
in U.S. v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
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immigrants “at any stage of the administrative process.”239
This long recognized exercise of prosecutorial discretion has
been exercised both “for humanitarian reasons” as well as for
more self-interested reasons like avoiding bad publicity.240
Either way, it has served to effectively reshape immigration
laws purely through Executive discretion and “without
express statutory authorization” even as Congress has
designed the immigration scheme with deferred action in
mind—granting certain rights and privileges to those who
benefit from it.241
In 1997 the Fifth Circuit had ruled that deferred action
“is unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act
because a court has no workable standard against which to
judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”242
It “reject[ed] out-of-hand the State’s contention that the
federal defendants’ alleged systemic failure to control
immigration is so extreme as to constitute a reviewable
abdication of duty. The State does not contend that federal
defendants are doing nothing to enforce the immigration
laws or that they have consciously decided to abdicate their
enforcement responsibilities. Real or perceived inadequate
enforcement of immigration laws does not constitute a
reviewable abdication of duty.”243
The Supreme Court had also declined to review deferred
action (absent “clear evidence displacing the presumption
that a prosecutor has acted lawfully”),244 relying on the
principle that prosecutorial discretion “is particularly illsuited to judicial review,” as much, if not more, in the
239. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Com, 525 U.S. 471, 483–84
(1999).
240. Id. at 483 n.8.
241. Id. at 484 (quoting 6 C. Gordon, S. Mailman, S. Yale-Loehr, Immigration
Law and Procedure § 72.03[2][h] (1998)).
242. Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1997).
243. Id.
244. Reno, 525 U.S. at 498 (internal quotations omitted).
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immigration context as in the criminal context.245
However, when the Obama Administration used
deferred action to create more systematic processes that
enabled certain classes of undocumented immigrants to
“come out of the shadows” and apply for a renewable twoyear period of deferred action that could ultimately result in
eligibility for a work permit, the Fifth Circuit reversed
direction and the Supreme Court has indicated that it might
as well.246 In particular, in 2015 a split panel of the Fifth
Circuit ruled that DAPA is reviewable because it “is much
more than nonenforcement: It would affirmatively confer
‘lawful presence’[] and associated benefits on a class of
unlawfully present aliens.”247 Having found that DAPA did
not amount to an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the
majority went on to ask whether the relevant statutes
authorized the agency to initiate such a program at all, let
alone without rulemaking.248 It explicitly set aside “the issue
of whether the presumption against review of such discretion
is rebutted” when used to create a systematic deferred action
process.249
The dissenting judge pointed out that the benefits
associated with deferred action were “a function of statutes
and regulations that were enacted by Congresses and
administrations long past” that were neither challenged nor
challengeable in the action at bar, making the only action
challenged the discretionary one as to how to determine who
should be eligible for those benefits.250 Viewed in this light,
245. Id. at 490 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)); see
also Robeldo-Soto v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2017) (discussing Reno’s
holding).
246. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
247. Id. at 166.
248. See id. at 177–82.
249. Id. at 168 n.108.
250. Id. at 197 (King, J. dissenting); see also Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d
733, 770–75 (5th Cir. 2015) (Higginson, J., dissenting) (arguing DAPA was an
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in denying a stay).
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she argued, DAPA is akin to “pretrial diversion in the
criminal context—which also developed over a period of
decades without express statutory authorization.”251
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in a 4-4 decision without
opinion issued after Justice Scalia’s death and before Justice
Gorsuch’s appointment, affirmed the majority’s opinion by
(non-precedential) default.252
One way to square this fragile result with the case law
just reviewed is to read it as akin to one aspect of the D.C.
Circuit’s reasoning in Adams. Recall that Adams involved a
challenge to HEW’s non-enforcement of school integration
orders. One reason the D.C. Circuit gave for reviewing
HEW’s decision was that it involved not just nonenforcement because HEW was actively providing benefits to
schools that were in open violation of the law HEW was also
charged with enforcing.253 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the Department of Homeland Security was not
just declining to enforce immigration laws, but actively
changing the immigration status of people who had violated
immigration laws, making them eligible for benefits
normally available only to people who have not violated
immigration laws (to greatly oversimplify). The principle to
extract might sound something like: if the decision not to
enforce a law is simultaneously a decision that entitles those
not subject to enforcement to a government benefit, a court
should hesitate to treat it as merely an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.
It is not clear that this principle can be stated in a way
that can sustain a defensible distinction among precedents.
Every decision not to enforce a law against a violator is a
decision to entitle that violator to whatever benefits are

251. Id. at 197.
252. See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188, 192 (1972) (affirmance by an equally divided court has no precedential
value).
253. Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1159–61 (1973).
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available to those who have not violated the law. The FDA’s
discretion not to enforce the usual rules for controlled
substances for lethal injection drugs entitled particular drug
manufacturers access to patent protections, to government
contracts, and to other benefits. Pretrial diversion and other
exercises of prosecutorial discretion in the criminal context
entitle beneficiaries access to benefits that people in prison
or with criminal records are not entitled to. What arguably
made Adams different was that the agency’s exercise of
prosecutorial discretion was also a decision to maintain
benefits delivered by that same agency. In the case of DAPA
and DACA, a decision to grant deferred action to a given
individual did not provide any benefits directly to
immigrants that the law did not otherwise entitle them to,
nor (as the dissent points out) was it even changing their
immigration status.
Another potential explanation for the turn in deferred
action jurisprudence is that the political valence of the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion matters. When
prosecutorial discretion is used to further progressive social
policies or to undermine conservative legislation, even
conservative judges normally in favor of unfettered executive
discretion are likely to view it with more suspicion. It has
long been liberal judges who have been skeptical of the
Executive’s arguments in favor of unreviewable discretion:
in the domain of prosecution as much as in the domain of
national security, of immigration enforcement, of racial
integration, etc. As a general matter, that likely remains the
case, but as conservative strategies to deadlock Congress has
borne fruit, progressive attempts to use the expanded powers
of the Executive creatively may have begun to engender a
more targeted skepticism from conservative judges.
Having got this far, the reader might be suspicious that
a ball has been hidden. Didn’t Heckler leave open the
possibility that an act of prosecutorial discretion could be so
dramatic as to amount to an “abdication of [an agency’s
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statutory duty]”?254 Since that possibility seems relevant to
an analysis of using prosecutorial discretion to implement
mass debt cancellation, wouldn’t it be useful to know how
that possibility has been fleshed out in the case law? Well,
yes, but unfortunately no case after Heckler (or Adams, on
which Heckler relied in raising the possibility of such an
exception) has addressed this possibility. It remains
undetermined what sort of case would trigger it that would
not also be a case in which a court found that the statute
limited an agency’s discretion, and, if such a case exists, what
principles a court would apply in reviewing the discretion at
issue.
4. What Happens if Non-Enforcement is Reviewable?
Although the analysis in this Article will only focus on
the question of whether the Secretary of Education’s
authority to modify or waive claims over student debts
counts as a form of unreviewable prosecutorial discretion, a
brief note on how courts proceed when they find Heckler
inapplicable. Basically, other sections of the APA apply.
Which section applies depends on the nature of the action at
issue. Discretionary decisions are reviewed for abuse of
discretion under § 706(2)(A).255 Decisions that amount to
policy judgments are reviewed under the standard
framework to determine whether an interpretation amounts
to a rule and, if so, whether the requisite rulemaking
procedures have been followed.256 The Chevron framework
for implementing § 706(2), with all of its twists and turns,
applies to interpretations of the statute in the process of
implementing a regulation.257

254. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 853 (1985).
255. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S.Ct.
361, 370 (2018); see also Mach Mining LLC v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 480, 495 (2015).
256. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 170–78 (2015).
257. See id. at 178 (discussing applicability of Chevron).
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B. Applying the Law of Prosecutorial Discretion to the HEA
1. The Nature of the Action
The action proposed here is that the DOE cancel some or
all student debt owed to it. This action could be characterized
as a modification and/or as a waiver of claims (or potential
claims) it has the right to enforce (or attempt to enforce)
against each borrower. Writing down some of a given
borrower’s debt (e.g. turning a $20,000 debt into a $5,000
debt) could be styled a modification of the amount owed (from
$20,000 to $5,000) or as a waiver of some of the obligation to
pay ($15,000 worth). Eliminating all of a given borrower’s
debt could be styled a modification of the amount owed to $0
or a waiver of the entire obligation. Canceling some or all
debt across some or all borrowers could thus be effected by
mass modification or mass waiver.
The most natural way to characterize either of these
actions is as a decision not to enforce rights that the HEA
grants to the DOE. At the retail level, debt cancellation is
akin to a settlement agreement or a unilateral decision not
to spend resources pursuing a claim is akin to pretrial
diversion. It is well established that a decision not to enforce
a right against a private party—whether as part of a
settlement or otherwise—is an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion that is presumptively unreviewable. At the
wholesale level, settling multiple claims as part of a plan is
akin to pretrial diversion in the criminal context or deferred
action in the immigration context. Both of these actions are
also presumptively unreviewable exercises of prosecutorial
discretion.
Of course, we have seen that at least one form of deferred
action has been adjudged not an act of prosecutorial
discretion. The reason given for this judgment was that the
deferred action in question, as characterized by the Fifth
Circuit, was not just non-enforcement. It granted positive
rights that also created duties in third parties (i.e. the
several states).
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Assuming the soundness of that judgment, cancellation
of student debt can be easily distinguished. The DOE would
be entitling (former) student debtors to no additional rights
or privileges as a result of debt cancellation. Or, rather,
whatever rights and privileges debtors would be entitled to
would be incidental to the debt cancellation at issue: the
right to have their credit rating amended, for example. This
is quite unlike a decision not to deport somebody that
simultaneously changes that person’s immigration status.
2. What the Statute Says
Nothing in the HEA rebuts the presumption that the
DOE has broad discretion to waive or modify claims against
students. In fact, the HEA directly grants both powers
without any meaningful limits on them.
When Congress first created student loans in the NDEA,
it placed the Commissioner of Education (then the head of a
division of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare) in charge of enforcing claims of the government
against student debtors. Though the power to enforce implies
the power not to enforce, Congress also explicitly granted the
Commissioner “power to agree to modification of agreements
or loans made under this title and to compromise, waive, or
release any right, title, claim or demand, however arising or
acquired under” the NDEL program.258 When Congress
passed the HEA, it gave the Commissioner “[i]n performance
of, and with respect to, the functions, powers, and duties
vested in him [sic] by” the Higher Education Act’s student
loan provisions to, among other things, “modify” and to
“enforce, pay, compromise, waive, or release any right, title,

258. National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864 § 209(a), 72
Stat. 1580, 1587 (1958). As discussed above, NDEL were eventually merged into
Perkins Loans before being discontinued. See 20 U.S.C.§ 1087hh(2) (2018) (“In
carrying out the provision of this part [regarding Perkins Loans], the Secretary
is authorized to enforce, pay, compromise, waive, or release any right, title, claim,
lien or demand, however acquired . . . .”).
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claim, lien, or demand, however acquired.”259 Let us refer to
these as the Secretary’s “modification” and “settlement”
authorities. The HEA further provides that their exercise
“shall be final and conclusive upon all accounting and other
officers of the government.”260 In 1979, Congress split the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare into the
Department of Education and the Department of Health and
Human Services. As part of the new DOE, it created the
office of the Secretary of Education, endowed with all of the
powers of the Commissioner (and then some).261 As relevant
here, all of the Commissioner’s settlement authorities
carried over.
Recall that both the FFEL and Perkins Loan programs
facilitate the creation of loans by parties other than the
DOE—financial institutions in the case of FFEL and
institutions of higher education in the case of Perkins. Thus,
DOE only has direct claims against debtors under these
programs if it takes possession of loans created thereunder.
Direct Loans, on the other hand, create a direct claim against
debtors from the moment they become due. When Direct
Loans were first created as a pilot in 1992, the statute did
not mention settlement authority, and no subsequent
amendment has explicitly done so.262 However, that statute
did—and does—make Direct Loans subject to “the same
terms, conditions, and benefits as [FFELP].”263 DOE has,
without objection, interpreted this provision to include
prosecutorial discretion.264 It was right to do so, as argued in

259. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1082(a)(4), (6) (2018) (Federal Family Education Loan); 20
U.S.C. §§ 1087hh(1), (2) (2018) (Perkins Loans).
260. 20 U.S.C. § 1082(b) (2018).
261. Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 301(a),
93 Stat. 668, 677 (1979).
262. See Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106
Stat. 572 (1992).
263. Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 456, 106
Stat. 572 (1992) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1087a(b)(2) (2018)).
264. See Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Perkins Loan
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the margin.265
The last Congressional statement with respect to the
DOE’s settlement authority came in the Higher Education
Opportunity Act of 2008 (“HEOA”), as follows: “The
Secretary may not enter into any settlement of any claim
[under FFEL or Perkins, or by incorporation, Direct Loans]
that exceeds $1,000,000 unless (1) the Secretary requests a
review of the proposed settlement of such claim by the
Attorney General; and (2) the Attorney General responds to
such request.”266 It is unclear whether “settlement” here
refers to both DOE’s modification and its settlement
authority (is modification a form of settlement?) or not.
These provisions do not create any practical limits on
DOE’s discretion given the current reality of student debt
Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, William D. Ford Federal
Direct Loan Program, and Teacher Education Assistance for College and Higher
Education Grant Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 39330, 39368 (June 16, 2016) (to be
codified at 34 C.F.R. Pt. 30) (discussing authority to issue regulations regarding
compromise authority over Direct Loans by invoking “Section 451(b)”, i.e. 20
U.S.C. § 1087a(b) (2018)).
265. Consolidating control in the federal government was designed both to
eliminate the needless budget line for private lenders’ profits and to enable the
government to reduce the burden of student loan repayment by making at least
some student loans not profitable. It was meant to give the Department of
Education more authority over student loans. See Jonathan Glater, The Other
Big Test: Why Congress Should Allow College Students to Borrow More Through
Federal Aid Programs, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 38–40 (2011).
Accordingly, the Direct Loan program kept constant all the aspects of FFELP
loans that were previously in place, including all of the Secretary’s powers
regarding them, except those that Congress specifically altered (mostly, but not
entirely, to make student debt less burdensome). Eliminating the Secretary’s
settlement authority through silence is inconsistent with this purpose, especially
when there is a provision explicitly putting Direct Loans on a par with FFEL.
Certainly there is no indication in the text of the relevant statutes or in the
legislative history that Congress meant to reduce the Secretary’s settlement
authority. If it had determined to do so, it is not clear why it would have done so
only for Direct Loans and not for FFELP and Perkins. As Eileen Connor, Deanne
Loonin, and Toby Merrill have pointed out, if powers related to FFELP did not
carry over to Direct Loans, DOE would be unable to issue regulations or sue or
be sued with relation to Direct Loans. See Ltr. From Eileen Connor, Deanne
Loonin, and Toby Merrill to Senator Elizabeth Warren, 3n.5 (Jan. 13, 2020).
266. Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315 § 433(a), 122 Stat.
3078 (2008) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1082(b) (2018)).
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levels. It is silent as to when and why and with whom DOE
may or must settle a debt. It merely requires the DOE to
request the AG’s approval for settlements, and then only if
the settlement is below a certain amount. And the $1 million
ceiling it sets on settlement size is too high to make even this
supervisory mechanism have any bite. It is a ceiling on “any
settlement of any claim,” which can only be made sense of if
read as a per claim, i.e. a per promissory note limit.267 If
Congress had wanted the limit to be on a collection of claims
it could have used “any settlement of any claim or claims” or
just “any settlement.” Similarly, the reference to “the
proposed settlement of such claim”—as opposed to “the
proposed settlement of such claim or claims” or just “the
proposed settlement”—makes little sense except as reference
to a limit on each individual claim. That Congress put in
“any” twice fairly well emphasizes the fact that the limit is
per claim. Read as such, the provision commands only that if
the Secretary decides to compromise an obligation of over $1
million, it must consult the Attorney General. If the
Department were to compromise multiple claims of less than
$1 million that together exceeded $1 million, it would not
have to do so. This is how the Department itself has read this
provision when it promulgated regulations, and without
controversy.268 This author knows of no evidence that any
student loan borrower owes more than $1 million to the
Department of Education.269
267. 20 U.S.C. § 1082 (2018) (emphasis added). We say “per promissory note”
rather than “per borrower” because the Department would have multiple
potential claims against a borrower with multiple student loans.
268. 34 C.F.R. § 30.70(e)(2) (2019) (referring to the limit as on “a debt that
exceeds $1,000,000”) (emphasis added).
269. That raises the question of why Congress would have enacted a totally
toothless provision, perhaps implicating the principle that statutory
interpretation ought to avoid absurdity. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. United States
Dep’t. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“When used
in a proper manner, this narrow exception to our normal rule of statutory
construction does not intrude upon the lawmaking powers of Congress, but rather
demonstrates a respect for the coequal Legislative Branch, which we assume
would not act in an absurd way.”). But the result here is not absurd. It is, firstly,
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What, then, is the scope of DOE’s settlement authority?
Begin with the authority of “modify” claims against debtors.
To modify is to change. A debt can be modified any number
of ways—by changing the timing of payments, by adding or
eliminating conditions, etc. Clearly reducing the amount
owed is a modification of a debt. Reducing a debt to nil—i.e.
eliminating it—would also seem to fall within the ordinary
meaning of “modify.” Doubts could surely be raised (would a
provision enabling waiver of a claim be rendered surplusage
if the modification provision enabled effectively waiving a
claim?), but, as Eileen Connor, Deanne Loonin, and Toby
Merrill point out, “the Secretary has used the modification
power to cancel out, or modify to zero, loan obligations under
FFELP and [the Direct Loan Program] in certain
circumstances” without even a whiff of objection from
courts.270
The authority to “compromise, waive, or release” is also
about as broad as can be on its face. Each of these terms refer
to a litigant’s or potential litigant’s ability to determine
whether and how far to pursue a legal claim without a court’s
supervision. This broad discretion is clearest in the case of

not absurd in the sense that the text makes no sense whatsoever. See, e.g., United
States v. Pabon-Cruz, 391 F.3d 86 (2d Cir.2004) (interpreting a statute that said
“[a]ny individual who violates . . . this section, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not less than 10 years nor more than 20 years, and both . . . .”)
(emphasis added). Nor does it have absurd or perverse results. See In re Kane,
336 B.R. 477, 486 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006) (making this distinction). Congress may
well have meant to place no actual limit in the near term or in the normal run of
cases, but may have thought it wise to create a cap on settlement power just in
case student debt suddenly ballooned or there was an outré situation in which it
made sense to have the Attorney General review the settlement. If the number
Congress had chosen had been so high that it was not conceivable that it would
create any limit, then perhaps avoiding absurdity could be invoked. But then the
question would be how to avoid it: to interpret the statute as pertaining to any
settlement, including any number of claims? To interpret the $1 million number
as a typo, and reading it as $100,000 (as the FCCS prescribes, see infra)?
270. Ltr., supra note 265, at 5 n.21 (citing Carr et al. v. DeVos, Case No. 19-cv6597 (S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. No. 15-1 (Decl. of Cristin Bulman), 16 (Stipulation of
Dismissal)).
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“waive” and “release.” Black’s271 defines “release” as
“[l]iberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act of
giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could
have been enforced,” and declares it synonymous with
“discharge” and “relinquishment.”272 Similarly, to “waive” is
“to abandon, renounce, or surrender (a claim, privilege, right,
etc.); to give up (a right or claim) voluntarily.”273 Avoiding
surplusage might compel us to somehow differentiate
between these two words—one possibility is that “waiver”
must be voluntary and knowing, while “release” need
not274—but it is hard to see how that would matter in this
context. Both refer to a litigant’s or prospective litigant’s
ability to choose to give up a right to enforce a legal
obligation—apparently for any reason or no reason.
Whatever differences between the definitions, they do
not relate to the scope of discretion that the person doing the
waiving or releasing may exercise. Courts generally do not
review waivers or releases of claims, except perhaps for
voluntariness.275 On the other hand, Black’s defines
“compromise” as “[a]n agreement between two or more
persons to settle matters in dispute between them; an
271. It is now standard Supreme Court practice to refer to multiple
dictionaries, sometimes even keying them to the year in which the statute was
passed. Both for the sake of brevity and because it seems to us that a legal
dictionary is most appropriate for these legal terms of art, we restrict our
discussion to the most recent edition of Black’s Law Dictionary.
272. Release, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019), Westlaw.
273. Waive, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019), Westlaw.
274. This distinction would be related to, but more general than, the
waiver/forfeiture distinction in federal procedure. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S.
443, 458 n.13 (2004) (“Although jurists often use the words interchangeably,
forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right; waiver is the
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”) (internal
punctuation and citation omitted); see also Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs.
of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1 (2017); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 482,
(2011); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). If this is the distinction
between the two words, it would have no relevance to our considerations here,
and perhaps no impact at all. Surely no Congressional authorization is needed
for an administrative agency to be able to inadvertently fail to prosecute a claim.
275. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 733.
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agreement for the settlement of a real or supposed claim in
which each party surrenders something in concession to the
other” as well as a “debtor’s partial payment coupled with the
creditor’s promise not to claim the rest of the amount due or
claimed.”276 On either definition, a “compromise” requires
both parties to give up something—perhaps it even requires
consideration, in the contract law sense.277 That might make
the “compromise” power more fit for debt write-downs (in
which the debtor “agrees” to continue to pay something)278 or
for cases in which debtors have colorable defenses or
counterclaims (such as the defrauded debtors discussed
above) than for unilateral decisions not to enforce a debt for
any or no reason. Still, a compromise is generally up to the
discretion of the parties, and, absent any indication of
skullduggery or any rules explicitly constraining the
circumstances in which a compromise can be entered into
(such as in class action settlements or consent judgments),
not generally subject to the review of any court.
What to make of the fact that the DOE’s modification
and settlement authorities can only be exercised “[i]n
performance of, and with respect to, the functions, powers,
and duties vested in [the Secretary] by [the relevant parts of
the HEA]”?279 At the most general level, this qualifying
clause merely clarifies that the DOE’s prosecutorial
276. Compromise, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019), Westlaw.
277. This would be especially appropriate to the extent that a compromise were
an actual contract, as it often is.
278. If a write-down were arrived at through the Department’s unilateral
decision, it would not really be an agreement. Were an actual agreement required
for a settlement to count as a “compromise,” it would limit this provision to cases
in which borrowers were in a position to bargain—most obviously in cases in
which they were engaged in litigation against the Department (whether as
plaintiffs or defendants). Insisting on applying a meaning of “compromise”
developed originally for private litigants would be absurdly formalistic in this
case, however. It would force borrowers to find lawyers (or class action lawyers
to find borrowers) in order to obtain a settlement that they would otherwise be
entitled to on the merits.
279. 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a) (2018) (Federal Family Education Loan); 20 U.S.C.
§ 1087hh (2018) (Perkins).
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discretion pertains to claims related to the student loans over
which it has direct or contingent ownership interests. The
clause granting prosecutorial discretion does not itself clarify
which sorts of claims it covers; it only makes clear that it
covers any of the claims it covers, whatever those are. The
“in performance of . . .” clause fills in that gap by tying the
grant of discretion to the portion of the statutory scheme it
covers. That sort of qualification does not add much: it
merely establishes that the compromise authority is over the
relevant type of student debt: FFELP in the case of § 1082(a),
and Perkins in the case of § 1087hh (and Direct via
incorporation of FFELP’s provision).
Yet the qualifying clause does tie prosecutorial
discretion specifically to “the functions, powers, and duties
vested in” the Secretary of Education in the HEA with
respect to student loans. If the Secretary’s “duties” include
specific obligations regarding enforcement of student debts
and/or how to determine when not to enforce them that are
concrete enough to constrain discretion and to guide a court
in reviewing that discretion, then it might be argued that
Congress created “law to apply” that constrains DOE’s
discretion, making it reviewable by a court.
What duties might those be? Unlike in the cases in which
courts have found non-enforcement decisions reviewable, the
HEA does not contain any explicit standard that DOE must
apply, any process that the DOE must go through, or any
obligations that DOE must fulfill in determining whether to
reject enforcement. It does have what the Second Circuit
called a “non-discretionary mandate to collect on federal
student loans” in the sense that it is commanded, like every
other “head of an executive . . . agency” to “try to collect a
claim of the United States Government for money or
property arising out of the activities of, or referred to, the
agency.”280 It also has the duty to “protect the United States

280. See Salazar v. King, 822 F.3d 61, 83 (2d Cir. 2016); 31 U.S.C. § 3711(a)(1)
(2018).
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from the risk of unreasonable loss” from FFELP loans and
otherwise to supervise the federal loan program to ensure
that collections are occurring.281 As well, the HEA charges
DOE with discharging debts under specific circumstances:
death, total disability, a school’s misbehavior or closure,
completing the public service loan forgiveness program,
etc.282 One might draw the negative implication that DOE
has the duty to collect in circumstances other than these.283
These duties do not seem specific enough to make a nonenforcement decision reviewable under the framework that
Heckler developed. Heckler explicitly rejected drawing
negative implications about how much prosecutorial
discretion an agency has based on a statutory grant of
discretion narrower than that exercised by the agency.284
More generally, it provided a number of reasons to reject the
notion that a broad mandate to collect on claims or to enforce
a given area of law provided sufficiently specific “law to
apply” to undermine the presumption in favor of
prosecutorial discretion, let alone an explicit grant thereof.
Recall that in Heckler the FDA declined to take any
enforcement action with respect to drugs used to execute
people even though the drugs at issue had never been tested
or approved as “safe and effective” for use in lethal
injections.285 Yet the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA)

281. 20 U.S.C. § 1078(c)(2)(A) (2018).
282. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087, 1087e(h), (m)(3) (2018).
283. Legislative history is of no help in clarifying the meaning of these
provisions of the HEA. As noted above, settlement power was first introduced in
the NDEA. The first version of the bill that became that law—The Federal
Scholarship Act of 1957—contains no explicit settlement authority. H.R. 85-4490.
It appears in the final version without any prior record; the legislative history
available reveals no mention. See National Defense Education Act of 1958, H.R.
REP. NO. 85-2688 (1958). The HEA’s legislative history is similarly vacant. It
seems the NDEA’s provision was merely transferred over, or perhaps the initial
conversations about settlement authorities that led to the passage of the Federal
Claims Collection Act in the next year influenced the drafting staffers.
284. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837 (1985).
285. Id. at 823–24.
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prohibited (and continues to prohibit) such unapproved uses
and requires that those who violate this prohibition be
punished by fine or imprisonment, which implicitly requires
the FDA to take enforcement action.286 The FDA’s own rules
made this even more explicit by requiring its officers to
“investigate . . . thoroughly and take whatever action is
warranted to protect the public” from unapproved uses.287
The Heckler Court held that none of this was enough to
undermine the FDA’s discretion to decline to enforce the law.
To reiterate, it characterized the prohibition on unapproved
uses as “simply irrelevant to the agency’s discretion to
refuse” to enforce it.288 Creating a scheme of enforcement,
making that scheme mandatory, and even creating explicit
exceptions thereto are not on their own sufficient to make an
agency’s prosecutorial discretion reviewable. A general duty
to enforce the law (or to “try to collect” on claims) will always
be violated by a decision not to do so. It is in the nature of
prosecutorial discretion that it sits in tension with full
enforcement. Heckler and its progeny make clear that the
tension is generally not for courts to resolve, at least not
unless Congress articulates a specific set of standards or a
process for how to do so.
And there is no such standard or process here. The clause
at issue here is unlike that found in Mach Mining, which
mandated that the EEOC make the effort to conciliate before
taking enforcement action, or Hodel, which required the
Department of Interior to consider certain factors before
determining whether or not to enforce. There is no
procedural framework, set of substantive considerations, or
even the vaguest standard to employ to sort one
discretionary act from another.

286. Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1186 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing
the mandatory nature of the FDCA’s prohibitions).
287. Id. at 1186 (quoting Legal Status for Uses Unapproved by the Food and
Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16503, 16504 (Aug. 15, 1972)).
288. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 836.
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3. Do DOE’s Regulations Tie its Hands?
It is not only statutes that can make prosecutorial
discretion reviewable. Agency’s own regulations and
interpretive actions that create “binding norms” can also
create “law to apply.” DOE has created regulations and
interpretive actions, but they leave open ample room for
discretion.
DOE has promulgated regulations that limit how it may
exercise its settlement authority. It first issued such
regulations in 1988—i.e. 33 years after the passage of the
HEA.289 Most of these regulations pertained to other
settlement authorities (i.e. over programs other than student
loans), most of which are governed by the Federal Claims
Collection Act (“FCCA”) rather than the HEA. But, because
DOE gets its settlement authority over student loans from
the HEA and the FCCA only governs where an agency does
not have a separate grant of settlement authority, the FCCA
does not govern DOE’s authority over student loans.290

289. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,424 (Aug. 30, 1988) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 30 (2019)).
290. One could come to this conclusion as an application of the general
principle that the specific governs the general, see, e.g., Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) (“[I]t is a commonplace of statutory
construction that the specific governs the general.”); RadLAX Gateway Hotel,
LLC v. Amalgated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012), but one need not, since
Congress explicitly said that “[n]othing in [the FCCA] shall increase or diminish
the existing authority of the head of an agency to litigate claims, or diminish his
existing authority to settle, compromise, or close claims.” Federal Claims
Collection Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-508, § 4, 80 Stat. 308 (1966). The Federal
Claims Collection Standards reaffirm this principle. 31 C.F.R. § 900.4 (2019)
(“Nothing in [the Federal Claims Collection Standards] precludes agency
disposition of any claim under statutes and implementing regulations other than
[the Federal Claims Collection Act] . . . In such cases, the laws and regulations
that are specifically applicable to claims collection activities of a particular
agency generally take precedence over [the FCCS].”). DOE is far from the only
agency with a separate grant of settlement authority. See U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 14 GAO-RB PT. D, S. 2, 2008 WL 6969346, *2, THE
GOVERNMENT’S DUTY AND AUTHORITY TO COLLECT DEBTS OWED TO IT (2008)
(providing examples of agencies that have such separate authority); 19 U.S.C.
§ 1505(b) (2018) (customs duties); 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(2) (2018) (Small Business
Administration); 38 U.S.C. § 3720(a)(4) (2018) (Department of Veterans Affairs);
10 U.S.C. § 8823(a) (2018) (the Navy); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651–52 (2018) (various
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Accordingly, regarding the Secretary’s student loan
settlement authority, the 1988 regulations said:
“Notwithstanding [other of the Department’s settlement
authorities] the Secretary may compromise a debt, or
suspend or terminate collection of a debt, in any amount if
the debt arises under [the FFELP or Perkins Loan
Program].”291 They said nothing further. In sum, they stated
that DOE had whatever settlement authority over student
loans the HEA gave it without doing anything to clarify, let
alone narrow, that authority.
This provision remained stuck in place for nearly two
decades, even as Congress created the Direct Loan program
and the $1 million limit. It was finally updated in 2016 as
part of a regulatory process focused on another set of rules.292
There was no debate or discussion of the changes to
settlement authority among otherwise highly contested
regulatory proceedings regarding the conditions in which
student debtors who were mistreated by their school can
have their debts discharged.293 The Department presented
the changes to prosecutorial discretion regulations as
“technical corrections” that would not bring about
“significant change in current practices.”294 It explained the
agencies with respect to third-party claims for hospital or medical care); 26 U.S.C.
§§ 6321–26, 6331 (2018) (tax liens and tax levy, respectively).
291. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,424, (Aug. 30, 1988) (codified at former 34 C.F.R.
§ 30.70(h)).
292. Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 39,330, 39,368–69,
39,407–08 (June 16, 2016) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 30, 668, 674, 682, 685,
686). The Department is in the process of repealing and rewriting these
regulations. The Department’s main purpose in doing so is to make it more
difficult to cancel student debt even for borrowers who were defrauded, so it
seems unlikely that the revised regulations would alter this provision. See Erica
L. Green, Education Department Has Stalled on Debt Relief for Defrauded
Students, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/us/
politics/betsy-devos-student-loan-debt-relief.html.
293. The final rule does not note any such comments. See Student Assistance
General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. at 39,330. The author was at all of the
negotiating sessions, acting as adviser to the student negotiator, and recalls no
discussion of this provision whatsoever.
294. Id. at 39,331, 36,397.
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changes as merely reflecting the “series of statutory changes
[since 1988] that have expanded the Secretary’s authority to
compromise, or suspend or terminate the collection of,
debts.”295
The new regulations include three noteworthy changes.
First, they include Direct Loans as on par with FFELP and
Perkins based on the reasoning that the statutory provision
that puts Direct Loans on par with FFELP requires it.296
Second, they seem to restrict the exercise of DOE’s authority
to “compromise, suspend, or terminate collections” to
situations covered “under the provisions of 31 CFR part 902
or 903.”297 Those CFR provisions are the Federal Claims
Collections Standards (“FCCS”), which were developed
jointly by the DOJ and Treasury to guide agencies that get
their settlement authority from the FCCA (but wait? Didn’t
I say that the FCCA doesn’t govern? Yes. All will be revealed
shortly).298 Through the FCCS, the DOJ and Treasury give
permission to other Executive Branch officers to
“compromise a debt” if they “cannot collect the full amount
because:” (1) “a debtor is unable to pay the full amount in a
reasonable time,” (2) the agency “is unable to collect the debt
in full within a reasonable time by enforced collection
proceedings,” (3) “the cost of collecting the debt does not
justify the enforced collection of the full amount” or (4) “there
is significant doubt concerning the [agency’s] ability to prove
its case in court.”299 Agencies that adopt the FCCS may
deviate from these conditions “as an aid to enforcement and
to compel compliance, if the agency’s enforcement policy in
terms of deterrence and securing compliance, present and
295. Id. at 39,369.
296. 34 C.F.R. § 30.70 (2019).
297. Id.
298. Federal Claims Collection Standards, 31 C.F.R. §§ 900–04 (2019).
299. Id. § 902.2(a). The FCCS limit suspending collection to situations where
“(1) the agency cannot locate the debtor, (2) the debtor’s financial condition is
expected to improve, or (3) the debtor has requested a waiver or review of the
debt.” Id. § 903.2(a).
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future, will be adequately served.”300 And, as a general
matter, the Attorney General must sign off on any
compromises and suspensions of collections on claims above
$100,000.301
Of these three, only the first and third alteration reflect
the “series of statutory changes” since 1988. We have already
discussed how the HEOA does not impose any real
restrictions on DOE. The second alteration is the only
candidate for imposing the sort of “law to apply” that might
actually restrict DOE’s discretion. It imposes a new set of
requirements beyond the statutory baseline. Because the
Secretary gets her settlement power from a statute other
than the FCCA, DOE is under no obligation to implement the
FCCS.302 Of course the DOE had the option of following the
FCCS, but it was not bound to do so before it tied its
authority to “compromise, suspend, or terminate collections”
to the FCCS.
It seems likely that DOE did not mean to narrow its
regulatory authority by promulgating this provision. As
noted above, DOE explained these regulations as mere
“technical corrections” and did not make any effort to justify
the changes during the negotiated rulemaking or comment
periods leading up to their enactment. There is no reason to
believe that DOE meant to restrict its authority. “To the
contrary,” Connor, Loonin, and Merrill rightly note, “the
regulation was revised so as to reflect expansions in the
Secretary’s authority.”303 Indeed, it is not at all clear that the
2016 regulatory drafters (unlike the 1988 drafters) realized
that DOE is not bound by the FCCA with respect to claims
on student debtors. They do not seem to have considered the
interaction between HEA and FCCA at any length.
Otherwise, why would they have bound themselves to
300. Id. § 902.3.
301. Id. §§ 902.1, 903.1.
302. See supra note 290.
303. Ltr., supra note 265, at 5.

2020]

STUDENT DEBT JUBILEE

383

regulatory guidelines that require consultation with DOJ for
claims over $100,000 while also incorporating the HEOA’s
aforementioned $1 million ceiling?304
One way to treat this regulatory change, then, is a
massive drafting error. A mistake to be ignored.
Even if we do not do that, there are several reasons to
think that this regulation does not constrain DOE’s
discretion much if at all. First, it does not seem to alter
DOE’s power to modify its claims305 or its power to
compromise, waive, or release claims not in collections (and
one might also quibble as to whether release and waiver of
claims is the same as “termination” thereof). The regulation
that refers to the FCCA only refers to DOE’s power to
“compromise, suspend, or terminate collections.” If
“collections” here refers to the procedures DOE (or any
debtor) goes through to collect on a defaulted claim
(including instituting suit), then the regulation would seem
to be inapplicable to DOE’s decision to release claims over
non-defaulted debt. Generally, this is what is meant by
“collections” in the world of debt enforcement. If “collections”
is read more broadly to include any activity involved in
managing claims based on debts still due, then this
regulation is more broadly applicable. Either way,
modification of a claim is distinct from compromise,
suspension, or termination of collections. A modification can
be implemented in the process compromising a claim or to
effectively terminate or suspend collections, but it can also
be exercised for other reasons and with other effect.
Similarly, the FCCS only refer to an agency’s power to
“compromise” or to “suspend” claims, providing no guidance
with respect to when or how modification is appropriate.
As well, if we are to make sense of the interaction

304. Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 39,408 (codified at
34 C.F.R. § 30.70(e)(2)) (2019).
305. As Connor, Loonin, and Merrill have pointed out. See Ltr., supra note 265,
at 6.
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between the HEA and the FCCA, we ought to note that, given
the context of their enactment, the FCCS are best understood
to have an implicit fifth condition when an executive branch
official may compromise a debt: whenever the Attorney
General says it is okay (so long as the Attorney General does
so within statutory and constitutional bounds). If so, the
regulation creates merely a procedural hurdle for DOE to
jump through—namely, obtaining approval of DOJ. To see
why, begin by imagining that the DOE got its authority from
the FCCA.
The FCCA was enacted against the background
understanding that the Attorney General has authority to
exercise full prosecutorial discretion, which includes full
discretion in determining whether to bring, to compromise,
or to otherwise settle claims. Agencies without explicit
statutory grants of prosecutorial discretion would bring
claims to the DOJ to borrow the AG’s inherent authority. The
DOJ drafted the FCCA to make clear that agencies without
explicit statutory authority could compromise claims below a
certain amount without having to ask permission from the
Attorney General, but it conditioned the ability to do so on
regulations promulgated by the Treasury and the DOJ.306
Effectively, then, the FCCA created a form of pre-approval, a
blanket permission to settle claims under certain conditions.
It did nothing to limit the Attorney General’s own authority
to compromise (or otherwise settle) claims above the
threshold amount or to grant permission to compromise
claims below the threshold amount for reasons beyond those
explicitly listed in the ex ante permission slip of the FCCS.
The FCCS themselves reflect the FCCA’s structure, first
granting the compromise authority below the threshold
amount, then declaring that the “authority to accept
compromises” of any claims higher than the threshold
306. 31 U.S.C. § 3711(a)(2) (2018) (unconditioned compromise authority,
compare with (a)(3)’s suspension authority, which incorporates an ability to pay
condition), (d) (conditioning suspension and compromise authority on agency,
Justice, and Treasury regulations and standards).
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amount “rests with the Department of Justice,” then
articulating the conditions under which an agency may
exercise its (sub-threshold) authority without having to ask
permission.307 The FCCS say nothing about the conditions
under which the Department of Justice can exercise its
compromise (or other settlement) authority, nor do they
restrict an agency from referring a sub-threshold claim to the
Department of Justice for the Attorney General to do what
she will. Accordingly, were DOE to have got its prosecutorial
discretion from the FCCA, it would merely be borrowing the
AG’s discretion for sub-threshold amounts subject to the
conditions of the FCCS. Nothing in the FCCA or the FCCS
would prohibit it from declining to exercise its discretion
according to the FCCS and referring a claim to the AG/DOJ
to exercise discretion not limited by the FCCS. After all, such
referral is what it would have done had it had no statutory
permission to exercise prosecutorial discretion.
Understood in context, the FCCS constrain the
discretion of executive branch agencies on terms created by
the DOJ and Treasury, but enable DOJ to override any of
those constraints in a case-by-case basis. When the DOE
adopted the FCCS, it incorporated this structure into its
implementation of the discretion that the HEA granted it. In
effect, it outsourced its prosecutorial discretion to the DOJ:
tying its hands to compromise only in situations preapproved by the DOJ (and Treasury) via the FCCS or
situations in which the AG gives specific approval, subject to
whichever other limits the HEA creates.
None of which denies that DOE has constrained its own
discretion by adopting the FCCS, only the practical
importance of that constraint should DOJ and DOE be of the
same mind with respect to how much student debt should be
canceled. In such a circumstance, the new regulations merely

307. 31 C.F.R. § 902.1(a) (granting sub-threshold authority); § 902.1(b)
(reserving supra-threshold authority to Justice); § 902.2 (articulating conditions
for exercise of sub-threshold authority).
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require DOJ to decide where DOE would have been legally
able to do so on its own. In fact, somewhat ironically given
the history of the FCCA, it has apparently been normal
practice for the DOE to obtain approval from the DOJ before
deciding on even the most trivial settlement.308 This practice
apparently developed because Justice represents Education
in any litigation and its attorneys want to make sure things
go according to their own standards. This regulation merely
maintains that peace between these instrumentalities of the
Executive.
If all else fails, DOE could avoid any of these limitations
by simply repealing and replacing its regulations with an
updated version of what it had in place from 1988 to 2016: a
regulation that merely reaffirms its full statutory authority.
Doing so would require going through a time-consuming
negotiated rulemaking proceeding, but it is perfectly
permissible.309
4. Does DOE’s Practice Create a “Binding Norm”?
Setting aside regulations, has DOE’s implementation of
its settlement and modification authorities created any
limitations? In short, no.
Public information on how DOE uses and thinks about
these authorities is scarce. Its announced view is that
“[s]pecific guidance related to settlements and compromises
is confidential, given that publicizing this information is not
in the best interest of the government as it could enable
borrowers to reduce their repayments below the amount they
can legitimately afford.”310 But what information is available

308. Bergeron, infra note 314.
309. Regarding the obligation to follow the same process to amend or repeal a
regulation as to promulgate one, see Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n., 135 S. Ct.
1199, 1206 (2015); F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515
(2009). Regarding the Department of Education’s obligation to use negotiated
rulemaking in addition to notice and comment, see 20 U.S.C. § 6571(b) (2018).
310. FED. STUDENT AID OFF. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., LOAN SERVICING AND
COLLECTION – FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2018), https://getoutofdebt.org/wp-
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indicates that DOE has consistently understood its
settlement authority as something to be used rarely, in cases
in which it seemed likely that further collection would not be
worth the expense.
In a 1993 guidance document for guaranty agencies, the
Department advised that these agencies would not sacrifice
their right to the Department’s insurance if they exercised
their discretion to compromise with borrowers who had
defaulted on FFELP loans and were “repeatedly unemployed
and have no prospects for future employment,” were
“repeatedly public assistance recipients,” were “chronically
ill, partially disabled, or of an age that results in their
inability to work,” or had “potential for future earnings [that
was] limited or non-existent”—that is, so long as they had
“no other funds available to them from other sources, such as
an inheritance.”311 In other words, it would not require
guaranty agencies to draw blood from stones, so long as they
really really made sure they were dealing with stones. Since
the Department only takes possession of FFELP loans once
a guaranty agency assigns it over to them (and a guaranty
agency only takes possession in case of default or discharge),
this guidance document likely reflected the Department’s
own internal standards for when the Secretary should
exercise its settlement authority.
Bolstering this interpretation, as late as 2009 the
Department had posted a PCA manual that described
similar standards for collections companies it contracts with
to pursue borrowers who default on any loan.312 The
Department’s most recent statement, in response to queries
from the National Consumer Law Center in 2015 is that
“[s]ettlements and compromises are only available to
content/uploads/2018/06/IFAP-Loan-Servicing-and-Collection-FAQ_new.pdf.
311. NAT’L COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUC. LOAN PROGRAMS, STANDARDIZED
COMPROMISE AND WRITE-OFF PROCEDURES (1993), https://www.studentloan
borrowerassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ex_6.pdf.
312. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PCA PROCS. MANUAL: 2009 DOE COLLECTIONS
CONTRACT 71–73, 2009.
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defaulted borrowers and are intended as a last resort after
other repayment options have been exhausted.”313
According to David Bergeron, a former acting assistant
secretary for postsecondary education, the reason DOE
concluded that its prosecutorial discretion only applies to
defaulted loans is that, under the FFELP program, DOE only
takes possession of loans in case of default.314 And one can
only exercise prosecutorial discretion over debts one owns.
As for Direct Loans, DOE has apparently reasoned that,
because their settlement discretion derives entirely from the
fact that they are available on the same terms as FFELP
loans, that discretion only kicks in when the DOE would
have been able to exercise it for FFELP loans: i.e. when they
default.315
This line of practice, inasmuch as it can be discerned,
does not seem sufficient to “create binding norms by
imposing rights or obligations on the respective parties,” as
D.C. Circuit precedent requires.316 DOE keeps its practices
confidential precisely because it seeks to avoid altering
private parties’ behavior. That is, it seeks to avoid even
creating expectations about its conduct, let alone creating an
enforceable right based on such an expectation.
While the Supreme Court has held that “the
longstanding practice of the government can inform [a
court’s] determination of what the law is” 317 and that “a
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, can
raise a presumption that the action had been taken in

313. FED. STUDENT AID OFF. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 310.
314. Email from David Bergeron, Senior Fellow, Ctr. for Am. Progress, to Luke
Herrine, Ph.D. in Law Candidate, Yale Law Sch. (June 18, 2019, 10:05 EST) (on
file with author).
315. Id.
316. Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
317. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014) (internal
citations and punctuation omitted).
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pursuance of its consent,”318 the Court has never held that
an agency’s failure to act in a certain way makes that action
prohibited. Put differently: failing to test the limits of a
power has never been treated as setting the limits of that
power, through some sort of estoppel principle. Such a
principle would be hard to justify. When an action of
questionable legality has long been performed without
objection, it might be presumed legal. But when an action
has never been attempted, nobody would have had the
chance to object or not. No information about its legality—
presumptive or otherwise—is produced. So the justification
for the former does not apply to the latter. What is more,
limiting officials to staying within the boundaries of prior
practice regardless of their paper grant of power would seem
to incentivize them to test the limits of their power early and
often to avoid losing the opportunity to do so later, which
would seem a recipe for nearly constant constitutional crisis.
The substance of DOE’s reasoning for a narrow reading
of its own discretion is also flawed. First of all, it is not true
that the Department only holds defaulted FFELP debts. It
also takes possession of FFELP debts by paying off loans on
behalf of debtors who are eligible for a discharge under the
HEA.319 And, as we will discuss later, it may have other ways
of taking possession of them. But, in any case, the
Department need not wait to be the holder of a loan over
which it has ultimate enforcement authority in order to make
a determination about whether it will enforce or discharge
the obligation to pay that loan. There is nothing in the
relevant statutes that prevents the Department from
determining whether it will enforce a FFELP loan should it
come in possession before it actually does, and it seems
absurd to prevent the Department from planning in advance
318. Medellín v. Texas, 532 U.S. 491, 531 (2008) (internal punctuation
omitted).
319. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087(a)(1), (b), (c)(1), (d) (2018) (requiring Department to
pay loan on borrower’s behalf and order a discharge); see also 34 C.F.R.
§ 682.402(a) (2019) (developing procedure for discharge).
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how it will exercise its rights to collect a debt should it come
to hold the debt. Indeed, such an interpretation would
undermine the Department’s explicit statutory authority to
issue ex ante regulations pertaining to how it will manage
debts in which it is not in possession should it come into their
possession.320
But the Department’s authority to determine how it will
manage debts that it does not yet but may hold is not
restricted to those cases in which the Department is granted
explicit authority to grant discharges. In particular, the
Department has long had the ability to determine that a loan
is not or would not be legally enforceable against the holder
of the loan due to misconduct in inducing the debtor to take
on the loan and to refuse to pay out a guarantee for such
loans.321 As far back as 1973, the Department informed
guarantee agencies that it would not pay out insurance on
loans taken out to attend for-profit colleges where there was
(more likely than not) consumer fraud.322 In such situations,
the Department can determine in advance that no holder of
the loan should continue to enforce it because it is not legally
owed.
A reasonable extension of this principle would be to
enable the Department to pay less than the full claim to the
guarantee agency in order to take possession of the debt to
ensure that it will be canceled. Doing so would involve a
determination that refusing to pay insurance would actually
not be the best way to prevent collection of legally nonenforceable debts by parties that have an incentive to
maximize collections even when legally questionable. The
Secretary would be exercising discretion to pay somewhere
320. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1082(a)(1), 1087(a)(1) (2018).
321. See 34 C.F.R. § 684.402(a)(4)–(5) (2019); see also Margaret Reiter,
Comment on Dep’t of Educ. Proposed Rule, Docket ED-2015-OPE-0103, p. 7–10
(Aug. l, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2015-OPE-010310697 (reviewing history of non-payment on non-enforceable notes, going back at
least to 1973).
322. Reiter, supra note 321, at 7.
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in between all and none of its guarantee to ensure the overall
purpose of the HEA is fulfilled.
In sum, nothing in DOE’s understanding limits its
discretion over FFELP loans in its possession (in which case
DOE has a claim over the debtor) or that it has the right to
bring within its possession (in which case DOE can
determine how it would exercise its claim over a debtor were
it to obtain one). But, in any case, whatever limits there are
on FFELP do not carry over to Direct Loans just because they
are subject to “the same terms, conditions, and benefits.”323
That is because Direct Loans are subject to the same terms,
conditions, and benefits except insofar as they are not.
“Direct Loans” is not merely a new label for FFELP, it is a
modification of the student loan program that makes
otherwise identical loans available on more uniform terms
and subject to more direct control by DOE. Indeed, the main
difference between FFELP and Direct Loans is precisely that
DOE does not need to take any action or pay any entity to
come into possession of Direct Loans. It issues them directly.
Thus Direct Loans obviously do not inherit the terms and
conditions that involve private lenders, guarantee agencies,
and insurance arrangements between DOE and these
parties. The whole point of creating Direct Loans was to
eliminate the complications involved with these particular
terms and conditions, such as they are. Since the settlement
authority itself says nothing about when it can be exercised,
it would be absurd to limit DOE’s authority to settle Direct
Loans to circumstances when it would have been able to take
possession of FFELP loans merely because the structure of
FFELP loans created a de facto limitation on the settlement
authority.
As for the more general principle that DOE’s discretion
can only be exercised to minimize administrative cost or
perhaps in cases where the legality of the claim would be

323. Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat. 572 (1992) (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1087a(b)(2) (2018)).

392

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

dubious (and thus where collection might generate costly
litigation or even be ruled unlawful), there is no HEA
provision that even remotely restricts the HEA in that way.
And reading that restriction into the HEA would be in
tension with the basic principle of presuming prosecutorial
discretion to be unreviewable, since it conditions nonreviewability on a court’s determination of the proper
reasons for which that discretion may be exercised.
5. Is Debt Cancellation an “Abdication of [DOE’s]
Statutory Duty”?
As noted, Heckler left open the possibility that an agency
that used its discretion to “consciously and expressly adopt[]
a general policy which is in effect an abdication of its
statutory duty” would not be entitled to normally applicable
deference.324 This exception is consistent with the general
principle of administrative law that “[r]egardless of how
serious the problem an administrative agency seeks to
address . . . it may not exercise its authority in a manner that
is inconsistent with the administrative structure that
Congress enacted into law.”325 As also noted, abdication of
duty has never served as a basis for finding an otherwise
discretionary agency action reviewable. Would DOE using its
prosecutorial discretion to enact a student debt jubilee
present the opportunity to develop this possibility?
The most likely scenario in which a court would find that
DOE has abdicated its duty by undermining the purpose of
the statute would be if it stopped collecting student debt
altogether. The argument for abdication of duty would be
that, whatever the scope of DOE’s discretion, it cannot be so
great that it can unilaterally decide that student debt ought
no longer be collected. The HEA charges it with creating and
enforcing such debts, after all. Congress cannot be said to
have granted DOE discretion so broad as to enable it to

324. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 855 n.4 (1985).
325. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000).
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override Congress’s decision to have an operational student
loan program. The core purpose of prosecutorial discretion, it
is often said, is to enable an agency to prioritize some claims
over others.326 Refusing to enforce all claims prioritizes no
claims at all. It goes against the structure of the statute. It
violates the oft-repeated principle that Congress does not
“hide elephants in mouseholes,”327 not to mention that courts
and agencies should exercise “common sense as to the
manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy
decision of such economic and political magnitude to an
administrative agency.”328
The main defense of a refusal to collect would be to point
to the routine exercises of prosecutorial discretion to refuse
to enforce laws perceived as overly harsh or otherwise
socially or morally problematic. As William Eskridge has
shown, sodomy laws, though universally enacted among U.S.
states for most of their history, were “rarely enforced . . .
against anyone before 1880, even when such illegal activities
were notorious in the community.”329 Recent years have seen
several district attorneys refusing to enforce laws that
criminalize various drug-related offenses.330 No court I am
326. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 609–10 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“These
judgments—arising from considerations of resource allocation, agency priorities,
and costs of alternatives—are well within the agency’s expertise and discretion.”);
Schering Corp. v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 683, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (describing FDA’s
decision to settle as a product of “precisely the sort of balancing of agency
priorities and objectives, informed by judgments based on agency expertise, that,
absent some ‘law to apply,’ should not be second-guessed by a court”).
327. This phrase comes from Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assocs., 531 U.S. 457,
468 (2001), and has taken on the status of ritual incantation since. See, e.g., Cyan,
Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1071 (2018);
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); Puerto Rico v. Franklin
California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016); EME Homer City, 572 U.S. at
528; Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006).
328. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).
329. WILLIAM M. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS
AMERICA: 1861–2003 21 (2008).
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330. Brooklyn DA Moves to Vacate 1,400 Pot Warrants, Overturn 28
Convictions, ABC7NY (Dec. 19, 2018), https://abc7ny.com/marijuana-convictions-
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aware of has ever ruled that prosecutors’ decision not to
enforce these and other laws was an abdication of statutory
duty reviewable by a court.
But suppose we assume that a total refusal would be
reviewable, perhaps by differentiating criminal prosecutions
from the efforts of the administrative state. Even so, none of
the proposals on the table involve unilateral refusal to ever
cancel student debt. Even a full jubilee would only involve
eliminating all current student debt. Such an action
(assuming it happens in the absence of other reforms that
would eliminate student debt) is more like a reset of the
student debt program than the elimination thereof. It would
involve a prioritization of resources towards the future
rather than the past, we might say.
We might note as well that even if a court were inclined
to rule against a DOE-enacted jubilee, it would likely be
given pause by the fact that doing so would surely be a
tremendously politically unpopular decision, transcending
partisan divides at least somewhat. A court that re-imposed
student debt on millions of people who just had the
experience of having that debt lifted off their shoulders
would at the least have a serious PR problem on its hands.
Especially a court worried about its eroding legitimacy might
think twice before taking the case.
Something less than total cancellation—say an acrossthe-board haircut and/or sliding-scale cancellation
depending on income—is even more obviously a matter of
prioritization rather than total abdication. Indeed, once we
are outside the realm of total elimination of debt, it is hard
to see what principles could guide a court in determining how
much discretion is too much to be beyond court review. So
long as the cancellation plan does not go outside the realm of
non-enforcement into the realm of granting or eliminating
pot-brooklyn-da-district-attorney/4927578/; Joe Trinacria, Larry Krasner Sues
Big Pharma, Drops All Marijuana Possession Charges, PHILLYMAG (Feb. 16,
2018), https://www.phillymag.com/news/2018/02/16/krasner-big-pharmamarijuana-possession/.
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borrowers’ rights (by, say, conditioning debt cancellation on
borrowers’ waiver of the right to vote), any line drawn
between reviewable and non-reviewable discretion would
seem to be equivalent to a court substituting its judgment
about the appropriate use of discretion for that of the
administrative agency charged with exercising such
judgment.
6. Even if Reviewable, Debt Cancellation Could Survive
Review
Of course, a finding that a given action is reviewable is
not a finding that it is unlawful. If a court were to review
DOE’s use of its discretion to cancel student debt, it would
have to apply the APA. I will spare the reader the full
analysis of what that would look like, but it could be either
review for abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious
review.
C. Complications with FFELP and Perkins Loans
In what remains, we will assume that DOE can cancel
student debt and avoid or survive court review. Yet further
legal matters remain in designing a debt cancellation plan.
As discussed above, not all public student loans are owed
directly to DOE, even if DOE has regulatory authority over
them. In particular, FFELP and Perkins Loans are initially
issued by and owed to non-governmental entities. Eighty-five
percent of outstanding FFELP loans—or 16% of all
outstanding public student—is held by entities other than
DOE. Because DOE can only decline to enforce debts it has
the ability to enforce, the fact that DOE does not have direct
claims on most FFELP or any Perkins debtors presents a
problem. Existing jubilee proposals introduced in Congress
address this issue by expressly giving DOE authority to
assume the obligation on FFELP and Perkins Loans. (This
problem does not pertain to Direct Loans, of course.) How
might DOE obtain possession of FFELP and Perkins loans
without this additional authority?
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1. FFELP
DOE has the authority to take possession of FFELP
loans when such a loan has been in default long enough and
after enough efforts at collection for a guaranty agency to
have paid out its guarantee and to have given up on
collection efforts itself. This authority would not be all that
helpful unless, perhaps, many debtors refused to pay,
whether in protest or in anticipation of a potential jubilee.
DOE also has the ability to “compromise[] any claim on, or
arising because of” its insurance on the guaranty on FFELP
loans.331 Using this authority, it might announce its plan to
exercise its discretion to cancel or write down (i.e. to decline
to enforce, to waive or release) some or all FFELP Loans that
ultimately come within its possession and then negotiate
with guaranty agencies to pay out a lump sum in exchange
for assignment of the relevant debts. Debtors would have a
lessened incentive to pay these debts, giving holders/lenders
an incentive to sell instead of expending further collection
costs.
2. Perkins
Similarly, DOE can take assignment of a Perkins Loan
from a college where the loan has “been in default despite
due diligence on the part of the institution in attempting
collection thereon” or where “an institution of higher
education determines not to service and collect” it.332 Once
DOE takes possession of a Perkins Loan via assignment from
a college, it must “attempt to collect” on it “until all
appropriate collection efforts, as determined by the Secretary,
have been expended.”333 DOE might exercise this authority
after encouraging colleges that hold Perkins to “determine[]
not to service or collect” Perkins Loans anymore, which
331. 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(5) (2018).
332. 20 U.S.C. § 1087cc(a)(4), (c)(5) (2018).
333. 20 U.S.C. § 1087gg(b) (2018) (emphasis added). It is not clear if this is any
different than the obligation to “try to collect” any debts owed to the federal
government at 31 U.S.C. § 3711(a)(1) (2018).
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would then require (and, a fortiori, enable) the colleges to
assign the loans to DOE.334 Loans assigned in this way do
not require DOE to make any payments to colleges.335
Though some colleges might be willing to get on board with
such a plan based on a belief in the value of student debt
cancellation alone, others might require further incentive.
DOE might be able to “compromise” with some sort of
incentive, such as providing some form of regulatory relief.
DOE also has the authority to “consent to modification”
of the terms of a Perkins Loan and/or to “waive any . . . claim”
over colleges who, for instance, write down a loan in a way
that runs afoul of the HEA.336 DOE might coordinate with
colleges willing to write down or cancel Perkins loans by
committing to exercise one or both of these authorities so
that colleges face no consequences for doing so.
3. Conclusion
None of these approaches to resolving the problem of the
indirect claims under FFELP and Perkins is foolproof.
However, a creative Secretary of Education could potentially
find a way to mix them together to ensure as uniform a
treatment of different kinds of public student loans as
possible under a debt cancellation program.
E. Budgetary and Tax Implications: Getting OMB and the
Treasury’s Approval
Assuming the Secretary were to decide to use her
settlement power to cancel a large amount of student debt
and setting aside the legal questions of whether doing so
would be based on a proper interpretation of the relevant
334. The HEA also enables DOE to authorize colleges to directly compromise
with student debtors, but only if the compromise results in the debtor paying a
lump sum amounting to at least 90% of the principal and all of the interest and
fees. 20 U.S.C. § 1087dd(f) (2018).
335. Indeed, any amount DOE collects on such a loan assigned in this way
must be distributed to colleges other than the assignor.
336. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087hh(1), (2) (2018).
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statutory authorities, there are two further potential
limitations: the legal implications of the effect of such
cancellation on the federal budget and the potential that the
IRS could treat the cancellation as a form of income for tax
purposes.
1. There are No Budgetary or Separation-of-Powers
Limitations on Debt Cancellation
There are three potential legal problems that
administrative discretion with a major impact on the federal
budget could have: it could contravene the constitutional
separation of powers, whether under non-delegation doctrine
or the Appropriations Clause; it could violate a statutory
restriction on use of appropriated funds; or it could violate
an executive directive on how funds can be used.
Non-delegation doctrine is currently in a state of flux.
Under current law, as long as Congress provides some
minimal “intelligible principle” to guide agency action—i.e.
as long as Congress does not create an agency that convenes
political coalitions to bargain over the terms of multiple
sectors of the economy—a delegation does not undermine the
constitutional separation of powers.337 However, it seems
likely that there is now a majority of Supreme Court Justices
willing to give non-delegation doctrine more bite.338 Nondelegation doctrine has never been used to strike down
quasi-prosecutorial discretion, although it has never
confronted quasi-prosecutorial discretion of the scope
envisioned here. And a more aggressive version of the
doctrine might at least be used as a background threat of
unconstitutionality to counsel a narrower statutory
interpretation on constitutional avoidance principles.
Speculating further on the matter would be more tedious
than interesting, but it is worth noting the risk.
337. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
338. See Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court’s Covert Plan to Gut the EPA, THE
NEW REPUBLIC (June 21, 2019) https://newrepublic.com/article/154266/supremecourts-covert-plan-gut-epas-powers.

2020]

STUDENT DEBT JUBILEE

399

Constitutional restrictions on appropriations are more
easily set aside. The Appropriations Clause of the
Constitution provides: “No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law.”339 The Supreme Court has understood this clause as
quite “straightforward and explicit.”340 “It means simply that
no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been
appropriated by an act of Congress.” 341 This prohibition is
strict: it prohibits a President from using the pardon power
to “order to repay from the Treasury the proceeds derived
from the sale of the convict’s forfeited property” and even
inadvertent expenditures in excess of appropriations.342
But it has no teeth in this case. It has nothing to say
about non-collection of debts, since failing to deposit money
into the Treasury is not the same as withdrawing money
from the Treasury. So it has nothing to say about settling
Direct Loans or FFELP Loans already in the Department of
Education’s possession. In theory, it might restrict the
Department’s payout of insurance to guaranty agencies in
the case of FFELP loans not already in the Department’s
possession, but Congress has granted blanket authority for
the Department to cover the costs of these loans. FFELP is
an entitlement program for which Congress pre-authorized
funds to pay out loan guarantees paid out in accordance with
law.343

339. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
340. Off. of Personnel Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424 (1990).
341. Id. (quoting Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321
(1937)).
342. Id. at 425–26 (1990) (citing Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154
(1877)); see also U.S. Dep’t of Navy v. Fed. Labor Rel. Auth., 665 F.3d 1339, 1347
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
343. See 20 U.S.C. § 1081 (2018) (creating an ongoing “insurance fund” to cover
any costs of insuring FFELP loans and authorizing the Secretary to borrow from
the Treasury as appropriate to cover costs); 2 U.S.C. § 661c(c)(1) (2018) (explicitly
using “the guaranteed student loan program” as an example of the types of
entitlement programs that are exempt from the usual appropriations process).
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There also seem to be no statutory restrictions related to
budgetary impact. It is difficult to prove a negative, but none
of the most likely candidate laws seem to apply. The
Antideficiency Act prohibits Executive Branch officers from
spending money in excess of Congressional appropriations
(as the Constitution does) and of regulatory restrictions. 344
But canceling debt would not authorize expenditures above
amounts appropriated, nor would paying off insurance. The
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act
(BBEDCA) and the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act (“Statutory
PAYGO”) both require Congress to generate revenue to
“offset” new expenditures, but neither apply to
administrative agencies or even to already authorized
expenditures.345 The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990
(FCRA), enables loans to be issued only to the extent that
their “costs” are annually appropriated by Congress.346
However, as Connor, Loonin, and Merrill point out, “FCRA
specifically exempts any ‘direct loan or loan guarantee
program’” that “constitutes an entitlement (such as the
guaranteed student loan program . . .); from this
appropriations requirement. Likewise, subsection (c)
exempts mandatory programs such as FFELP and DLP from
the requirement that any outstanding direct loan or loan
guarantee ‘shall not be modified in a manner that increases
its cost’ unless the cost increase is provided for in an
appropriations Act,347 Congress also anticipated and
provided ‘permanent indefinite authority’ for agencies’
‘reestimate’ of the cost for a group of direct loans or loan
guarantees made in a single fiscal year.”348
Perhaps this does not prove a negative, since your
humble pro-jubilee author does not have a sufficient

344. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1514, 1517 (2018).
345. 2 U.S.C. § 900–22 (2018); Pub. L. 111-39 (Feb. 12, 2010).
346. 2 U.S.C. § 661c(b) (2018).
347. 2 U.S.C. § 661c(e) (2018).
348. Ltr., supra note 265, at 6 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 661c(c), (e), (f) (2018)).
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incentive to find limitations. But take heart. Congresspeople
with ideological motivations to find such an authority have
failed to do so. In a 2016 letter to the Secretary of Education,
Republican Chairmen of the House and Senate Budget
Committees expressed concern that: “[t]here are at present
no [Congressional] budget control mechanisms to limit the
cost of administrative changes to student loan programs
made pursuant to current law, however great the cost or
departure from long-standing policy.”349
However, since the George W. Bush Administration, the
OMB has imposed budgetary restrictions on administrative
agencies under what has become known as “Administrative
PAYGO.”350 The details of these restrictions are not fully
public, but it is known that they apply to any “discretionary
administrative action” by an agency official—apparently
including everything from new regulations to increased
staffing—that “increase[s] mandatory spending” (i.e. preauthorized Congressional spending) “relative to the
projection in the most recent [President’s annual budget
request] or Mid-Session Review of what is required, under
current law, to fund the mandatory-spending program.”351
Any such increase must be presented to the OMB for
approval alongside cost estimates and “one or more proposals
for other administrative actions . . . that would comparably
reduce mandatory spending,” which is to say, an “offset.”352

349. Letter from Tom Price, Chairman of the House Budget Committee, and
Mike Enzi, Chairman of the Senate Budget Comm., and Mike Enzi, Chairman of
the Senate Budget Comm., to John B. King, Sec’y of Educ. (Jul. 14, 2016),
https://www.budget.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/EnziPriceLetter.pdf.
350. See Clinton T. Brass & Jim Monke, OMB Controls on Agency Mandatory
Spending Programs: “Administrative PAYGO” and Related Issues for Congress,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Aug. 19, 2010), https://nationalaglaw
center.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/R41375.pdf.
351. Id. at 1, 3 (quoting Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, Director of OMB,
to heads of departments and agencies, “Budget Discipline for Agency
Administrative Actions,” M-05-13, May 23, 2005, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/memoranda_2005/).
352. Id. at 4 (quoting Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, at ¶ 1).
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One might quibble as to whether refraining from collecting
debt counts as increasing spending, but ultimately the
OMB’s interpretation would win the day. And it seems likely
that an OMB skeptical of the budgetary impact of student
debt cancellation would apply Administrative PAYGO to any
exercise of the settlement authority that substantially
reduced the Department of Education’s revenues, especially
if that lack of revenue would require the Department to
borrow from the Treasury to maintain other parts of its
budget. On the other hand, since Administrative PAYGO
only applies if the OMB says it does, it could be repealed
entirely (as it should be) or waived for any particular case of
“spending” increases. And if the President had prioritized
canceling student debt enough to appoint a Secretary of
Education willing to employ novel interpretations of existing
law to do so, surely that President would appoint an OMB
director who would cooperate.
2. Tax Implications
The Treasury would also have to cooperate, because
“cancellation of indebtedness” is generally treated as income
for tax purposes, and frequently referred to as “COD
income.”353 If this general principle were applied to
households that benefited from discretionary student debt
relief, it would trade their indebtedness to DOE for
indebtedness to the IRS. The debt would be smaller as an
absolute amount (because it would only be a fraction of the
debt relief granted) but would be due as a lump sum
immediately, without any of the repayment plan or
forbearance options available on student loans. As such, it
would likely make most intended beneficiaries worse off.
Any debt cancellation that originates within the
executive branch—i.e. without Congress explicitly making it
353. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(12) (2018); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T
THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 4681, CANCELED DEBTS, FORECLOSURES,
REPOSSESSIONS, AND ABANDONMENTS (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p4681.pdf.
OF
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such that the cancellation is tax-free—would require
coordination with the Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy and
with the IRS to determine whether and how to ensure
favorable tax treatment. Because the COD principle has
multiple exceptions and an uncertain scope, there could be
several ways to do so, each of which would have distinct
implications for the design of the jubilee.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that there is
no authoritative definition of COD income and its exceptions,
so the IRS has a good deal of leeway in determining its
applicability to any given situation. The Internal Revenue
Code, as Richard C.E. Beck points out, “does not specify what
kinds of obligations are subject to income treatment when
canceled, and it speaks ambiguously of ‘indebtedness’ . . .
without any further limitation at all.”354 For its part, “the
Treasury has never promulgated any regulations in this allimportant area,” instead filling out the law case-by-case
through Revenue Procedures and a smattering of not really
coherent court decisions.355 Neither of Revenue Procedures
or court decisions do much to constrain the IRS’s ability to
determine that a particular cancellation of indebtedness is
non-taxable. Revenue Procedures are not binding on the IRS:
the “rules” they announce can be overruled by future revenue
procedures (without notice and comment) or by regulation.
Court decisions are, of course, binding, but they do not limit
the IRS from adopting interpretations (or regulations) that
result in less tax enforcement, not least since nobody would
challenge such interpretations.
Nevertheless, some patterns have emerged, and the IRS
tends to treat these patterns as if they were binding, with
some flexibility at the joints.356 These patterns are worth

354. Richard C.E. Beck, The Tax Treatment of Cancelled Interest and Penalties
on Consumer Debt, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1025, 1028 (2009).
355. Id.
356. It seems that the main reason the IRS does so is to avoid creating rules
that would be easily gamed by the wealthy to avoid taxes.
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noting as potential grounds the IRS could refer to, but
ultimately it seems the IRS has leeway to refer to multiple
grounds or simply to decline to pursue taxes, whether due to
legal uncertainty or otherwise (After all, who would sue?).
Perhaps the most straightforward approach would be to
apply the general welfare exception to COD income. Under
this exception, government benefits provided to improve
individual and/or social welfare are not includible in gross
income. The principle here is similar as the principle in the
exception of charitable gifts from taxation: an accession to
wealth based on need should not be undermined by the tax
code.357 The test developed by the IRS to determine whether
a government benefit qualifies for the general welfare
exception has three parts. The benefits must “(1) be made
pursuant to a government program, (2) be for the promotion
of general welfare (that is, based on need), and (3) not
represent compensation for services.”358 For a benefit to be
“based on need,” it need not be based on financial need, or to
use policy-speak, “means-tested.” Government benefits for
the blind, for disabled people, for vocational training, for
victims of natural disasters, among others, have been found
to be “based on need” for purposes of qualifying for the
general welfare exception.359 As Senator Elizabeth Warren
pointed out in a letter to the Treasury while it was
determining how to treat cancellations of student debt for
students who qualified for defense-to-repayment discharges,
educational background has been treated as a need-based
category previously.360 Funding for vocational programs has
also been treated as non-taxable, so long as it only includes

357. 26 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018).
358. Rev. Proc. 2014-35, 2014-26 I.R.B. 1110; see also Bailey v. Comm’r, 88 T.C.
1293, 1300 (1987).
359. Rev. Proc. 2014-35 at 4–6; Letter from Senator Elizabeth Warren to Jack
Lew, Sec’y of the Treasury, and John Koskinen, Comm’r of the Internal Revenue
Service 2–3 (Aug. 11, 2015) [hereinafter “Warren Letter”].
360. See Warren Letter, supra note 359, at 3.
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“reasonable expenses.”361 Confusingly, the IRS has treated
Pell Grants as non-taxable to the extent that they fund
education expenses but not room and board, apparently
because it applies the “scholarship exception” rather than
the “general welfare exception.”362
As a general matter, loans are not taxable income, so the
only question is whether turning loans into grants subject to
a discretionary authority to cancel some or all of a repayment
obligation would qualify for the general welfare exception.
Public student loans are “made pursuant to a government
program,” and canceling them would be done according to a
statutory authority created as part of that program. The
loans were provided based on the need for education. That
would seem sufficient to establish need. Cancellation
functionally turns a loan (non-taxable) into a grant
(potentially taxable), so the appropriate question is the
purpose for which the grant was provided. It should also be
of no object whether any of the loan was spent on room and
board, since appropriate funds for room and board have been
found to be part of the general welfare exception in job
training programs, even if not for Pell Grants, and there is
no principled reason to differentiate.
In any case, one could also argue about whether the
cancellation was based on need. With respect to some
debtors, this argument would be straightforward: those who
are facing financial hardships or whose lives are otherwise
made much worse by student debt would benefit from a
program of cancellation. Even those debtors for whom
student debt is relatively less onerous would have that
burden lifted, and would be able, for instance, to pursue
different careers or to get married or buy a house when they
could not before. Either way, neither the initial payment nor

361. Rev. Proc. 2014-35 at 5.
362. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 970,
TAX BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p970.pdf.
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the cancellation would represent compensation for services.
Applying this exception has the advantages that it is well
established, it is flexible enough to cover cancellation of
nearly any breadth (unless one thinks that “need” should be
understood more narrowly), and it, since it is keyed to a
specific government benefit, it cannot easily be used as
precedent for tax avoiders to game the tax system.
The general welfare exception is an exception to any
“accession to wealth.” There are also exceptions specifically
for COD income. The related “disputed debt” and “purchase
price adjustment” doctrines were both created by courts. The
former refers to situations in which a dispute between debtor
and creditor as to the reality, enforceability, or amount of a
debt leads to the creditor accepting less than the original
amount claimed. The latter refers to situations in which a
creditor agrees to accept less than the original amount owed.
As these (hesitantly offered) descriptions suggest, there is
some overlap between these two doctrines and no agreement
as to how they ought to be differentiated.363 The most widely
cited disputed debt cases involve situations where the legal
enforceability of the debt is called into question, but other
authorities (pointing out that a settlement on an
unenforceable debt is actually a loss for the taxpayer) argue
for preserving the term “disputed debt” for factual disputes
as to the existence or amount of the debt. Some authorities
have used purchase price adjustment as the term for cases of
dispute over legal enforceability.
For our purposes, it is more important to know how much
territory the two of them occupy together than how to draw
a boundary between them. What is clear is that, whatever
their label, cases where a downward reduction in amount
owed due to an “infirmity that clearly relates back to the

363. Even more confusingly, there is also a “contingent liability doctrine” that
applies in an overlapping set of cases. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(3)
(1980); Central Paper Co. v. Comm’r, 158 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1946).
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original” transaction are not taxable.364 Nor are cases in
which the reality or amount of the debt is genuinely in
dispute. What is less clear is when debt write-downs or writeoffs that are not attributable to a legal infirmity or genuine
dispute count as non-taxable changes in the price of debt
rather than taxable cancellations of indebtedness. It is
difficult to see how at least write-offs of interest and fees
should not count as price adjustments, but the IRS has
tended to insist that the answer is never or almost never and
some courts have agreed.365 Nothing stops the IRS from
going further, though the further it goes the more the line
between that cancellation and modification of indebtedness
fades.366
Under existing interpretations, the most natural
application to student debt cancellation would be to those
whose student debts were issued under legally questionable
circumstances. Although its Revenue Procedure was not
entirely clear, the former seems to have been the primary
justification the IRS gave for declining to tax the “income”
generated by canceling the debts of (some) defrauded forprofit college students.367 This reasoning might apply to
millions of others, but it would still only apply to a fraction
of debtors and not to any debtors facing hardship who were
not subject to fraud. The purchase price adjustment doctrine
could also apply to write-downs of interest and fees for any
debtor if the IRS modifies its current position on that issue.
Of course, broader interpretations would enable broader
applicability.
364. Rev. Rul. 92-99, 1992-46 I.R.B. 5; Sherman; Zarin.
365. See Beck, supra note 354, at 1033–37.
366. Professor Beck points out that adjustments of the price of services
(including educational services) are not treated in the Tax Code’s purchase price
adjustment provision, and there are even stronger reasons to treat such
adjustments as non-taxable adjustments (the equivalent of cash-back bargains)
rather than COD income, since when one receives a service one does not obtain
an asset that might be re-sold to obtain liquid assets that could be used to pay a
tax. See id.
367. Rev. Proc. 2015-57, 2015-51 I.R.B. 863.
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A potentially broader but less well-established exception
might be called the “avoidance of loss doctrine.” As Beck puts
it, “although the case law is sparse, it seems agreed . . . that
canceled debts do not give rise to income if they were
originally incurred without loan proceeds—for example such
obligations as fines and penalties, tort judgments, alimony,
child support, taxes, or pledges to make a gift to charity.”368
Although cancellation of such debts does free assets in the
sense that has gained freedom in how to use one’s existing
assets, it does not result in an “accession to wealth.” When
such debts were incurred, they did not increase assets but
rather imposed a legal obligation that, if complied with,
would reduce one’s assets. Cancellation of these debts thus
does not result in a gain but an avoidance of a loss. Moreover,
as will become more important in a moment, cancellation of
such debts does not increase the assets with which a
taxpayer might pay a tax. Collection of such taxes thus does
not comply with horizontal equity and, in practice, might
turn out to be more trouble than it is worth.
Courts have been uneven in the application of this
doctrine, but it has been applied in at least some contexts
and could be picked up on by the IRS. There are at least two
arguments that it could be applied to student debt
cancellation. The first would apply to debts incurred as a
result of the government’s payments to third parties
(colleges, bookstores, etc.) rather than as the result of a
disbursement of cash to the borrower. The reasoning here
would be that the debtor did not actually receive loan
proceeds, but rather received a benefit that came with an
obligation to repay—effectively a 100% tax, payable in
installments with interest. Cancellation of this obligation—
effectively transforming it into a government grant—avoids
the loss that would have come with paying that tax. A
broader application would be to any student debt, used for
368. Beck, supra note 354, at 1029 (citing Comm’r v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F.2d
751 (2d Cir. 1932); Eagle Asbestos & Packing Co. v. United States, 348 F.2d 528,
531 (Ct. Cl. 1965)).
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any purpose. The reasoning would be that whether the
debtor received loan proceeds (i.e. cash) or not does not
matter, since the cancellation of the obligation to repay
effectively switches the program from a grant with a 100%
tax to an unconditional grant. The debtor avoids loss that
would have come with the tax but does not (necessarily) gain
any assets that could be used to pay a tax.
This last argument shades into the more radical, and
more rational, approach suggested by Beck: only tax COD
income for individuals when it results in a “realization of
gain,” i.e. an increase in liquidity with which a tax obligation
could actually be paid. The theoretical reason for doing so
would be that the tax code generally only treats realized
gains as taxable. Appreciation of an asset is only taxed when
the asset is sold, and receipt of valuable opportunities that
are not themselves fungible assets (such as an introduction
to a wealthy friend or a job offer) are not taxable unless and
until they result in a gain in assets. Also, treating unrealized
gains results in violations of horizontal equity when, for
instance, a gratuitous cash refund is not taxed but a
gratuitous purchase price adjustment via cancellation of
indebtedness is. On a practical level, imposing a tax on a
theoretical “freeing of assets” through dis-encumbrance
when the taxpayer has not actually gained any assets that
could be used to pay the tax (or even sold to gain the liquidity
necessary to pay the tax) results in situations in which a tax
might not actually be payable, leaving the IRS to expend
more on the cost of pursuing a taxpayer than it would
actually receive in taxes. In fact, it turns out that this was
the approach prior to the IRS’s overreading of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kirby Lumber. Kirby Lumber itself
involved a situation in which cancellation of indebtedness
resulted in a realization of gain, but the IRS used that
decision to justify taxation of a broader and broader swath of
COD income. Courts and tax lawyers have gone along, but
only at the expense of creating a series of not fully thought
through exceptions that overlap with each other in confusing
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ways.
To the extent the IRS would be interested in more
broadly reconsidering its approach to COD income in this
way, it would have no trouble classifying cancellation of
student debt as non-taxable. Such cancellation, after all,
results in no realized gain, only an avoidance of loss.
The IRS need not even choose between the above options.
It can declare that it will not treat cancellation of student
debt as taxable income (and not require the submission of
1099s) by vaguely gesturing at the variety of reasons
adduced in the foregoing. This was the approach the IRS took
when it decided not to treat as taxable the cancellation of the
student debts of debtors who were fraudulently induced to
take on such debts. It reasoned as follows:
The Treasury Department and the IRS believe that most borrowers
whose Corinthian student loans are discharged under the Defense
to Repayment discharge process would be able to exclude from gross
income all or substantially all of the discharged amounts based on
fraudulent misrepresentations made by the colleges to the students,
the insolvency exclusion, or another tax law authority. However,
determining whether one or more of these exceptions is available to
each affected borrower would require a fact intensive analysis of the
particular borrower’s situation to determine the extent to which the
discharged amount is eligible for exclusion under each of the
potentially available exceptions. The Treasury Department and the
IRS are concerned that such an analysis would impose a compliance
burden on taxpayers, as well as an administrative burden on the
IRS, that is excessive in relation to the amount of taxable income
that would result. Accordingly, the IRS will not assert that a
taxpayer within the scope of this revenue procedure recognizes
gross income as a result of the Defense to Repayment discharge
process.369

Similarly, the IRS could cite the above doctrines, note
the probability that at least the great majority of borrowers
would not have taxable income, cite the compliance cost, and
simply declare that it will not replace a debt with a tax
obligation.

369. Rev. Proc. 2015-57 at 4.
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CONCLUSION
The last Part of this Article argues that the law is no
impediment to canceling student debt. The first Part argues
that doing so would be a great benefit to millions of people,
directly and indirectly. But there is something of a
disconnect between these parts. Many of the most important
benefits of student debt cancellation—those pertaining to the
structural reform of the political economy of higher
education—could not be realized merely through an
Executive Branch jubilee. That is because such a jubilee
could not be paired with a program to prevent future student
debt from accumulating.
So it may be. But debt cancellation now does not preclude
more reforms later. Jubilees can create fresh starts in more
ways than one.

